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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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United States & Canada

Chief of General Staff Moiseyev To Visit Canada

LD1005084891 Moscow TASS in English 0832 GMT 10 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—General of the Army Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, left for Canada today.

"Cardinal changes in East-West relationships inspire hope that the process of advance to a new world order may become irreversible," General Moiseyev told TASS before departure.

The Soviet Union consistently implements an extensive programme of military transformations so as to bring "all the components of the defence potential of the state into line with the new military doctrine and its principle of defence sufficiency", Moiseyev said.

He mentioned some practical steps taken by the USSR within the framework of the current military reform. "In 1989-90 alone, we completed the fulfilment of our obligation to unilaterally reduce the Armed Forces by 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 820 combat aircraft", the general pointed out.

Speaking about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Eastern Europe, he said that 85 per cent of troops had been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary by May 10. Troops will be completely withdrawn from there, as was planned, by June 30, 1991, he added.

"By the end of 1993 we shall withdraw troops from Poland and finalise the troop withdrawal from Germany a year after that. There will be no Soviet soldiers on the territories of other countries by the end of 1994," Moiseyev said.

The above-mentioned steps, the general emphasised, confirm once again that practical measures to implement the Soviet military doctrine are not a "declaration of intent" but a firm and consistent policy of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the NATO leadership, judging by everything, does not intend to substantially reconsider the objectives and character of the military and political alliance and tries to keep the bloc's political and military structures and, to a certain extent, to expand them beyond the "zone of its responsibility", Moiseyev noted.

"Closer cooperation in the military field is essential" on the threshold of the twenty-first century when the world enters a new period of development characterised by growing interdependence of countries, the Soviet general said.

"I am convinced that all the necessary prerequisites exist now for Soviet-Canadian military cooperation to develop, acquiring dynamics adequate to the requirements of our times. The forthcoming visit, I hope, will serve this goal," General Moiseyev said.

IZVESTIYA on Topaz Reactor Imbroglio

91UF0724A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by S. Leskov: "The Adventures of a Soviet Reactor in America"]

[Text] **A few days ago IZVESTIYA (No. 96, 1991) reported that the Soviet Topaz-2 nuclear reactor model, which had been exhibited at the international fair in Albuquerque, had been prohibited from being taken out of the United States. The situation is, by all counts, extraordinary. We already reported on the U.S. side's reaction. What is our specialists' opinion of the events?**

"During the last few months, there were political games played around Topaz-2—by both sides," N. Ponomarev-Sedoy, first deputy director of the Kurchatov Nuclear Power Institute, expressed his view on the incident. "The victims of such games are both the business and specific people. As before—when a Soviet reactor caused a burst of attention by its alleged potential for use in the SDI program—I do not see any reasons to sound alarms."

Could it be that while Topaz-2 is forcibly detained on the other side of the ocean the Americans will pry out some design secrets? N. Ponomarev-Sedoy assured us that the reactor is in a container sealed by our specialists. In general, N. Ponomarev-Sedoy believes there is no need to rush Topaz-2's return home. The reactor is currently being exhibited at various international fairs. At the same time, there are no resources or appropriate buildings at home to store such a unit properly. Nevertheless, if the issue of the unit's return to the USSR is not resolved in a positive manner, we are not going to leave this "gift" to the United States—the reactor will simply be destroyed.

Still, it is necessary to draw some lessons from the events. One may throw a stone at the American bureaucracy that slapped a veto on the export of nuclear devices, even on their way home. American nuclear scientists are now saying with a guilty feeling that their bureaucracy turned out to be no better than our Soviet one. But it will not do us any good to discuss the merits of someone else's bureaucracy. If we are serious about cooperation with the United States, it would not hurt to learn some of the laws of that country, especially 40-year-old ones. However, it did not occur to anybody to figure out foreign laws. Our delegation in Albuquerque learned about potential problems with the reactor's return only in January, after the unit had already been delivered to the United States.

Alarmed dispatches from across the ocean about the reactor's "arrest" did not turn out to be news for our specialists. What did they hope for? We received a guarantee in January—verbally—that the lawyers will find a loophole in American legislation that will allow this paradoxical situation to be resolved. But time goes on, and a loophole has not been found. Just recently, representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission visited Moscow. In their opinion, there is only one chance left: to bring the question up at the highest political level, and to ask the administration for a one-time permit to export the unit back to the USSR.

And, perhaps, the most important point: Will not all these troubles influence the Americans' intentions to buy the Soviet reactor? This is not something we are indifferent to—the approximate value of the contract is $10 million, which would come in very handy in the situation where budget financing for work in this prospective area has been cut. Currently, a version of the contract signed by the American side has been passed to Moscow. By the way, the contract stipulates the return of the industrial prototype to the USSR. But if such legal possibilities were there from the beginning, it is hard to understand why they were not used to export an exhibition model?

One way or the other, after the necessary clarifications were made, even the strictest Soviet authorities approved the contract. The delay is in the Ministry of Defense. Many years ago this department cut the financing for Topaz and lost all interest in it. Now they propose—as is typical here—to create a commission: Such a process can go on for years. It should be emphasized that authoritative specialists in both the United States and the USSR believe in principle, based on its technical characteristics, that Topaz-2 cannot be used for the SDI program—if for no other reason, then because the unit's technology is on the level of 15 years ago. Besides, the contract for the purchase of the reactor stipulates firm guarantees on the part of the American side that the unit will not be used for military purposes. Another point is that, according to the contract, the reactor's "know-how" is not to be violated—the unit cannot be dismantled.

Still, it is hard to say whose bureaucracy is worse. Research in space nuclear reactors, deprived of domestic financing and financial support from abroad, is facing a sad fate. Scientists in the Nuclear Power Institute involved in the Topaz project are already experiencing financial difficulties, such as meeting the payroll. And this is in one of the rare areas where we hold an advantage—space nuclear devices.

Northeast Asia

Commentary on TOKYO SHIMBUN Summit Poll

OW1005082291 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1100 GMT 9 May 91

[Oleg Alekseyev commentary]

[Text] Public opinion in Japan is increasingly inclined to positively consider developing trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union, separate from the territorial issue. This was indicated by the interesting data gathered by the TOKYO SHIMBUN in an opinion poll on President Gorbachev's Japan visit. According to the survey, many readers are in favor of a major expansion of economic cooperation with the USSR at the current stage. More than 30 percent of the employees of the major Japanese companies surveyed by TOKYO SHIMBUN are of this opinion. They would like to see substantial contracts signed on joint development of natural resources in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. In this connection, Radio Moscow's commentator, Oleg Alekseyev wrote the following comments:

The results show a great change in Japanese sentiments after President Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April. As you all know, before the visit, the idea that, without the return of the four Southern Kurile Islands, currently under Soviet administrative jurisdiction, not only large-scale contracts, but also small-scale cooperation would be impossible, had been firmly rooted in the Japanese mind for a long time. Thus, before the Soviet-Japanese summit talks, only 14 or 15 percent of Japanese would accept wide-ranging cooperation in various fields without the resolution of the territorial issue. However, this number has increased remarkably, as evidenced by the results of the TOKYO SHIMBUN poll. Why? Perhaps because the USSR dealt with the question of the Kuril Islands seriously during the summit talks, and its efforts to seek a solution compatible with the interests of both parties have convinced the Japanese side. Total agreement has also been reached on the understanding that the question of national boundaries will be the most important element in a future peace treaty, which will be the final postwar settlement. In other words, both the Soviet and Japanese governments firmly believe that a strong foundation for fruitful dialogue has been built. This was the decisive factor which brought about the atmosphere of Soviet-Japanese partnership during President Gorbachev's visit. This atmosphere has undoubtedly influenced public opinion and sentiments in the industrial sector.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

IZVESTIYA Reports Pavlov, Do Muoi Meeting

PM0905123191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Soviet-Vietnamese Talks"]

[Text] On 7 May a meeting took place in the Kremlin between USSR Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov and Do Muoi, chairman of the SRV Council of Ministers, who is in our country on a working visit.

The heads of government of the two countries held an in-depth discussion of the state and prospects of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in various fields. They noted the positive advances which have taken place recently in enhancing the effectiveness of trade and economic ties and transferring economic relations to a balanced mutually advantageous basis. There was a discussion of measures to ensure the implementation of intergovernment agreements on trade and economic cooperation in 1991 and to increase mutual deliveries of goods.

Agreements were reached on accelerating work to form an effective mechanism of trade and economic cooperation close to world market conditions.

The common opinion was voiced that under the conditions of the transformations which are being carried out in the USSR and the SRV together with the conservation of economic collaboration at intergovernment level increasing importance attaches to the expansion of cooperation on the basis of direct ties and economic collaboration between individual republics and regions, enterprises, firms, and associations and also to the activity of joint ventures.

There was a discussion of fundamental questions of settling Vietnam's debts to the Soviet Union and extinguishing them with deliveries of goods necessary to the USSR.

The sides were united in the opinion that Soviet-Vietnamese economic collaboration has big prospects.

V.S. Pavlov noted that the Soviet Union is in solidarity with the constructive steps of Vietnam and the Indochinese countries aimed at the speediest settlement of the conflict situation around Cambodia.

In the sides' opinion, the improvement of the political climate in the Asian and Pacific region would be assisted by the speediest normalization of Vietnamese-Chinese and Vietnamese-U.S. relations.

Commentary on Strengthening Ties With SRV

BK1005102391 Moscow International Service in Vietnamese 1300 GMT 8 May 91

[Station commentary]

[Text] Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation covers almost all state activities. Of course, there are problems in this multifaceted cooperation, given the current implementation of the restructuring in the Soviet Union and renovation in Vietnam. Vietnam's debt payments to the Soviet Union and the bilateral trade are yet additional bilateral problems.

It is necessary to mention here that payments between the two nations are made in foreign currencies at world market values. The visiting Vietnamese guest is, of course, discussing with the Soviet leaders this issue and other pressing ones. However, the main topic of their discussion is not aimed only at resolving these pressing issues but also at consolidating cooperation and establishing new relations. During Mr. Do Muoi's meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev, the two sides did assert this point.

In the recent past, while implementing the traditional cooperation, the Soviet Union and Vietnam have expanded direct contacts between organizations and enterprises, set up joint venture corporations, and developed the specialized production of scarce goods. These forms of cooperation have enhanced mutual interests for both sides.

I think that we should also pay attention to the implementation of the renovation in Vietnam during the past four years, which has begun to bear fruit. It is obvious that Vietnam is getting rid of its economic crisis thanks to the active, rational coordination among the private sector, the people, and state-run business establishments. The fact that Vietnam, which faced a rice shortage two years ago, can now export rice is eloquent proof of its success. The production of consumer goods in the country has also improved.

In Moscow, the distinguished Vietnamese guest also exchanged experiences in implementing the renovation cause with the Soviet leaders. They also discussed political and international developments, including the situation in Southeast Asia and the Cambodian issue.

The current talks between Vietnamese and Soviet leaders in Moscow conform with the new cooperation concept advocated by the two countries. Moscow and Hanoi are intended to strengthen their relations on the basis of realities, attitude of goodwill, and mutual interests.

Near East & South Asia

Bessmertnykh Arrives in Jordan for Talks

Meets With Al-Masri

LD0905105891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1010 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] Amman, 9 May (TASS)—Jordan can play a very constructive and decisive role in a Middle East settlement since it occupies a special position in the region and is a country where the problems and interests of various sides intersect, stated Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, who arrived in Amman from Damascus today on a short working visit. I am sure that conversations with Jordanian representatives will help to push forward the process of convening a peace conference, he noted.

The Soviet minister positively appraised the efforts of James Baker, U.S. secretary of state, in the matter of activating the peace process in the region.

Talks began today in the Jordanian capital between A.A. Bessmertnykh and Tahir al-Masri, Jordanian minister of foreign affairs. On the agenda are a complex of problems connected with a Middle East settlement and discussion of a mechanism for holding a peace conference on the Middle East.

Briefs Press With King Husayn

LD0905175591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1619 GMT 9 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Gennadiy Marunin, Georgiy Shmelev, and Anatoliy Kerzhentsev]

[Text] Amman, 9 May (TASS)—King Husayn of Jordan expressed deep satisfaction at the talks with A.A. Bessmertnykh, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, which took place today. "They were serious and intensive talks on the possibilities of guaranteeing a just and universal peace in the region," the head of the Jordanian state said at a short news conference in the royal palace.

During the talks, the question of convening a peace conference on the Near East was discussed, the monarch continued. In his words, favorable opportunities have arisen for that now. However, he pointed out, a number of problems, in particular, regarding who will take part in it and the place and time of its convocation, are to be resolved yet.

In his turn, the head of the Soviet foreign policy department noted that a wide range of questions touching upon the general situation in the region, a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian Problem, and also the development of Soviet-Jordanian relations was discussed at the talks in Jordan. "The conversation was rich in content and specific," the minister stressed. A.A. Bessmertnykh pointed to the "key role" of Jordan in a Near East settlement since it occupies a particular place "at the crossroads of interests of the various sides in the region."

"The talks revealed the coincidence and proximity of the sides' approaches in the main elements of holding a peace conference on the Near East which is being elaborated just now. The exchange of opinions with King Husayn and also with Foreign Minister Tahir al- Masri was very useful," the Soviet minister said.

Praises Baker's Efforts

LD0905165591 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] Amman May 9 TASS—Jordan can play a very constructive and crucial role in the Middle East settlement due to its special position in the region and being at the intersection of problems and interests of various countries, Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said today.

Bessmertnykh arrived in Amman on a brief working visit from Damascus today.

"I'm sure that discussions with the Jordanian leadership will help speed up the convocation of a peace conference," he said.

Replying to journalists' questions, Bessmertnykh remarked that "the mission of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East is to help parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to launch a peace process in order to resolve contentious issues by themselves."

Bessmertnykh positively assessed the Soviet-American joint efforts to resolve Middle East problems. "We have been engaged in this effort since January this year after we released jointly with Secretary of State James Baker a statement on the Middle East settlement," he said.

"Intensive cooperation has been under way ever since. The USSR and the United States can contribute to helping the parties involved in the Middle East conflict organise peace talks," Bessmertnykh said.

"I would like to stress the personal role played by the U.S. Secretary of state who has already visited the Middle East three times," Bessmertnykh remarked, adding, "this is my first trip to this region."

The Soviet minister did not rule out a meeting with PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat. In his opinion, there are no political problems in the way of talks with the Palestinian leadership. There are only technical difficulties, he said.

Asked about the possible restoration of diplomatic ties between the USSR and Israel, Bessmertnykh replied, "We will not accept any terms, the less so preconditions, regarding our participation in the Middle East peace process.

"Our role in this process is sufficiently natural. We have already expressed our opposition to linking these two issues. I mean the USSR's role and the restoration of Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations. These relations can be restored when necessary conditions for that emerge."

Bessmertnykh began talks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri today. On the agenda are issues of the Middle East settlement and the discussion of the mechanism for convening a peace conference on the Middle East.

Comments on Visit

LD0905201891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 9 May 91

[Report by correspondent V. Lyubovtsev in Amman; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Lyubovtsev] Jordan is the second country on the route of Aleksandr Bessmertnykh's Near East trip. Amman, the capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, greeted the USSR minister of foreign affairs with honor.

Among the questions discussed today in Amman, both at the meeting of the two ministers of foreign affairs, Bessmertnykh and al-Masri, and in the conversation with King Husayn of Jordan, were the approaches to the start of the negotiation process and the joint efforts for a way out of the impasse of regional quarrels, hostility, and mutual distrust.

On completion of the talks, the participants made a statement for the media. King Husayn expressed deep satisfaction at the conversation that had taken place. He noted the proximity and similarity of the positions of both sides on the key problems of the region and highly evaluated the consistent and peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union in the Near East.

Then Aleksandr Bessmertnykh answered journalists' questions. I asked: Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, how have your talks here in Amman been during the second stage of your Near East trip?

[Begin Bessmertnkyh recording] I think that the talks that took place in Amman with the King of Jordan and the minister of foreign affairs are an exceptionally important part of our trip to the Near East. From the very outset it was thought that it made sense to carry out an exchange of opinions with the leadership of Jordan and Syria in order to gain a deeper understanding of the problems facing the region and to sound out the opportunities for finding the ways for a settlement that are acceptable to all sides, to all peoples of this region. [end recording]

Departs Jordan for Israel

LD1005083791 Moscow TASS in English 0816 GMT 10 May 91

[Text] Amman May 10 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh completed his talks in Amman and left by air for Israel this morning.

While in Jordan, he held talks with King Husayn and Jordanian Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri, discussed ways and means to stimulate the Middle East peace process, the convocation of a conference to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and the development of bilateral relations.

King Husayn expressed deep satisfaction with the talks held while Bessmertnykh described the discussion in Amman as "constructive and substantive."

In Israel, the Soviet foreign minister will meet Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and Foreign Minister David Levi.

Nishanov Delegation Talks With Libyan Official

LD0905173391 Moscow TASS in English 1724 GMT 9 May 91

[By Vyacheslav Anchikov]

[Text] Tripoli May 9 TASS— A visiting Soviet parliamentary delegation, led by Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR parliament, today met with deputy general secretary of Libya's General People's Congress Mahmoud al-Hfeifi.

Al-Hfeifi described the system of direct popular power in Libya and the structure and activity of primary people's assemblies. The sides discussed issues of Soviet-Libyan relations and Soviet-Arab cooperation.

Al-Hfeifi said that Libya was following with great interest developments in the Soviet Union, stressing that his country always viewed the USSR as its reliable friend.

He expressed confidence that relations between the two countries will continue to develop successfully for the benefit of the Libyan and Soviet peoples.

Nishanov informed Libyan officials about changes in the Soviet Union, described the activity of the supreme body of legislative authority in the country and reaffirmed the earlier invitation for a libyan parliamentary delegation to visit the USSR.

Both sides favoured the development and consolidation of ties between the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the General People's Congress of Libya.

Israeli Consulate Issues Victory Day Statement

LD0905132691 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] The press service of the General Consulate of Israel in Moscow has spread a statement in connection with the holiday of 9 May Victory Day over Nazi Germany: For the Jewish people who have lost at the hands of the Nazis one-third of their sons and daughters, this day is the symbol of triumph of good over evil and of the inexhaustible heroism of all those who won the victory, says the statement. In Israel there live a lot of people who took part in the war against Hitlerite Germany. They fought in the allied armies. Among them are many former soldiers of the Soviet Army, including four Heroes of the Soviet Union. For many Israelis, there lives on a memory and gratitude to the officers and men of the Red Army who liberated them from the horrors of the extermination camps.

Article Lists Proposals To Curb Iraqi 'Threat'

91UF0728A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 8 May 91 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Legal Sciences G. Nikerov: "What Should Iraq Become?"]

[Text] *How soon the lessons of history are forgotten. In 1945 the allied troops entered Germany and liquidated the Nazi regime there that was threatening all mankind. Not long before that they had done the same with fascist Italy, and soon after, with militarist Japan.*

These were all totalitarian states, and, moreover, aggressive; in contrast, for example, to the nonaggressive regimes in Spain, Portugal, and other countries that were thus less dangerous to mankind. If at one time Trotskiy had been head of state instead of Stalin it is possible that we also would have been an aggressive totalitarian state.

Iraq can undoubtedly be classified as a totalitarian state. In 1979 its leader, Saddam Husayn, gathered all power into his own hands. He is both the state leader and the party leader in the country. He is head of the Revolutionary Command Council—the highest organ of power—and also of the government. He is the president of the state, the supreme commander in chief, and the general secretary of the only legal party—the Ba'th Party.

Fascism existed in Germany for just over 12 years. Totalitarianism in Iraq has been imposed gradually, both before and since the overthrow of the king, Nuri al-Sa'id [name and title as published], in 1958. "Purging" Iraq of those who thought differently has now being going on for many decades. The communists have been destroyed, along with the Kurds, objectionable functionaries in the Ba'th Party itself, and all others who hampered the creation of the monolithic state.

All of this would be repulsive enough even if S. Husayn had busied himself only with his domestic affairs, but he tried to foist his ideas on the rest of the world! Events have shown that he was nurturing plans to combine under his own power the entire Arab world, perhaps the entire Muslim world. To that end an enormous army was created and the entire country was militarized. In 1980 Iraq unleashed war against Iran, and during the course of that war about 1 million people died. Then it was the turn of Kuwait, which was pillaged and laid waste.

As a result we have before us an exceptionally aggressive totalitarian state that represents a danger to the entire world. And we created it—both the West and the East. The West because of the profit it wanted from delivering military output from private companies. The East—and first and foremost our country—because it was guided mainly by ideological considerations. It was necessary to give aid to those developing countries whose leadership made use of demagogic socialist phraseology. Both the West and the East tried to tie Iraq to themselves to use it as a counterweight, in particular to Islamic Iran. Iraq was even being given aid when, after it had invaded Iran, the essentially aggressive nature of Saddam's regime became obvious. The sobering up came for many of our politicians, but unfortunately not all, in August last year when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Did the Americans and their allies act correctly in taking the war beyond the borders of Kuwait into the territory of Iraq itself? I think that they did. It was impossible to free Kuwait without inflicting a decisive defeat on the army of a maniac who would in no way make any concessions. Did they exceed the Security Council mandate? That is a very controversial question. Probably not. They acted within the framework of the UN Charter, which makes provision for the possibility of collective defense against aggression.

How do we see postwar Iraq? What should be our policy toward it?

A democratic and peace-loving state should replace the totalitarian state. Only if this happens will the threat to its neighbors and to the people themselves be eliminated. But what must be done to achieve this?

In my opinion, it is first of all necessary to make sharp cutbacks in the army—the regime's main support. Even the developed countries are able to build up, arm, and maintain only the kind of armed forces whose numerical strength usually does not exceed one percent of the population. In peacetime a huge army is created in a totalitarian state first to establish rigid control over its own people, and second, to implement aggressive plans and impose its order on the rest of the world.

Taking into account the size of the country and the numerical strength of its population, the Iraqi armed forces should number 100,000 maximum. They should not possess any offensive weapons. If they have them, biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons should be destroyed. It is necessary to establish firm international control over the numerical strength of the army and its weapons. In order to exclude any pressure on an Iraq now weakened in this way it is necessary to create a regional system of security. Iraq is undoubtedly obligated to pay compensation, using all its own assets (in oil, gold, currency deposits and so forth), for all the damage done in Kuwait and other countries.

Our country should continue to cooperate in matters relating to a postwar settlement with the United States and other countries. This cooperation has shown its exceptional effectiveness in the matter of eliminating the threat posed by Iraq to international peace and security.

Let us remember the lessons of history.

Middle East Security Efforts Assessed

91UF0715A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel R. Mustafin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA international observer: "The Near East After Desert Storm"]

[Text] With the end of the war in the Persian Gulf the Near East, with the package of its chronic problems, is once again moving into a leading position on the international agenda. World public opinion is once again focused on the events in the region, a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a solution of the Palestinian problem. True, the question is now being posed considerably more broadly than prior to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the subsequent war. Many politicians are speaking of the need for a comprehensive solution of the

Near East problems and the creation of a new international order in the region. The basis of such an order is to be a system of regional security together with the democratization of the Arab states, a fairer redistribution of wealth, and the restoration of the areas ravaged by the war.

There is no particular need, I believe, to speak of the long- urgent necessity for such changes in the region. It is obvious. Also obvious is the need for the creation of a regional security system which, in my view, might incorporate several key elements:

1. A mechanism of a Near East settlement oriented toward an easing of the contradictions derived from the Arab-Israeli conflict and a solution of the Palestinian question.

2. A system of regional security proper in the Near and Middle East.

3. A system of control of the proliferation of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

4. An economic regional cooperation association.

Various versions of the creation of a regional security system may be encountered in reports of the mass media. This is understandable. The approaches of many countries to the problem differ from one another considerably.

Take, for example, the United States. As might have been expected, it is endeavoring to perform the main role in the formation of the new order in the Near East. And is doing so as a matter of urgency, what is more, reluctant to let go of the initiative gained thanks to the military victory in the Gulf. Also evidence of this is, to speak plainly, the assertiveness, unprecedented since the 1970's, of the American foreign policy department in the Near East. U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker has made three trips to the region in six weeks.

The efforts of the United States are geared to the convening of a conference which would help the organization of direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Baker declared at a news conference in Cairo.

The plan proposed by the United States essentially reflects the traditional U.S.-Israeli approach based on direct negotiations. True, in the present version the idea of these negotiations is being served up under the cover of a regional conference. It is planned holding it in two stages.

Initially the parties would embark on the discussion and settlement of the disagreements which exist between them and would then switch to a discussion of such problems as water supply, economic development, and arms control. At the first stage Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians would take part in the negotiations. At the second stage they could be joined by European states and Saudi Arabia. It is planned to hold the conference under the sponsorship of the United States and with the participation of the USSR. One notices that under its umbrella Israel intends to conduct direct negotiations with its Arab neighbors. In other words, it is a question of a resuscitation of Camp David.

In proposing the second stage the United States thereby intends to bring its version close to the current proposal of a number of European countries, including the USSR, concerning the organization of an international Near East conference.

This idea has been received quite guardedly in almost all Arab capitals except Cairo. Saudi Arabia has refused to take part in a regional conference, believing that only Israel's closest neighbors should negotiate at it. The king of Jordan has gotten away with a few vague words. The conference is opposed also by the Palestine Liberation Organization, although it did sanction a meeting with J. Baker of a delegation of prominent Palestinian figures from the occupied territories.

But the biggest obstacle in the way of the convening of a conference has been the position of Israel. While having agreed to it in principle, Tel Aviv categorically objects to the participation of the PLO or other Palestinians connected with this organization and also representatives of East Jerusalem, which Israel considers its territory. In addition, it is not yet clear whether Israel is prepared to consent to the European states' participation in a conference.

So there has been no big breakthrough in a settlement of the Near East conflict. Nonetheless, there has, in my view, been a certain positive result. The meetings which the U.S. secretary of state has held in the Near East have shown clearly that both the Arabs and the Israelis have "matured" to the point of finally sitting down at the negotiating table and commencing a discussion about peace.

The idea of a regional conference and direct negotiations may be viewed variously. Considering the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations in 1977-1979 and with regard for the present realities of international life, the possibility of the organization of a regional conference should hardly be dismissed out of hand. The more so if, for all that, it can be diverted into the channel of an international conference, which would seem far more preferable. In any event, not a single opportunity to move forward should be let slip. I believe that we have the right to expect in the very near future more assertive Soviet foreign policy activity in this region. After all, our place in the region will depend on how specific and effective the role of the Soviet Union in a settlement of the Near East conflict proves.

USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh declared on the eve of the latest working meeting with his American colleague in Kislovodsk, incidentally, that he intended to visit a number of Near East countries in the first half of May and negotiate on a whole set of questions of a settlement, which, in his opinion, will be a "stage-by-stage process." In the first phase, a "regional" or "regional peace" conference—its name has not been determined. There would then be negotiations with the Palestinians, and as a logical finale, the convening of a broad international Near East conference.

As far as the United States is concerned, it might appear at first sight that Washington has suddenly taken up Arab positions. The Israelis have, at any rate, begun to complain about the severe pressure on the part of Washington. This is not the case. The White House has in this case displayed a more balanced approach. This is linked with many factors, including a reluctance to lose, if not friends, at least temporary companions among the Arabs and a considerable easing of the pressure on the U.S. Administration on the part of the powerful Jewish lobby, which has refused to support the diehard position of Israeli Premier Y. Shamir.

The United States' strategic aims, however, remain the same. The newspapers recently reported that Washington is studying plans to sell five Persian Gulf countries large arms consignments totaling $18 billion. It is about to supply Egypt with 46 F-16 aircraft for a further $1.6 billion. And this, it is to be assumed, will lead not only to a new spiraling of the arms race in the region, which is overloaded with weapons as it is, but also to the entrenchment of the U.S. military presence in the Near and Middle East. The more so in that, when speaking of a regional security system, the United States assigns considerable space to a "cooperative force" of the Arabs, which it envisages most under the sponsorship of the American Central Command.

This is where we might be able to dot the "i." But there is one further important point inasmuch as it has come to be a question of a system of regional security. This system will hardly be complete without the participation in it of Iraq. This is recognized by many politicians in the West also. Iraq represents an important component in a balance of forces in the region, and it cannot be disregarded.

A future regional security system will largely depend on a solution of the Kurdish problem also. Unless it is solved, there will be no stability in the region. What is being done currently to assist the Kurds—the creation of a security zone, food delivery and distribution, and the construction of camps for them—are undoubtedly necessary, but manifestly inadequate measures. They are merely of a temporary nature. Even if Baghdad fulfills its promises, grants the Kurds broader autonomy in northern Iraq and hands over Kirkuk as the "capital" of Iraqi Kurdistan, this would still not solve the problem. Cardinal solutions are needed, and the more active involvement in this problem of the world community is essential.

East Europe

Parallels Between Yugoslav, Soviet Troubles Seen

PM0905134991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 May 91 First Edition p 5

[IAN correspondents A. Baturin and S. Gryzunov report: "SFRY: Bloody Civil Strife"]

[Excerpts] Belgrade—The past few days' events in Yugoslavia are painfully reminiscent of our Soviet reality. We have already grown accustomed to reports of combat actions in Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. And casualty figures have long been a familiar statistic, IAN correspondents in Belgrade report for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. [passage omitted]

In the prevailing situation, which Croatian President Tudjman has called the beginning of "open confrontation," the central authorities and the supreme leadership of Yugoslavia—the SFRY Presidency and the Federal Executive Council (government)—have proved powerless, once more becoming the target of acute criticism from all sides. Time has moved on and yet the supreme echelons of power, internally split, are still conducting protracted negotiations on the country's future state organization. The past five "summit" meetings of the Yugoslav republic's leaders did not achieve the desired consensus.

The only force which today has managed to prevent the escalation of violence and bloodshed is the Yugoslav People's Army, which is called upon in all crisis situations. However, by no means everyone reacts in the same way to the army's presence. For example, Slovenia has officially stated that it intends to recall its citizens who are doing fixed-term service in the Yugoslav People's Army. The Slovene Government wants nothing to do with "antidemocratic actions directed against Croatia and the Croatian people."

Contrary to a ban imposed by the Yugoslav People's Army, the Croatian leadership itself has announced the mobilization of the republic's Interior Ministry reserves.

Thus there are now three forces confronting one another: The Croatians, the Serbs, and the Yugoslav People's Army, which at present is adopting a neutral stance. A stalemate. On the one hand, the solution of the general crisis in the country and Yugoslavia's future depend very much on the largest republics—Serbia and Croatia—and their desire to find a common language between themselves. On the other hand, the question of demarcation and of defining precise boundaries has already been raised, but this in itself is an impossibility because there are a large number of Serbs living on Croatian territory and vice versa. If it comes to a split, and people are already talking about that openly, civil war and bloodshed are inevitable. [Passage omitted]

The signs are that May will be a hot month in Yugoslavia. Spring, which began with democratic actions by the public in Belgrade in March, threatens to end with large-scale interethnic clashes.

Yugoslavia, where until recently we gladly borrowed experience of economic management, enterprise, and dealings with the West, is now copying our experience of resolving interethnic conflicts, which can hardly be called positive.

Search for New Polish Defense Doctrine Viewed

PM0905111691 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Senior Lieutenant S. Yegorov article: "Poland: Looking for a New Defense Concept"]

[Text] Until recently it was considered axiomatic in Poland that the country's security could only be ensured in alliance with the USSR. Today a different model is being adopted as the basis of that country's new military doctrine.

According to the original plans, after freeing itself of its "obligations to its eastern neighbor," Poland intended to pursue a policy of nonalignment with any military alliance. In order to realize this concept it was planned to carry out a reorganization and partial redeployment of the Polish Army. The new armed forces were to ensure the country's defense against "attack from west or east." It was also planned to set up a supreme commander's reserve consisting of several mechanized and airborne assault brigades and two fighter aircraft regiments.

However, after scrupulous calculations it emerged that "defense on all fronts" will for a number of years remain "beyond the capacity" of the national economy, whose development, in the opinion of the Poles themselves, is proceeding from crisis to crisis. Redeploying a single division, to say nothing of reforming and rearming it, for instance, according to the most optimistic estimates, will cost several million dollars, and will seriously undermine the Polish military budget. And this year that budget is barely enough to maintain the troops' combat readiness at the minimum level. The Polish Government has accordingly adopted a decision to carry out a partial reform of the armed forces. Some tank divisions will be converted into mechanized divisions. It is planned to form a fourth military district, the Malopolska district, in the eastern regions of the country.

At the same time they have begun to seek security guarantees in a closer relationship with NATO. In the opinion of Janusz Onyszkiewicz, vice minister of national defense, the North Atlantic alliance is today the sole factor for stability in the region. Primarily because, thanks to NATO, American troops remain in Europe, and the Poles see this as the main guarantee against the growth of chauvinist and revanchist feelings in the united Germany.

Poland is also considering the possibility of establishing regional military cooperation, for instance with Prague and Budapest. There are arguments to support this idea. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, after leaving the Warsaw Pact Organization, encountered similar problems. For instance, the three states' armies are equipped with virtually identical armaments and equipment. Questions of organizing an exchange of experience in personnel training, holding joint exercises, and making firing ranges available to each other are also under discussion.

At the same time many Polish military experts agree that establishing contacts with NATO and widening collaboration in the military sphere with the countries of Eastern Europe should not lead to the abandonment of cooperation with the Soviet partner. The question of modernizing the Polish armed forces is on the agenda. In two or three years' time, it will have to be tackled urgently. Buying arms from the West appears unrealistic, not only because of the high cost, but also by virtue of the enormous expenditure that would be involved in retraining personnel to use totally unfamiliar equipment. It would be more logical to acquire inexpensive, reliable, and—most importantly—"well-broken" armaments.

The process of formulating a new military doctrine concept in Poland continues. Time will tell which aspects of it predominate in the end. But it is already clear that the security of Poland, as well as of any other country in the continent, can only be assured on condition that a system of public security [obshchestvennaya bezopasnost] is formed.

West Europe

PRAVDA on Gorbachev-Mitterrand News Conference

PM0805114191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 91 Second Edition pp 1-2

[TASS report: "Soviet-French Dialogue. Reportage From News Conference Given by M.S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand"]

[Text] Moscow, 6 May—Opening the news conference M.S. Gorbachev noted that visits by Soviet and French leaders, mutual contacts, talks, and meetings have already become commonplace. They are no sensation, he said, nothing out of the ordinary, but they are always—I can assure you—an event. Not only, I hope, in our bilateral relations, but also in world politics. The present meeting is worthy of note in that it is above all taking place in a new context. In my opinion, this is due to two most important elements. The first being—and I think it necessary to say this—the fact that this meeting is taking place directly ahead of 10 May, when Mr. Francois Mitterrand celebrates 10 years as president of France. I think that this is an event not only of significance for France and the French people but also for Europeans and the world as a whole, since Mr. Mitterrand's term as French president has coincided with very important periods in the restructuring of international relations and European politics and the development of France itself. Mr. President has contributed to all these events—a contribution which, I think, should be and will be appreciated. But let's not wait for history to decide where to lay the stress. We contemporaries would say that this represents a significant contribution. Ahead of this date I take advantage of our meeting here in our country, in the Soviet Union, to congratulate you, Mr. President.

Here is another important element. Today both in world politics and on the European continent we are going through a very important period, requiring intensive intellectual work on the part of politicians, scientists, specialists in various areas of knowledge, and our press. Events in these months—the decisions that we will adopt, as regards perestroyka, European policy, and the ways of putting an end to the Persian Gulf crisis—have all created the special context of our present meeting with the French president.

During our conversations we have touched on all these aspects of world politics. Naturally, we also had thorough talks about our bilateral relations—again within the context of these changes. I have said on several occasions that, from our viewpoint, Soviet-French dialogue and cooperation are of unique value in world politics. On this premise I think that today's discussion was simply essential for us. I am pleased with the way in which we exchanged opinions and talked. We have once again discovered the tremendous coincidence of our views, approaches, and opinions on all the questions that I mentioned during my brief opening address. This causes me great satisfaction. I welcome the President here to our country and hand him the floor. We will then be ready to answer your questions.

French President F. Mitterrand then delivered his opening address.

I would first like to thank President M.S. Gorbachev for his hospitality. I would also like to thank him for the kind words he said about me in connection with my anniversary as president. Needless to say, every day is an anniversary for us and it is hardly necessary to single out this anniversary more than any other. But nevertheless I am extremely touched by what M.S. Gorbachev said, expressing, when he spoke of my time as president, not only his opinion but that of a great country. He spoke with a feeling of friendship—friendship that I would like to preserve without fail in relations between our two countries.

What did we discuss? We spoke about specific European events linked with CSCE structures, the steps taken after the Paris conference, and the plans to create a European confederation and regarding the life of the European communities. We also spoke about economic cooperation in all spheres, multilateral ties, and bilateral ties. Moreover we also discussed the aftermath of the Gulf war, not, of course, forgetting events in northern and southern Iraq. We mentioned the first steps that have been taken to try to settle the serious Near East conflict, in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We also broached the situation in Lebanon. In short, we discussed matters of direct concern to us in those spheres where our diplomatic actions could be combined, where they could complement one another. We are ready—at least I am—to answer your questions and satisfy your curiosity.

I thank you once again, Mr. President. Meetings with the press have now become a traditional part of our meetings which—as of 1985, that is, the year that Mr. Gorbachev paid an official visit to Paris—have given us an opportunity to have the pleasure of talking. I hope that this meeting is not our last. At any rate we intend to continue to discuss together questions of interest for our two countries in the world in which we have to play the role that history has assigned our countries. We are doing this in a desire to understand one another and reach agreement; this is an extremely important approach for us. That is what I would like to say by way of introduction, Mr. President. Like you I am prepared to listen to questions.

Correspondent from AL-MUSAWWAR, Egypt: I have a question for both presidents, if possible. How do you regard the idea of convening an international conference to settle the Near East problem, and what is the possibility of UN participation part in this process? Lastly: Are the Palestinians entitled to set up their own independent state?

M.S. Gorbachev: I will ask the French president to speak first.

F. Mitterrand: Willingly. Unfortunately, this is a very long-standing question. For many years now there has been discussion of the question of how to escape from this interminable conflict between Israel and its neighbors. There are various viewpoints as to what kind of conference should be convened. At any rate there is talk of an international conference. Mr. Shamir talks of a regional conference, but that is in effect an international conference, only with fewer participants compared with the conference that Mr. Gorbachev and I proposed five or six years ago.

In essence we must not forget that when Israel was set up, fortunately, as a result of a UN decision—and I take a very positive view of that decision—the same UN resolution made provision for the creation of a Palestinian state. I constantly tell my Israeli friends this. I call them friends even when they doubt that fact. I have told them that they cannot avoid settling the serious problem of realizing the Palestinian people's dream of having their own homeland where they could set up their own state structures and create their own state as they see fit. This has long been under discussion. Although the situation is changing and the correlation of forces is evolving, ultimately we always come back to the same subject, to the question of a procedure that could settle this problem peacefully, once and for all, moreover. I am not of course speaking for President Gorbachev,. As I see it, our positions are very close, albeit not identical. But close. I still reckon, for my part, that the proposed conference should naturally take place without fail with UN involvement (since it was the United Nations that formulated the legal norms governing relations between Israelis and Palestinians), at least at the end of the process. Despite numerous denials of this logic on both sides, I still believe that this is the only way out. Of course there is another way out—the use of force. But who would want that?

M.S. Gorbachev: I want to voice my solidarity with the president's opinion: Our positions on this very important, complex, chronic conflict are very close. That allows me to confine myself to a brief answer. Events in the Persian Gulf showed all of us over and over that we must take more resolute action to solve such an acute international conflict as the Near East conflict. Dragging out this process may give rise to more acute situations in the future again. I corroborate what the president said—we still favor an international conference. It is very important now to start up the mechanism for this. We may see one format for the conference in the initial stages and then the format may change at subsequent stages when other problems arise. But we must without fail embark on settling highly acute questions, including the Palestinian question and the creation of a Palestinian state. We see everything that has happened of late as additional arguments confirming the correctness of our approach and position.

Correspondent from AFP, France: We know that the Soviet Union's internal problems were also broached in the course of the meeting. Did you mention Armenia? And, in particular, the actions taken by Soviet Army units and their actions against Armenian volunteers which resulted in injuries to inhabitants, including the residents of an Armenian village in Armenia itself?

M.S. Gorbachev: We said a great deal about the situation in the Soviet Union. I thank the French president for his constant interest in our affairs and his solidarity with us as regards the implementation of the political course of restructuring and renewing our society. In briefing the president, I provided him with a great deal of information showing the scale, the fundamental nature, complexity, and drama of the processes taking place at this time within the framework of the reform of our society—both as regards property relations, as regards the political process, and as regards the renewal of our multiethnic state, and in other spheres of our life.

We also touched on the acute situation that has emerged, only I would say, not in Armenia, but in Azerbaijan, on whose territory Nagorno-Karabakh is located, and a large proportion of whose indigenous inhabitants are Armenians.

We have covered a long and difficult road in our quest for a political solution to this conflict. Both the Supreme Soviet, the executive, and deputies have made a great deal of effort here. Representatives of our scientific and artistic intelligentsia and representatives of other republics have also been involved in seeking a solution to the problems. The situation there constantly brings us face to face with the kind of worsening conditions that not only disrupt normal life in these two republics, particularly their border regions, but also entail grave consequences for their population: People have perished and many thousands have now become refugees. I am talking about a human tragedy. Aware of this, we are trying to find realistic approaches, but that is hard. I am sure that political means of solving this problem must be found.

The political process, notably the full restoration of autonomy in Nagorno-Karabakh with all its features, is impeded by the presence of armed bandit groups on both sides terrorizing the people—both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The point is that you cannot start up the political process without eliminating all these detachments.

When I went along to my meeting with the French president, I asked for information as to what had happened in the March-May period. Some 235 attacks and shootings took place in Nagorno-Karabakh and the border areas—that is in March, April, and May alone. Of these 153 and 82 were perpetrated by the Armenians and Azerbaijanis respectively. Some 20 Azerbaijanis and 10 Armenians have been killed. The USSR internal troops stationed there have been shot at on 115 occasions. Were they not there, a real war or bloodbath would break out. Some nine men of the internal troops have died and 15 have been wounded. Since we have found ourselves facing this situation, it was deemed necessary to fully implement the presidential decree, disarm the illegal formations, and confiscate their weapons. But their weapons come literally from around the world. Ranging from homemade to modern flame throwers, not to mention submachineguns, machine guns, armored personnel carriers, and so on. It's a complex situation. It must be defused, otherwise it may give rise to the kind of events that will lead to tremendous bloodshed.

Operations to disarm groupings are currently under way within the framework of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, and the presidential decree. Population center by population center. Some people don't like it, because some people have gleaned political capital from the grave drama facing the people and want to exploit it still further. We cannot allow this. Constitutional order must be restored. The Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous entity with all its attendant features must be fully restored. What is more—and I think the Azerbaijani side shares these intentions—this autonomous entity must be given the kind of status that will ensure that people are aware of the concern and attention for them.

The country's leadership cannot be blamed for failing to make political efforts. It has made them from the outset of the conflict. We still intend to hew strictly to the law and operate within the law.

I have tried to give you a detailed answer since you broached a very painful question. It affects all of us and causes us deep suffering. This question was considered once again at the Supreme Soviet session today. I will confine myself to saying this.

Vremya correspondent: Mr. Mitterrand, our president broached the question of your ten years as president. What is your opinion of the results of your activity in this time? Tell me please, what is the most important decision that your government has adopted in the sphere of Soviet-French relations in this time and what was, perhaps, the decision that you found most disappointing? Are you pleased with the results of your talks with President Gorbachev on economic questions, that is, on questions of settling the economic problems between our two countries?

F. Mitterrand: I will being by answering the second part of the question. Our talks were very interesting and should result in the new decisions for which both our countries are striving. We spoke in very great detail about cooperation in industry, agriculture, and food production. We also broached cultural aspects. There is a proper time for everything. We will definitely provide more detailed explanations a little later, but I will leave Moscow with a sense of the need to further develop economic relations, which have remained below the desirable level for a long time.

Now a word about the first part of your question. You simply took me unawares. Of course I mustn't sing my own praises on the 10th anniversary of my presidency. Let other people do that. Those people who say they are my friends have spoken highly of a number of the decisions that have been adopted. Those people who count themselves my enemies have reproached me for a great deal. Let those interested in this date voice their own opinion of it.

As far as the best or least successful decisions are concerned, I don't know. I have made various decisions. Decisions at the national or international level require most careful analysis. That is why I would perhaps answer this question as follows. At any rate the decision to come here has been my most important and interesting decision of late.

CBC, Canada correspondent: Mr. Gorbachev, the reports of your meeting with [Rupert] Murdoch mentioned some kind of regrouping. What kind of regrouping do you have in mind? Do you feel that the West is losing faith in you as a reformer? Who is threatening to plunge the world into Cold War again?

M.S. Gorbachev: Yes, I had an interesting discussion with Murdoch yesterday. Naturally, it covered various problems, including the current situation in the world, the opportunities it offers, and the dangers. I would briefly illustrate the subject you have raised as follows. The chance to restructure international relations and strengthen the positive trends which have taken shape thanks to joint efforts by this generation's politicians still exists. Moreover, I am sure that these trends will ultimately gain momentum. But we can already see that the new approaches to world politics—above all, the political approach which is replacing the strong-arm approach and reliance on force—are encountering major obstacles. This is understandable—after all, we are going through the initial period, I could even call it the transitional period from one phase of international relations to another. We are leaving the Cold War behind, but we can see that the relics of the Cold War and its politics do still exist and are being quite thoroughly exploited and utilized. That is why the policy of new thinking—or whatever you want to call it—and the new approaches in international policy are undergoing serious tests, and we must understand this. Our common responsibility and the responsibility of all those shaping this new course and these new approaches is to preserve them and give them substance in order to ensure that this mighty tree puts out deep roots and that no winds or upheavals can budge it. But in order to do this we must be aware of the dangers that exist.

I should mention in this connection that the press (and not only the press—often the press quotes politicians, so this means that politicians do it too) sometimes very quickly and without due responsibility assesses certain events or periods unconditionally, passing some kind of sentence. If we take this attitude to the asset and initial capital which we have only just built up and which we are obliged to build up, we will have great disappointments ahead. But that is not all: We can expect even greater problems, since powerful processes encompassing all countries have emerged on the basis of the new approaches to politics. If we focus attention on some individual points, incidents, episodes, or even events—including dramatic events—and draw hasty conclusions while casting doubt on everything we have achieved and created by channeling international relations in a new direction and entering, as we have said, a period of peaceful development, then dangers will emerge.

Take the commentaries on events in the Gulf. Some politicians and some of the press have been suggesting certain ideas in order, essentially, to provide arguments for those who simply do not want to leave the Cold War behind—they clearly like living in its draft and do not care how the peoples feel. What kind of ideas are these? It turns out that the settlement of conflicts invariably requires force—that is the argument. It turns out that people should do the following. Cold War supporters believe that other people's opinions can be ignored and that even casting doubt on the UN role is no big deal. These are all very dangerous arguments. I think that they reflect a kind of political counter-course that has already taken shape. But these arguments need to be noticed in good time before it is too late.

Hasty arguments about events in the Soviet Union can be found in our press and even more so in the international press. Subsequently, history will spend a long time looking at what is currently happening in the Soviet Union and what importance it has for our country, Europe, and the entire world. But we can already claim that what is happening is required by us, Europe, and the whole world. We realize that the processes in our country cannot proceed easily or simply. I constantly say that those people who want to prescribe simple solutions for society are wrong. There is nothing to back up these simple solutions—no knowledge of the past, of current realities, or of forecasts, even for the immediate future. You have asked such a serious question that I could not answer it in just a few words. We essentially devoted our entire discussion with Mr. Mitterrand to this issue.

Correspondent from LIBERATION, France: Mr. Mitterrand, a few weeks ago you received Boris Yeltsin. Did you discuss a formal meeting or matters of substance? How do you currently assess the phenomenon of Yeltsin or the personality of Yeltsin?

A question for Mr. Gorbachev. How do you view Mr. Mitterrand's meeting with Mr. Yeltsin?

F. Mitterrand: I did indeed meet with Mr. Yeltsin. Incidentally, I have seen very strange assessments of the meeting. Initially Mr. Yeltsin had very in-depth talks with the Elysee Palace secretary general, and then I met him personally. We discussed the issues we considered it necessary to discuss. As I always do, I had given the head of state—in this case, Mr. Gorbachev—prior notice of my intention to have this kind of exchange of opinions. That is why I simply cannot understand how there could be any other assessment of this meeting, which was courteous, normal, and exactly as it should have been. The fact that this question is now being asked shows that you are ascribing to it an importance which it essentially does not have.

M.S. Gorbachev: I would confine myself to using Mr. Mitterrand's last phrase.

Correspondent from NEWSWEEK, United States: Perhaps, continuing this subject, Mr. Gorbachev would say what kind of relations with the head of a Soviet republic he considers appropriate for a Western head of state in the wake of the document of the nine republics, which the president signed? How should Western countries treat these republics and what advice would you give to Western leaders?

M.S. Gorbachev: Gentlemen, we all need to proceed on the basis that the Soviet Union exists. That is the first point. Second, it will continue to exist. Third, it is a mighty power. And, fourth, it will continue to be one. The difficulties and crises which we are experiencing are a great test for society, but this test could be no less. We must get through it. At the meeting of republic leaders held with my participation and on my initiative, we jointly concluded that common national interests should now be placed above everything. It is a question of the future of the state and the future of a common economic space—the market. It is a question of our state's international role, and everyone agreed that we should increase our efforts along all these lines rather than damage them. In this connection we discussed what should be done to implement the referendum results. The referendum advocated preserving the Union state as a renewed federation within which sovereign republics can operate and human rights and freedoms are safeguarded and guaranteed. That is the key to how relations should be restructured. I think that in the new federation the role of the republics in connection with the reform and redistribution of powers—and I consider this necessary because until now we have been called a federation while essentially being a unitary state—will change on the basis of the decentralization of power and responsibility.

Union organs will be created in whatever form is necessary. But they are needed in order to implement the main task supported by the people in the referendum of preserving this state, this power, making it more dynamic, and raising rather than diminishing its role. Union organs will have everything they need to bring this about. This will be in line with the interests both of the Union as a whole and of the states [gosudarstvo] and republics which make it up. It is on this basis that relations will be restructured and that responsibilities and powers will be redistributed within the country—naturally, in the implementation of foreign and foreign economic policy. In this sphere, I think, all fundamental questions will be coordinated, both foreign policy and foreign economic courses jointly worked out, and their implementation coordinated. This will open up opportunities for republic governments to participate more actively in the implementation of foreign and foreign economic policy. But I should also say something else: At the same time, we are developing initiative and granting rights—including in the sphere of foreign economic activity—to actual enterprises, concerns, associations, and so forth. So this is a common process.

I think that the journalists currently working in the Soviet Union want to look into all this as well as looking into policies. They want to take a balanced position at a stage of perestroyka which is fundamental. I would like to take the opportunity afforded by answering this question to note that all our foreign partners understand this process. We do not sense any decline in interest in us. It is another matter when everyone wants us to complete the transitional processes as quickly as possible and to solve specific problems more actively. Such issues do exist, and we have been discussing this with Mr. President today. As a result of the processes of perestroyka the world will be dealing with a mighty power, but at the same time it will have an opportunity to deal with it in new forms and with the active participation of all republics.

V. Terekhov, INTERFAX: A question for both presidents. Mr. Mitterrand, the Soviet Union's position at this stage, in terms of both domestic politics and economics, is quite complex—it could probably not be otherwise. Could you please say to what extent this complexity has influenced your attitude to the Soviet Union?

A question for Mikhail Sergeyevich. Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich! Could you please tell us what has caused the events over the past five or six years, and the turns to right and left in relations with Russia?

The correspondent compared the Soviet president to the captain of a ship from whom others are occasionally trying to take the helm, and asked whether the president will continue his course or maneuver in order to preserve the country's integrity.

F. Mitterrand: The fact that the Soviet president is experiencing difficulties is clear—and nobody knows that better than the Soviet president himself. All these difficulties are known worldwide. It is impossible to carry out a real, comprehensive revolution—which is what President Gorbachev is doing—without being affected by its numerous consequences at the same time. When there is an opportunity to realize freedom, it is very demanding. When there are economic difficulties and these take a harsh form, not to mention local nationalism, or when demands are made for state restructuring, it is clear that these problems simply cannot be solved all at once. We are talking about major changes; the need for other subsequent changes stems from them, and, naturally, this cannot be resolved with a wave of a magic wand. I admire the courage of those people—and particularly that person—who have shouldered responsibility for these changes while remaining true to their own convictions. I would like to hope that both in France and on the international arena I will do as much as possible to help not only President Gorbachev personally but perestroyka from outside. Why indeed should I change this view of mine?

M.S. Gorbachev: I would touch on the part of the question concerning the helm. You know, I agree with you that, of course, we are steering our ship of perestroyka in rough weather and seas—it is stormy, not everything is clearly visible, and it is foggy. In addition, the instruments are on the blink and the crew does not include everyone we need. There is everything to contend with. Nonetheless, I would say the following. The ship is following the course we have worked out. I call this course the perestroyka concept. We are headed for the goals set by that concept. Yet everything relating to our specific activity within the framework of this course, and to the efforts aimed at moving toward our planned bearings, is a question of tactics, maneuver, and taking account of realities. Our way is difficult. And all the difficulties which I have figuratively listed do exist.

If we are talking about whether the leadership is at the helm or not, I would have to say the following. If it sometimes seems to those aboard or watching from the shore that the ship is listing, then this is indeed sometimes related to the fact that many people are rushing to take the helm, getting in each other's way, and grabbing each other's arms. This sometimes happens. But in principle the helm is in hand, and the ship will continue to be on course. That is the first point.

The joint statement issued by the nine republics and the president is what—a continuation of the course or a maneuver? No, Comrades, I assess this document highly. It is particularly important by dint of the context in which it was drawn up and signed. It attests to the presence of a sense of responsibility on the part of those who signed it for the fate of the state and the country, and for the continuation of this course. And that is its importance.

I realize that questions may arise, but not over the text of the statement—because what it contains is very serious and necessary. I think that you would have signed the statement with us, Comrade Terekhov. I am sure of that. But suddenly people started talking about some secret memorandum, which was allegedly also signed. Who is doing this and to what purpose I do not know. And what about the fact that the press organs closest to "Democratic Russia" and the Moscow City Soviet suddenly started criticizing B.N. Yeltsin for signing this document. And they have been criticizing him for allegedly giving ground and backtracking, saying that this is unforgivable and so forth. Clearly, in order to disabuse their supporters of this impression, B.N. Yeltsin himself and later R.I. Khasbulatov and certain others suddenly started saying that, on the contrary, it was the president who had given ground and found himself over a barrel. You know, this is not a serious approach when we are talking about a document like the Joint Statement, which concerns fundamental questions at such a crucial stage of the perestroyka processes. It is not serious. This begs the question of what it meant. That's your homework, Comrade Terekhov. Clearly, somebody wants there to be no agreement in practice even if the statement has been signed. And since that is what they want, they are bringing pressure to bear.

In actual fact we had a very serious, responsible, and principled discussion. It had its own logic, its own development. It was a meeting of the group of people who were involved in the referendum. And everyone said yes to the federation and yes to the single market with all the attributes and features of a single economic space—money, customs, financial instruments and so forth, and taxes. There was a dispute over taxes, and it will continue. But in general there was an exchange of opinions on all issues. But it was a serious and responsible discussion. Nobody had anyone over a barrel, I did not see anyone going for the solar plexus or some other painful spot. No, I must say that it was a very responsible discussion among understanding people. On the basis of this discussion I called for a recess and in the space of 45 minutes dictated these theses and the points which formed the basis of the agreement. After they were typed up we started finalizing them. Basically everything was retained. But yesterday I heard that only 20 percent was retained. People have started talking percentages: None of this is serious. I do not want to go any further into it, I want to stay true to the statement, and I hope that all the participants in that crucial meeting at this stage of Soviet history will show that they can keep their word and not allow people to play around with these things or with them. In a situation when people are expecting changes for the better, I think it would be political suicide for those politicians who signed this document to engage in cheap political games...

Supreme Soviet

IZVESTIYA on 6 May Presidium Session

PM0905092791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[TASS report: "USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Sitting"]

[Text] A USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium sitting took place 6 May in the Kremlin with A.I. Lukyanov in the chair.

The Presidium focused its attention on the joint statement signed by the USSR president and the leaders of nine republics on urgent measures to stabilize the situation in the country and overcome the crisis. It was pointed out at the sitting that the document evoked a tremendous response and won support from many public organizations, trade unions, mass movements, and the broadest strata of our society. Assessing the joint statement as an important constructive step toward pooling the efforts of Union and republic leaders to stabilize the political and economic situation in the country, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium outlined practical steps designed to implement the fundamental provisions of this document. Attention was drawn to the need for all future activity by the USSR Supreme Soviet and union republic supreme soviets to be carried out in close coordination with the statement to ensure that the Union and republic laws adopted fully accord with the letter and spirit of the accords. It was emphasized that the USSR Supreme Soviet, its committees, and its commissions face the task of vigorously helping to conclude the Union treaty and expedite the formulation of a new draft USSR constitution.

Questions connected with the continuation of the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet fifth session were examined at the sitting.

The Presidium discussed certain questions of improving the work of USSR Supreme Soviet committees and its chambers' commissions. Attention was also paid to the need to raise the quality of law-making work, strengthen collaboration and cooperation with republic supreme soviets, and improve the provision of information to the USSR Supreme Soviet and its organizations and USSR people's deputies.

The question of publishing collections of USSR laws and other USSR Supreme Soviet acts was examined, as was the question of elucidating legislative acts in the press, on television, and on the radio. It was deemed expedient to elaborate a program of measures to create the appropriate conditions to ensure that the laws adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet are conveyed in a timely fashion to executants and all USSR citizens.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium heard and considered a report by A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs, on the formation of a legislative assembly of countries participating in the CSCE.

Some other questions of state life were also examined at the sitting.

Naval Manpower, Emigration Viewed 7 May

PM0905120591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Kremlin report by parliamentary correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev: "Seamen and Petty Officers Under Contract"]

[Text] The 7 May joint sitting of the chambers of the country's Supreme Soviet turned out tense and thematically varied. Four questions at once were examined at the session on this day. Unfortunately, they were not all brought to a logical conclusion. The lack of a quorum, which was so frequently the case in previous sessions, seemed to have revisited the union legislature....

After the draft law on social protection for citizens affected by radiation as a consequence of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station was, on the whole, approved at the morning sitting, the deputies also adopted a resolution bringing this law into force.

Chairman A. Lukyanov then proposed that the deputies return to the question of the Armenian Supreme Soviet resolution and the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution, which had been discussed for more than three hours the previous day. The agreed text of the document had been distributed among the sitting's participants, and so A. Lukyanov considered it possible first to adopt it as a whole and then to make the necessary amendments; however, the deputation from Armenia disagreed with that proposal. So the question of convening an extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies was raised once again. At the same time, Deputy S. Ambartsumyan, citing the USSR Constitution and the standing orders, declared that the question of convening a congress is not discussed or voted on by the USSR Supreme Soviet, but that it is convened on the initiative of one of the republics and the decision to convene it is adopted within 15 days.

The chairman responded to this as follows: Under the standing orders the USSR Supreme Soviet is obliged to adopt a decision on this question. How is it possible to adopt a decision without a vote?

On being put to the vote, the question of convening an extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies gathered just eight votes in its favor.... Another proposal submitted by Deputy M. Minasbekyan—on setting up a USSR Supreme Soviet commission to study the state of affairs locally and draw up recommendations for settling the conflict—did not gather the necessary majority of votes either. The deputies considered that the following decision would be more effective: To entrust the USSR general prosecutor with sending an investigative group to the region of conflict without delay to verify the reports of violations of the law set forth in the aforementioned resolutions by the Armenian and Azerbaijan legislatures.

In the course of a rather emotional discussion, many deputies spoke of the need to seek solutions mutually acceptable to both republics, to end the bloodshed, and to fulfill the decisions adopted earlier by the country's president and the Union legislature.

First of all, at the 7 May evening sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session—the last sitting before the second brief legislative vacation—a lack of a quorum came to light. Thus, the country's legislature proved unable to adopt any decisions. Nevertheless, the deputies agreed with Chairman A. Lukyanov's proposal to begin, as planned, the hearings of two draft laws to start discussing them at the next sitting with a full quorum. It has to be said that both draft laws are extremely interesting. Both became objects of close public attention while still at the stage of being prepared.

The first to take the floor was Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the General Staff, who submitted to the deputies the USSR draft law "On Amending the USSR Law 'On Compulsory Military Service'" and a draft resolution by the country's legislature on conducting an experiment in the USSR Ministry of Defense to have servicemen on compulsory active military service voluntarily fill the posts of Navy seamen and petty officers under contract.

The essence of the draft law—if adopted—is that young people drafted into the Navy this spring will serve for two years, just like their comrades-in-arms in the Ground Forces. The essence of the draft resolution is that young naval sailors undergoing six-month training will be able, if they so wish, to conclude a contract with the Navy. In this case they will serve a further 2.5 years, getting a wage.

Submitting these two documents, G. Krivosheyev pointed out that they are a constituent part of the reform that is beginning in the country's Armed Forces. The Navy's switch to a two-year term of service for petty officers and seamen requires the allocation of additional appropriations—535 million rubles [R] to improve the Navy's training base. In addition, the Navy's personnel will also have to be increased by 40,000 men—this, too, is connected with the expansion of training subunits. Mindful of the complex economic and sociopolitical situation and, at the same time, the urgency of the problem, the USSR Ministry of Defense proposes to realize the transfer of petty officers and seamen to a two-year term of service without additional appropriations from the state budget and also without increasing the size of the country's Armed Forces.

The Navy's switch to a two-year term of service, the colonel general emphasized, is not an instantaneous act. It is proposed that the transitional period will span 1991-1992. During this period all young men drafted into the Navy, starting this spring, will serve for two years, whereas petty officers and seamen drafted before the resolution was adopted will serve either three or 2.5 years. Otherwise, the speaker explained, up to 60 percent of personnel will be discharged from ships at the same time, and ships will simply be unable to put to sea.

Undoubtedly, the reduction in the term of service in the Navy cannot fail to affect the level of crews' professional training and their combat ability. To compensate for these losses to some extent, the USSR Ministry of Defense has asked the country's legislature to allow an experiment to be conducted in the Navy to man ships with petty officers and seamen volunteering for military service under contract. The proposed wage rates have been mentioned—ranging from R308 to R770 a month, depending on the conditions of service. These purposes will require approximately R170 million, which the Ministry of Defense also intends to find in its own budget.

G. Krivosheyev particularly emphasized in his speech that it is a question only of an experiment at the moment, but the military hopes that its results will largely make it possible to ascertain how realistic the creation of a professional army is under our conditions.

Deputy L. Sharin, chairman of the legislative Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, spoke on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions that have studied the draft laws and, on the whole, voiced support for the documents discussed.

Then came the turn of the USSR draft law on the procedure for citizens of the Soviet Union to emigrate from and enter the USSR. Forestalling the speech by Deputy F. Burlatskiy, who submitted the draft law, A. Lukyanov reminded his colleagues that the draft law was discussed at first reading at the second session of the legislature, after which the committees for international affairs and legislation had been entrusted with finalizing the document jointly with the government with due regard for all comments and suggestions. The chairman said that it took so long to finalize it because there really were many comments and suggestions and, most important, it was a very complex matter to calculate how much it would cost the country to implement the future law. Deputy F. Burlatskiy's speech was largely devoted to this problem.

In particular, he drew the attention of the sitting's participants to the fact that the draft resolution on bringing the law into force proposes to do so on 1 July 1992. The Cabinet of Ministers believes that during this time it will be able to resolve all the financial and organizational questions which will ensure the law's implementation. What kind of questions are they?

The speaker made a rather skeptical assessment of forecasts, according to which a mass exodus of Soviet citizens to other states is expected after the adoption of the law on immigration and emigration and, as a consequence of this exodus, the need for billion-ruble appropriations to expand the consular, customs, and other services. Calculations made recently by the State Foreign Economic Commission, however, show more modest figures. At the same time it will be necessary to attract only some of the necessary funds from the state budget. It is proposed that those leaving will themselves pay most of the money. This, in fact, is customary all over the world.

How many of our fellow citizens will be able to emigrate abroad in the next few years? For emigration will require not only considerable funds but also the consent of the receiving side. A majority of states are now introducing restrictions on immigration. The United States, for example, has introduced a restrictive quota of 50,000 emigrants a year from the USSR. Meanwhile, approximately 1 million applications have already been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Sweden accepts no more than 100 emigrants a year from all countries.

Last year 454,000 people emigrated from the USSR to take up permanent residence. This was double the figure in 1989. Last year 5 million Soviet citizens left the USSR temporarily; this, too, was double the figure in 1989. According to estimates by Soviet and Western experts, no more than 0.5 million Soviet citizens a year will emigrate in the very near future. Already this year there has been virtually no increase in emigrants. Regarding temporary departures, the forecast here is for 5-7 million people a year. According to the State Foreign Economic Commission's estimates, budget expenditure to ensure the emigration and immigration of this number of Soviet citizens will amount to 160-240 million conventional rubles and 110 million currency rubles during 1991-1995 (not counting funds to develop the border service).

This is the cost of the law. Incidentally, last year the Visas and Registration Department service alone transferred to the state the R375 million received in return for drawing up emigration and immigration documents.

F. Burlatskiy also dwelt on a problem which, to judge both from reports in certain mass media and from deputies' questions, is also of concern to a certain section of society: Will the adoption of the law not lead to a mass exodus of the best minds and the most skilled work hands from the country? The speaker considered this danger to have been exaggerated. It is generally known, he remarked, that manpower exports are five times as profitable as raw material exports. In addition to currency, this means access to world economic culture. Moreover, in F. Burlatskiy's opinion, the majority of those who leave, being confident that the iron curtain has been dismantled forever, will return to the motherland, bringing fresh knowledge and new experience with them. He also remarked that, even without any law, approximately 20,000 Soviet citizens are working in Poland today. They are also working in other European countries. The interesting thing is that they are regarded there as disciplined and, most importantly, nondrinking workers.

Deputy F. Burlatskiy's speech gave rise to far more questions than the submission of the preceding draft law had. But, as in the case of the previous draft law, it was decided to start discussing the draft law on emigration and immigration when there is a quorum. At the next joint sitting, which will be on 12 May.

Political & Social

Further Reportage on Victory Day Celebration

Young Soldiers' Meeting Held

LD0905214891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1530 GMT 9 May 91

[Excerpt] Moscow, 9 May (TASS)—On Victory Day, 9 May, the Kremlin's Georgiyevskiy Zal, the hall of our fatherland's martial glory, was the venue for a meeting between USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and representatives of the All-Union Young Soldiers' Movement. They had come to Moscow from the country's various republics.

Besides the president, the meeting was attended by Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense; Oleg Baklanov, deputy chairman of the Defense Council under the USSR president; Lieutenant General Georgiy Beregovoy, commander of the All-Union Young Soldiers's movement; other military commanders, statesmen, politicians, war veterans, and representatives of the public. Raisa Gorbacheva also attended.

The participants in the movement, through which a vast amount of work is carried out with regard to the patriotic upbringing of children and adolescents, have many glorious deeds to their credit. Tours to the sites of the Soviet people 's military glory, the care of war and labor veterans, searching for nameless defenders, physical training, and visits to the historical and cultural sights of our multinational country—these and other deeds were described for the president by the young soldiers. These accounts were brief, very direct, and sincere. No matter who spoke—whether it was a representative from the Don region, from the Urals, or from Central Asia—all the speeches were permeated by the assurance that, at this difficult time, the motherland, the cause of perestroyka, and the president personally would always find loyal support among the young soldiers.

The young soldiers also said that they would very much like to publish their own magazine and have a museum for the movement in Moscow, and asked for help to be given to them in this connection.

The feeling of lofty patriotism evoked by the young sucessors who had come to the Georgiyevskiy Zal was described in his speech by Lt. Gen. Pavel Grachev, commander of the air assault troops.

Gorbachev Addresses Soldiers

CM0905135391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 9 May 91

[Speech by USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to Young Soldiers Movement representatives in St. George's Hall in the Kremlin, Moscow on 9 May—recorded]

[Text] Dear friends: I sincerely and cordially, from myself and the whole leadership of the country, and from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, welcome you in this magnificent hall in the Kremlin, in the center of our great motherland. I welcome you and all your comrades-in-arms—I'll put it like that—who have remained at home.

You will have meetings, there will be [word indistinct] meetings, inasmuch as this movement is linked with and expresses the wishes and the mood of our young generation which is ready to serve its fatherland and is already aware of its responsibility for the destiny of the state. The fact that this meeting is being held today on a noteworthy day merely underscores the continuity of the generations. Yes, indeed, we achieved a great victory, a hard victory, a difficult victory, and we are proud of this. And I share here the words which were first addressed to our veterans of the Great Patriotic War, I join these words and want, together with you, to honor the victors of 1945, and in their person, our people, those on the front and those who wrought this victory in the rear services. Let us render this generation its due.

They did the incredible in gaining that victory. But that victory required efforts and sacrifices that oblige us to remember that forever, and secondly, oblige us to always be capable of defending our country and ensuring that no one is tempted to test our strength. Therefore I want to join with you here in greeting the minister of defense, officers of our Armed Forces, and in their person the Armed Forces of the USSR, our glorious Soviet Army.

It has always been characteristic of our peoples to appreciate and give their due to all those who take the side of a just cause in difficult times. Today I want to join with you in remembering all the peoples, and the representatives of all the peoples, who participated and made their contribution to this great victory, and first and foremost I want to greet the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition from here, from the Georgiyevskiy Hall in the Kremlin.

May they hear it. We have a mandate to say that we remember that fighting cooperation that defeated fascism, and we remain true to ther words that were spoken on the Elbe and in other places during those victorious days of May, 1945.

As president, I want to say an enormous thank you to you, dear young friends, for what you are doing, first and foremost with regard to the veterans, and what you are doing to ensure that the memory of and respect for the feat of those who gave us this victory and the possibility to continue living, building, overcoming difficulties, and moving forward are preserved. The fact that this feeling has manifested itself in you in these early years—I am sure that you will preserve it forever in your lives, and I congratulate you on this civic choice. It is the kind of moral height upon which I wish for you to remain always: No matter how difficult things are for you in your lives, preserve this choice, the sacred choice that you have now made, having joined the ranks of the young Army men. Thank you once again.

I am also very glad, twice as glad, about this meeting because present here are representatives of our republics and our peoples. This is yet another very important symbol and sign of friendship, the sacred cause that has always come to our aid at the most difficult moments in our complicated history, heroic, but dramatic, too. Maintain this friendship. This is nothing greater as you go through life than feeling true friends at your side. Everything then becomes easier. I congratulate you on this! You are fine young people, because you have understood the main thing: one has to be together. This is very good. Preserve this and national digntiy: but beware of the plague of national arrogance and haughtiness. Be friends. This is what I call on you to do.

In this great time of ours, of perestroyka, this difficult time, we need charity, goodness, sympathy, and participation. What you are doing is making you just what you are, and I wish you success and the continuation of the great task in which you have become participants in your youthful years. Carry the banner, hold the banner of the young Army men high, and hold it strongly in your hands.

We are by no means making of ourselves people with intentions to go and try to get any—and with plans—the territory of other people. [sentence as heard] No, we have a lot of land. Our expanses are enormous. But we should think to ensure that this house is peaceful, and that no one should be tempted.

Well, and the main thing, all the same, is that I regard your movement as a movement in which young people, young hearts find friends, learn much that is new, where they recognize the meaning of the generations in our difficult history, and themselves find their own place in life. It is in this that I see the most important meaning of this movement, and I greet you and your teachers who are present here, and who there, together with your friends are probably going to the tombs, and to the eternal flame and are taking part in the nationwide tribute to the feat of our people in the Great Patriotic War.

Expressing my enormous satisfaction at this meeting, I welcome you all once again to the Kremlin. I want you to remember these days forever. I wish you great successes in your affairs.

CPSU Secretariat Greets Veterans

PM0905122991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 91 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee Secretariat message: "To the All-Union Council of War, Labor, and USSR Armed Forces Veterans"]

[Text] Dear Veterans!

These days the Soviet people and all people of good will are celebrating the 46th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, which was a severe ordeal for our multinational motherland.

The maelstrom of this war—the bloodiest in world history—raged for 1,418 days. Each of these days forms a page in the tragic and heroic annals of Soviet people's feats on the front and in the rear, of their courage and staunchness.

During these years of most severe trials, moral-political unity was manifested with particular force among all the USSR's peoples who embarked on the deadly combat with fascism and the defense of the socialist fatherland.

The people's creation—the Soviet Army—staunchly endured the failures of the first few battles with the aggressor, stood firm, and brought the war to a victorious conclusion having brought Hitlerism to its knees.

The whole country rose up in response to Mother Russia's call. Our compatriots sacrificed man's most valuable possession—their lives—on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, at sea, in aerial combat, and the partisans' forests. Among them were millions and millions of Communists and Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] members. Glory to the heroes who died for the freedom of the motherland and the happiness of future generations! May they live forever in our memory!

"Everything for the front, everything for victory!" This was no mere slogan. It was the moral core of people's thoughts and feats of labor. Rear services workers of the war generation—in cities, villages, stations, kishlaks, auls, plants, factories, in transport, at construction sites, and in agriculture—overcoming hunger, privations, and pain at the death of their relatives, devoted their labor, personal savings, and warm hearts to victory.

Glory to the rear services personnel who ensured our victory over the enemy!

The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War made it possible not only to defend our motherland's freedom and independence but also to liberate the peoples of Europe from enslavement. The rout of fascism by the combined efforts of the anti-Hitler coalition and the victorious conclusion of World War II were an event of worldwide historic importance which opened up for liberated mankind the path of progress and the prospect of a just lasting peace on the planet.

Our respect for war, labor, and Armed Forces veterans is unbounded. The country owes the victory to you, dear comrades, and it remembers with gratitude what your generation did for the motherland.

Esteemed war, labor, and Armed Forces veterans!

Your lives are an example of selfless devotion to the fatherland, an example of patriotism and internationalism. Did you really think about your comrade's nationality during the battles for the motherland and your daily work? Reliability, mutual assistance, and a feeling of love for the socialist motherland were always a most important indicator of relations.

We appeal to you: Pass on these sacred feelings of fraternity and friendship to the new generations. Use all your authority to eliminate interethnic enmity and help secure civic accord. Let us save for our children the fatherland that you defended and to which you have devoted your entire lives.

Dear war, labor, and USSR Armed Forces veterans!

Accept our most cordial congratulations on this Victory holiday!

We wish you good health, happiness, prosperity for your families, and peace on the planet.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat.

Officials Lay Wreaths

LD0905103691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1000 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] Leaders of the country and state and political figures came to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin wall according to tradition. There was a wreath-laying ceremony. Taking part in the ceremony were Comrades Gorbachev, Yanayev, Pavlov, Lukyanov, Yazov, and Yeltsin. There was a minute's silence in tribute to the memory of Soviet soldiers who gave their lives in memory of the independence of the fatherland and in the name of peace.

Zhukov Memorial Unveiled in Moscow

LD0905143691 Moscow TASS in English 1336 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 3 (TASS)—A memorial plaque honouring Soviet commander Marshal Georgiy Zhukov, who led Soviet troops during the Second World War, was unveiled in downtown Moscow near the Soviet Defence Ministry headquarters today.

The plaque, topped by Zhukov's bust, reads "prominent Soviet commander, four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Marhsal Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov worked in this house in 1941 and 1953-1957".

The ceremony was attended by Zhukov's associates, war veterans, military leaders, servicemen and Muscovites.

First Deputy Defence Minister Army General Mikhail Moiseyev praised Zhukov's outstanding contribution to the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War and the development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

A Moscow garrison unit marched past the plaque to end the official ceremony.

Bakatin Views Union, Ethnic Strife

PM0905122391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with V.V. Bakatin, member of the USSR Security Council and the Presidential Council, conducted by Major S. Knyazkov; place and date not given: "Common Sense Will Prevail"]

[Text] [Knyazkov] Vadim Viktorovich, if it is not a secret, could you start by describing the range of your duties as a member of the Security Council?

[Bakatin] I would rather not answer that question as the Security Council is still not fully formed. But look at the USSR Constitution, Article 127-3, Point 9.

Duty—"to draw up recommendations"... As there are only two "full-time" members (Primakov and Bakatin) in the Security Council, we have to "cover" together the whole range of problems left by the members of the Council who are ministers. Which is what we are doing.

Our principal urgent task is to set up our own information analysis service. There is a more delicate issue. Relations with the Cabinet of Ministers. Parallelism, duplication, and interference in government actions are unacceptable; as is interference in those cases where an understandable departmental approach, let alone anything else, damages or could damage security. This does not as a rule affect security on the defense and military plane. The chief danger lies in the spheres of economics, politics, and interethnic conflicts. That covers the range of our duties.

[Knyazkov] The recently signed "Statement of the Ten" substantially alters the idea of the USSR's future and the forms of collaboration among its constituent sovereign states. What in that case is your forecast regarding the Union treaty? When will it be signed and will it bring relief to society?

[Bakatin] I have always said that the Union is essential. It can even be said, to paraphrase a well-known saying, that "the Union is inevitable." Any disintegration goes against historically objective processes. But the Union is only possible in the modern world as a **voluntary** union. There is no other way. Therefore all attempts, despite the best intentions, to maintain the Union by force only destroy it, as we have already "successfully" demonstrated.

Only consent, mutual respect, and repudiation of force and threats. At the end of the 20th Century there should be enough internationalism, basic education, culture, and common sense in the world's first socialist country for us to appreciate that there is no alternative to this. The strength of the hierarchy of the centers with the Union center lies not its ambitions but in its functional utility and necessity for all the republics, peoples, and territories. That is what the new Union is about.

Will the Union treaty be signed? When? This will now depend solely on the wisdom of the politicians, since the people have expressed their will in the referendum.

As for "relief," it can be put this way. Yes, there will be relief provided all the republics carry out the treaty in earnest. And no, there won't be if, after signing it, we treat it as we now treat the operative, albeit outmoded 1922 Treaty, the Constitution, and the laws.

[Knyazkov] What, in your view, will then be the fate of the country's Supreme Soviet, people's deputies, and indeed the USSR president himself?

[Bakatin] That is a question for the new constitution. I think that it will retain those institutions. That, however, is in the hands of the deputies themselves. To be tackled by them.

[Knyazkov] The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is becoming increasingly dangerous in nature and threatens to develop into large-scale hostilities. What outcome do you see for it as a former minister of internal affairs and present member of the Security Council?

[Bakatin] Everything has its beginning and its end. And all enmity ends in peace. But I have always said that no third party can bring peace to the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Not even the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the USSR Supreme Soviet, or even the United Nations. Peace will not come unless first and foremost both peoples and their governments want it. Immediate direct talks in line with the USSR Supreme Soviet decision of 5 March 1990 constitute the first step along the long road to breaking out of the impasse into which bellicose political extremists are driving the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples.

But this step has, unfortunately, simply not been taken. I think that whoever takes this first step will exhibit greater courage than those who are escalating the hostilities.

[Knyazkov] In one of your recent speeches you said that we now need to engage in a commonsense policy. What do you mean by this in such difficult times?

[Bakatin] Common sense is common sense at any time. True, there are other theories which hold that a "commonsense policy" is impossible in principle. I do not think that way. To put it briefly, cooperation among all political forces and social strata to save the nation, let alone bring it prosperity, is what is important today, not a struggle to assert some old or new ideologicals "isms." Will the people find it easier if some rabid politicians first incite and intimidate and then actually unleash a civil war to secure the triumph of "their" ideology?

It is hard for me to imagine any "ism" more idiotic than that. And I am sure that the overwhelming majority of people in the country think likewise. Common sense will prevail. We need to get down to business rather than count chickens before they have hatched.

[Knyazkov] Reports have appeared in a number of publications that you have been nominated as a candidate for the RSFSR presidency. Do you intend to enter the election contest?

[Bakatin] There are other reports too. Moscow Radio reported today that I have renounced my intention. I should make things clear. It is only possible to renounce what has been promised. I have not to date done either the former or the latter. In the near future I myself, not the mass media, will make my decision, relying on the will of the voters.

[Knyazkov] Many people predict a Yeltsin election victory. What, in your view, are the strengths and weaknesses of his policy? How do you assess the chances of other contenders?

[Bakatin] Sorry, but I have no intention of assessing anyone's chances. As far as the strengths and weaknesses of a policy which I would not wish to personalize are concerned, clearly everything that is happening in our country and in Russia above all shows that there is no policy here at all in the generally understood sense of that word.

[Knyazkov] As is well known, the idea of creating a Russian Army surfaces periodically on the agenda of political interests. Does that question frighten you as a military man? It is, after all, difficult today to predict the consequences of the fragmentation of the unified Armed Forces?

[Bakatin] No one should be frightened by any question. Particularly a military man. It does not frighten me. But the Union has had and will continue to have a unified army, unified command, and unified complex of defensive systems which protect all the republics. If it is otherwise, then it is no longer the Union. Transferring troops carrying out escort functions to the republics MVD's is the only thing I consider possible. It is also important to switch them over to a contract principle.

At the same time I am surprised to see today how even with the unified Armed Forces, weapons and combat hardware up to and including missile systems are being stolen and used by bandit formations in South Ossetia and Karabakh. This is not the seizure of hunting weapons from the population. This is far more alarming than "a question." And it must be stopped.

I am grateful to you for your attention, for the questions, and for the opportunity to come into contact with your always serious—I have seen for myself—readers. But I would ask that you allow me to congratulate KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers on Victory Day. I was once asked in a lecture hall how long it could go on being marked. I answered that I would like it be marked for ever as the day of victory in the last world war in mankind's history. And to ensure that the eternal flame on the graves of the soldiers consumed by the conflagration of that war is never extinguished. I pay my deepest respects to the war veterans, to the frontliners, and to those who forged victory in the rear services. I personally have always considered and will always consider myself eternally indebted to them.

I would like through your newspaper to convey my congratulations and wishes for success to the veterans of the Kuzbass and of Kirov Oblast and the Soviet militia, with whom I have had numerous productive meetings. Thank you.

Kasparov: Gorbachev Not To Be Trusted

PM0905142591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 May 91 Second Edition p 4

[Unattributed report under the "Our Own About Us" rubric: "Opinion for Export"]

[Text] In its 6 May edition, the Netherlands newspaper NRC HANDELSBLAD published an interview with world chess champion G. Kasparov. Below is a summary of the text of the interview.

Trying to explain to the Western public what is happening in our country today presents a virtually insoluble problem, G. Kasparov said. You have grown up with a black-and-white stereotyped way of thinking: Everything is divided into black and white. You are well familiar with the period of the "cold war." Today you should watch a color movie. This is a problem not just for the average citizen of the Western world but even for political figures like G. Bush, F. Mitterrand, and H. Kohl. They are dealing with a situation that is changing by the minute and where a number of unknown factors are playing a special role. A split into social-democrats and liberal conservatives of a right-wing tendency recently occurred within the democratic movement in the Soviet Union. This split also occurred in my own party and I joined the conservative wing. The social-democrats are advocates of a "roundtable" following the examples of Czechoslovakia and Poland, but I do not see any point in this at all. Only if the Communist government were to acknowledge its failure could you consider a "roundtable." However, there are no signs today that M. Gorbachev will take such a step.

Question: What are we to think of the agreement between M. Gorbachev, B. Yeltsin, and the leaders of eight other republics?

Answer: I do not think that Yeltsin should have signed this agreement, and in my opinion this is only a kind of declaration of intentions. Too much depends on things that are based on trust, and Gorbachev should not be trusted. He will remain the Communist dictator that he is today. We should hold other talks to create an economic federation in which only certain common interests, for example the supply of electric power, will be centrally regulated. However, you do not need to hold talks with the central authorities for this. I have already said in a speech at the "Democratic Russia" congress: "We would have dealings with Gorbachev if the Kremlin had a status similar to that of the Vatican. The Kremlin is not a state. If the new union is to be a reality, we must first of all replace the central government with a strong democratic leadership."

Question: What can the West do to assist in this process?

Answer: If you proceed on the basis of the idea that there is a struggle going on between the population and the Communist government, any support for this cabinet will be a form of undesirable intervention. Every dollar given to Gorbachev today slows down the processes of democratization and transition to the market economy. This money is not being used for the purposes of economic transformations, but to strengthen the militarist system. If you want to invest these resources anyway, wait until the democrats come to power.

Republics To Begin Paying Unemployment Benefit

LD0605085291 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0800 GMT 6 May 91

[Text] Almost all of the Union republics have decided to start paying unemployment benefits beginning 1 July. This is a new phenomenon in the life of the USSR where the guarantee of full employment was one of the main achievements of the socialist system. Now, several million people in the country have lost their jobs as a result of the transition to a market economy and the closure of a number of establishments.

Eleven republics have signed an agreement on joint measures to tackle the problem of unemployment. It has been resolved to establish a single information service for inquiries about the availability of employment. There is a plan to set up an experimental system for the requalification of unemployed people.

Party Youth Policy Debated at PRAVDA Fest

PM0905095391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 91 First Edition p 1

[N. Lyaporov article: "Open and Enthusiastic: Echo of the PRAVDA Festival"]

[Text] Before the festival someone predicted: Young people will not take part in your discussions, it will only be pensioners. The prophesy was not fulfilled. For example, in the hall of the "Moskva" pavilion, where there were discussions on the party and its new Program, it was pleasantly surprising to see a large number of young, not to mention very young people, starting with those of student age.

An athletic-looking young man reached for the microphone, he was given leave to speak, and immediately fired some incisive and quite precisely worded questions at the audience. And he answered them himself. Why do Communists call the CPSU the party of the working people? Is it because they think that their duty is to defend the interests of all working people and thus they cite Lenin's teaching? But there is no mention of this in Lenin! According to Lenin, the party is the vanguard of the working class which in turn is the vanguard of the working people. Those are the "three links." And when it comes to protecting the interests of working people generally, that in the speaker's opinion is where capitalism begins. He also has his own view of market relations. Once again the speaker referred the audience to the works of the Marxist-Leninist classics.

Of course, these works may be interpreted in different ways—for some they are the key to the creative understanding of today's complex realities, for others they are merely a procrustean bed into which those realities must be fitted.

A debate erupted on this theme after the young speaker left the platform to the accompaniment of applause. It was felt that by his openness and enthusiasm he had won if not the minds then at least the sympathies of many members of the audience.

By all accounts the young are impressed by many ideas which do not coincide with the convictions of Communists. Well, that is perfectly natural. And our traditional interest in young people, everything by which they live and breathe, must surely be equally natural. But is this always the case in life or in our practical work? It seems that, since the former Komsomol [Communist Youth League] changed its guidelines and to a considerable extent "moved away" from the party, the attitude of many Communists toward young people has cooled and a number of party organizations have ceased working on young people's questions and have left them to their own devices.

It is appropriate in this context to mention the following fact. The Russian youth movement "Communist Initiative" has been in existence for some months now. At the end of last year, it held its constituent congress in Moscow and elected a republic committee. The members of the youth initiative movement have quite a few sympathizers locally (at least 800,000 according to some estimates). But ask any party worker or party committee member what he knows about this movement. At best he will only have heard the name.

But these young people have their own aims and viewpoints on many phenomena and processes taking place in our society. For example, they are not as nihilistic toward the past of our country or of the Communist Party. And they are convinced that the issue is not that "socialism was built wrongly." The nub of the question is this: Socialism has now reached the stage when its internal contradictions have surfaced and become aggravated. But those contradictions are themselves sources of further movement—to a new stage of socialist society.

Of course, this is just a very compressed and simplified account of the "Initiative" group's views. One can challenge those views or disagree with them. But can one pretend that neither they nor the movement itself exist? I do not think so. Especially since this movement's young activists are quite definitely in favor of, as they put it, "becoming a youth organization of a renewed Communist Party." And by all accounts, Communist support is certainly not a matter of indifference to them.

This theme was also expressed at the meeting between readers and workers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. Incidentally, I cannot agree with the author of the notes published here that this meeting was attended "mainly by middle-aged people" who "disagree" with M. Gorbachev's policy, and so forth. I can attest that there were young people there, just as there was an incisive and keen discussion about youth problems.

Frolov Addresses PRAVDA Festival

*PM0905171591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 May 91 Second Edition p 3*

[V. Potapov, V. Skvortsov, S. Filatov report: "Cordial Meeting"]

[Text] This year foreign guests' participation in the PRAVDA festival enriched its newly established traditions. The delegations that came laid out their exhibits in the "consumer goods and services" pavilion, and many of those who came to the Exhibition of National Economic Achievements visited this pavilion during the festival's first few hours.

I.T. Frolov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and PRAVDA chief editor, delivered a welcome address, cordially greeting the foreign guests and newspaper readers. The PRAVDA festivals are becoming a thing of tradition, he stressed. Thus, the present festival—the second—has attracted much more attention than the previous one, and has drawn more participants. It is no secret, he said, that PRAVDA as well as the party is going through a complex period. So it is all the more gratifying to see how many ordinary people want to support the newspaper.

In organizing the festive occasion the PRAVDA staffers drew on the rich experience accumulated in this respect by friends from the French L'HUMANITE and the Italian L'UNITA. The active participation in the festival of the chief editors of newspapers and journals from over 20 countries worldwide testifies to PRAVDA'S establishment of fundamentally new international ties.

The chief editor especially singled out the fact that M.S. Gorbachev had sent greetings to the festival participants. It is only on the basis of open dialogue with people of varied views and convictions, he quoted M.S. Gorbachev, that our party can work out and pursue a policy enjoying the people's confidence and support. And PRAVDA is striving to act in precisely this way.

A meeting with foreign guests at the PRAVDA festival was held in the pavilion. Frolov answered numerous questions concerning Communist Party policy and the newspaper's life.

In particular he stressed that for the Soviet press—including PRAVDA—a new period of activity has arrived in which subordination and sermonizing have vanished into the past. We do not intend to correct or upbraid anyone, but that does not mean that PRAVDA will not express its opinion firmly and in a principled way, standing up for its own positions.

Answering a question from a German ADN correspondent, Frolov reported that PRAVDA has a current print run of 3.2 million copies, 700,000 of which are distributed retail. This print run has as it were been newly defined in the conditions of market relations being established in publishing. The newspaper has not found it easy in these conditions. It has needed credits. But can the prime cost of the current of ideas which the party is conducting through PRAVDA really be compared with anything? Is it really possible to find a monetary equivalent of today's festival, for the holding of which the newspaper has also allocated resources? The newspaper is now changing; it is developing into a modern publishing enterprise and possibly a concern with various branches, including its own television channel. Such diversification of the newspaper's activities will assist its economic viability and will enable the price of an issue to be made more accessible for readers. Leading world publications such as the Japanese ASAHI newspaper provide an example of the work of such concerns, the chief editor pointed out.

The chief editor dwelled especially on the newspaper's ties with its readership. The PRAVDA readers' club, the constant dialogue with the authors of letters to the newspaper, and other forms of work are intended to enrich theoretical discussions too, above all, of the draft CPSU program now being prepared. Increasing the intellectual level of speeches and [maintaining] high standards are integral parts of the party newspaper's work. Especially at the present time, when we are talking about preparing the new program, which will essentially be the making of a renewed party. It would be erroneous to oversimplify the party's ideas, which has frequently happened in the past. Party intellectuals can take perestroyka to new heights. In doing so the party and PRAVDA staffers will not only have to teach others but also study good and hard themselves. An ideological mood must prevail in the party, which must be a party with new relations.

Animation was caused among those present by a question addressed to Frolov regarding features of PRAVDA's masthead, specifically the motto "Proletariats of all countries, unite!" which virtually all newspapers have now scrapped. The newspaper's chief editor noted that he had never attached particular or fundamental importance to any external features. This slogan which ends the "Communist Party Manifesto," written by Marx and Engels, cannot of course be perceived in the same way as before. Today it remains a distinctive symbol, as it were. One can relate to it in different ways, including from the scientific viewpoint. An understanding of these words from present-day positions is important here. And so, as regards the past "bedecking" of the newspaper's name with orders, Frolov said, changing this really was necessary. There is an inscription beneath the title saying that the newspaper was founded by Lenin in 1912. That is the fundamental thing.

Now, Frolov said, many newspapers prefer to point out that they are independent, of mass appeal, and so on. PRAVDA newspaper is the organ of the CPSU Central Committee. And it plainly says so.

Concerning the prospects for PRAVDA's work, Frolov noted that agreement had already been reached with many eminent theoretical social scientists and academics about newspaper pieces following publication of the draft party program. They are setting themselves the task of showing the new things that perestroyka has brought to socialism.

Not only foreign guests and foreign journalists participated in the dialogue with the chief editor but also numerous readers of the newspaper who had gathered in the hall. This was a graphic illustration of their interest in solving the problems faced by PRAVDA.

Frolov Awarded UN Environment Prize

PM0905132491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[IAN report from news agencies roundup: "Prize for Academician Frolov"]

[Text] Academician Ivan Frolov, chief editor of PRAVDA, is the first Soviet scientist to be awarded the UNEP (United Nations Environment Program) "Global 500" prize for formulating and discussing international global problems.

Ivan Frolov is a philosopher and a biologist, and is the author of 20 books and 400 scientific articles. For over 20 years he has been interested in the study of global problems, many of which formed the basis for the new political thinking proclaimed by perestroyka. Frolov regards the establishment of an All-Union Center for Human Sciences, an Institute of Mankind, and the magazine CHELOVEK as the principal achievements of his life, the IAN agency reports.

Problems of External Broadcasting Aired

LD0705165591

[Editorial Report] Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian at 0613 GMT on 7 May carries a three-minute interview with (Vladimir Anatoliyevich Andreyev), deputy head of the All Union Television and Radio Company, by correspondent (Kirill Shakhunovich), about external radio broadcasting.

Andreyev says that the company has come to the conclusion that this is not the right time to expand, all the more so because of the lack of effectiveness of the technical equipment: The transmitters are not powerful enough, so this is probably not the way in which radio broadcasting should be developed. "For that reason the network of broadcasts has been reexamined, and the volume of broadcasts too, which will make it possible to step up programs to other countries by using the existing capacities. As far as the East European countries are concerned, our task is first of all to show in a positive light the processes underway in our country—the transformations, the pluralism of opinion and various points of view, that is to say the process of development of democratic processes."

In answer to a question about broadcasts to countries that have kept old-style regimes, like Cuba and China, Andreyev says: "We are not increasing (?the number of) broadcasts to these countries, but we are simply talking more about the processes of democraticization and transformation taking place both in the Soviet Union and the East European countries. Our idea is to show that the processes of (?de-ideologization) should take place and, we are convinced. [words indistinct] (?of these countries) cannot remain in the state where they are now."

On the subject of staffing, Andreyev admits that many highly qualified language specialists are leaving for joint enterprises and other such organizations. The company's pay is below that in other organizations. As for young creative, people, he disagrees that they are all attracted more to other broadcasting structures, such as the Russian television and radio company, and believes that if conditions are changed they will want to work for the all-union company.

Chernobyl Officials To Be Prosecuted

PM0905131691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[INTERFAX report from news agencies roundup: "Chernobyl Officials Will Be Invited To Call on the Prosecutor"]

[Text] The USSR general prosecutor has initiated criminal proceedings relating to abuse by officials of their official position and failure to carry out their duties in dealing with the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

The Belorussian section is headed by Mikhail Gordyko, investigator for particularly important cases under the republic prosecutor. He told an INTERFAX correspondent that it is essential to give a legal assessment of the criminal negligence of certain leaders of ministries and departments and republic and local organs of power, with regard to their failure adequately to protect the population from radiation.

War Hero Urges Public Vigilance

LD0905142591 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0800 GMT 9 May 91

["Festive address" by Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub; celebrated pilot of the Great Fatherland War, three-fold Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Aviation, and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet; place and date not given: "People Be Vigilant"—recorded

[Text] Our dear compatriots, brothers and sisters, servicemen of our glorious Armed Forces, war and labor veterans, our children and grandchildren, the children and grandchildren of those who failed to return from the battlefields and who defended the motherland's freedom and independence! On the bright and festive Victory Day, I address you not only in order to cordially congratulate you on this glorious day.

In these tempetuous and difficult times, conscience and duty compel me to address all those who hold their fatherland dear with words of alarm and concern for the fate of the country, for its present and future. The four years of war were a cruel test of our people. There were millions of killed and wounded, hundreds of towns were destroyed, and thousands of villages were burned down. That was the price we had to pay for our freedom and independence. Our great forefathers, from Dmitriy Donskoy to Aleksandr Nevskiy, Peter the Great, and Aleksandr Suvorov charged us to look after our power and not to yield an inch of our land to desecration. Adolf Hitler stated: The main goal in a war against the USSR is depriving the eastern peoples of any form of state organization and, in accordance with this, keeping them at the lowest possible level of culture.

Our people not merely defeated fascism. We defended our statehood, ensured the country's integrity, saved our culture, language, and traditions, and did not permit ourselves to be thrown back to an epoch of slavery and colonial yoke.

But life has shown that it is not enough to overcome the enemy in an overt battle. One must not waste the results of this victory in peace time, either. Hitler understood very well that our unity makes up for power and might. Not relying on arms alone, he asserted that, regarding the people populating the vast expanses of Russia, policy should consist in encouraging all forms of differences and splits. During the war years neither he nor Goebbels' propaganda apparatus succeeded in achieving that goal. Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, the peoples of Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Baltic, representatives of all great and small peoples fought shoulder to shoulder in a single many-million-strong rank defending common interests.

But what has happened to us now? Who has laid a mine under our common abode, with unprecedented cunning and perfidy? Why has inter-ethnic strife flared up with such a devastating intensity in the country? We already have answers to these questions. The political and ethnic stance of destructive forces can be seen clearly and graphically today. Those politicians who oppose the Union begin, in the first turn, by fighting with those who defeated fascism. Monuments to Soviet commanders are being dismantled, streets named after heroes of the Great Fatherland War are being renamed. The blasphemous rehabilitation of the enemy's accomplices—the Banderites, the Forest Brethren or Vlasovites—is underway. Ambitous leaders who have taken upon themselves the role of grave-diggers of a great power understand very well who hinders and who helps them in leading peoples astray, toward the narrow paths of national isolation.

But it is with particular bitterness and mortification that we, veterans of the Great Fatherland War, see that the destructive activity of separatists is met with support from certain people in our country. My conscience urges me to declare in all frankness that the policy of national isolation has no future, despite the enticing promises made by its advocates. It will inevitably lead to a split, not in the Union alone, but in the variegated Russia which for centuries has had cohesion as its strong point. People, do not allow anyone to deceive you! Think not only about today, but also about tomorrow! What will our children and grandchildren inherit? What they need is not a fragmented country torn by strife, but a monololithic and mighty one capable of overcoming all the vissicitudes of life and ensuring peace and economic and ecological prosperity.

As a military man, I cannot fail to voice our alarm concerning the state of our Armed Forces and their situation in society. The prestige of military service has sunk below a tolerable level. According to sociological studies, one young conscript in three says that his parents do not want him to serve in the Army. Call-up evasion and desertion have become widespread. Over the last few years, discriminatory measures taken by local authorities against servicemen have become widespread. The situation with housing for officers and warrant officers has aggravated in many regions. They cannot obtain residence permits, find jobs for their wives, or place their children in kindergartens. They have difficulties in getting coupons for food and industrial goods. Service in those republics where the Army is regarded as an alien force and Soviet soldiers are openly called occupants has become especially hard. It was not by us and it was not in our time that the phrase was uttered: The people which does not want to feed its own Army will feed a foreign one. But these words are a timely warning to us.

I am not a hawk or a militarist but, first of all, I am a man who had his full share of frontline hardship. But I know better than anyone else what grave consequences a lulled vigilance may entail and what a high price one must pay for excessive gullibility in international affairs. Martynov, a well-known military historian and general in the Tsarist army, wrote in the beginning of the century: If the words by Peter the Great—contempt for war leads to general undoing—are already considered outdated in Russia, then let them at least heed President Roosevelt, who said: A nation which fears war is falling apart on the spot. It is doomed to decline and slavery. Judging by their actions, the Americans have not forgotten the sermons by their former leader. We ought to heed the wise words uttered by our great ancestor, too.

We support perestroyka, glasnost, the genuine democratization of life, and a multiparty system. The individual is free to be a Communist, socialist, or member of other parties. But I am indignant over the rally-style aggressiveness of those who, under the banner of democratization are trying to revive the cult of the one and only correct view and who are gaining control over the masses, not by the attractiveness of their economic or political programs, but by trenchant calls such as: Out!, Down with..!, Prosecute them! As has already been the case more than once, these slogans lead to pogroms, violence, and, finally, dictatorship.

People, you must not believe those turncoats who as recently as yesterday lauded the party impetuously and played principal roles in it, but today demand that it should be brought to a kind of Nuremberg trial. Who are they going to try, these types? The political instructor or the commissar who was the first to rush to the attack with the call: Communists, ahead!. Or the killed soldier whose party card, pierced by a bullet, has been kept in a museum? Or the pilot-Communist who rammed an enemy aircraft and prevented it from bombing peaceful civilians? To what degree must one hate his own people and history to demand a trial of patriots of the motherland! What inner blindness must one have to listen indifferently to such calls! People. do not give in to provocations! Be vigilant! I believe in our society's collective reason. I know that everything alien and evil bred by ambitions and party feud will be cast away, whereas the sacred ideas of unity of the peoples and state integrity will gain the upper hand over the policy of national egoism. I know that the feats of frontline soldiers will not be forgotten, and our Army will enjoy the people's love and trust, as it always has. Best wishes on Victory Day, dear compatriots! I wish you peace, prosperity, inner strength, and unshakable faith in our country's better future!

Economic

Statistics Committee Reports Losses From Strikes

LD0805141591 Moscow TASS in English 1152 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 8 TASS—Strikes in the Soviet Union from January through March 1991 caused production shortfalls worth 218,422,000 roubles, according to a communique from the National Statistics Committee.

It says that most of the working time and output losses came in March, when 53,000 people stayed off the job.

All together, 148,000 workers laid down their tools during the first three months of the year, most of them in the Russian republic (71,000) and the Ukraine (66,000). The lowest numbers of strikers were registered in Kazakhstan (10,000) and Moldavia (1,000).

A total of 1,169,000 man-days were squandered, including 573,000 in Russia and 577,000 in the Ukraine, the communique says.

The stoppages involved the staffs of 542 factories and organisations, most of them in Russia (451).

Working time losses due to the ethnic conflict in South Ossetia from January-March added up to 2.4 million man-days, with production shortfalls in industry and construction amounting to 30 million roubles, the communique reports.

Finance Bodies on Estimated Effect of Prices

PM0105091091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 91 Union Edition pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "At the USSR State Committee for Prices and the USSR Ministry of Finance"]

[Text] The situation relating to the retail price reform remains heated. The mass media are full of assertions about the sharp discrepancy between the level of increases in retail prices and the size of compensation payments, even alleging deliberate deception of the people.

In this connection the USSR State Committee for Prices and the USSR Ministry of Finance consider it necessary to report the following.

All the estimates preceding the reform of retail prices were carried out on the basis of plan indicators for 1991. They provided the necessary detailed breakdown of the structure of trade turnover for the country as a whole and for the republics, including the volume of production, imports, and exports of goods for each commodity group. This made it possible to determine comparatively fully the total sum of retail price increases for the country and for each republic, and also the total amounts of compensation payments.

The total sum of trade turnover and paid services at prices established in accordance with existing legislation and normative acts as of 1 January 1991 was defined as 519 billion rubles [R], which was R149 per capita per month. The estimate of the total sum of trade turnover did not take into account the new increased retail prices established in Estonia last year or any of the various types of commercial and "contract" prices established for a wide range of goods by the decisions of local organizations in direct violation of legislation, exceeding the powers of the said organizations.

The size of the price increases was decided for each category of prices (fixed, regulated, free) on the basis of the upper limits for price increases that were agreed with the republics. For fixed prices, the total increase was set by a direct calculation based on the envisaged change in prices for a specific range of goods and the volume of sales of such goods.

We cite these estimates (in billion rubles), broken down into the most important commodity groups.

	total at old prices	total at new prices	price increase:	
			actual	percent
Food products	77.28	199.82	122.54	159
of which:				
Meat and meat products	24.23	72.70	48.47	200
Milk and dairy products and butter	17.2	38.35	21.15	123
Bread and grain products, including groats and pasta	12.5	37.5	25.0	200
Tea	2.5	5.0	2.5	100
Sugar	6.8	16.0	9.2	135
Salt	0.16	0.54	0.38	240
Eggs	5.1	10.2	5.1	100
Concentrated food products	0.5	1.5	1.0	200
Fish and fish products (excluding luxury products)	4.84	11.13	6.29	130
Vegetable oil, margarine, and mayonnaise	3.45	6.9	3.45	100
Nonfood products	47.8	112.1	64.3	135
of which:				
Children's products	10.9	32.16	21.86	195
Tobacco products (excluding imports)	5.39	8.14	2.75	50
Underwear, clothing, and standard types of footwear	27.6	64.9	37.3	135
Cultural, domestic, and household goods	3.42	6.01	2.59	75
Toilet and household soap	0.46	0.92	0.46	100
Total at fixed prices	125.05	311.91	186.86	149

Footnotes:
1. Of which: beef—up 265 percent; poultry—up 64 percent.
2. Of which: rye bread—up 300 percent; rolls made from top-grade wheat flour—up 140 percent.

It is well known that the agreement between the USSR and the republics on the reform of retail prices and social protection of the population makes provision for the introduction, alongside fixed prices, of regulated and free prices whose specific level is determined by agreement between suppliers and trade organizations. The estimate of the total change in these prices is largely a prediction. It was calculated taking into account the monetary incomes of various population categories and normal (not panic) demand. For output sold at regulated prices, the new wholesale price level was also taken into account. In total, for goods that are to be sold at free prices, the increase in prices was estimated at R63.4 billion (96 percent), and for those sold at regulated prices it was estimated at R53.3 billion (75 percent). The relatively smaller increase in free and regulated prices compared with fixed prices is associated with the lower level of subsidies or unprofitability in the production of these goods at the prices formerly in operation.

The said agreement did not provide for an increase in prices for vodka, gasoline, articles made from synthetic fibers, domestic fuel, and medical supplies, or for fruit and vegetable produce, potatoes, jewelry, luxury food products, and fashion and prestige goods, which have been sold at free prices since 15 November 1990, or for printed matter and certain other goods. The total volume of trade turnover of these goods will amount to R189.6 billion.

As regards paid services, the agreement provided for an increase in tariffs for railroad shipments of 70 percent, for air shipments—80 percent, for maritime shipments—140 percent, and also for unionwide communications services—20 percent. The total sum of increases in tariffs, according to the estimates, amounts to R7.3 billion.

Thus with the total volume of trade turnover and paid services amounting to R519 billion, the estimated total increase in prices and tariffs was R311 billion. The average size of the increase in prices, over the entire range of goods and services, is estimated at 60 percent. Taking into account the change in taxes, which automatically increase as a result of the increase in prices (sales tax, import tax), the total volume of the change in the value of output estimated for the year amounts to R327 billion. Taking into account the fact that the new prices were introduced from 2 April this year, and also the extension of the list of concessions on sales tax in accordance with the USSR president's 5 April 1991 decree, according to the estimate for nine months the change in the value of goods and services is set at R240 billion.

Into what areas are these funds being channeled?

First, all types of monetary compensation to the population: working people, pensioners, students, servicemen, families with children. Under the nine-month estimate, R188.3 billion will be directed into these areas. These compensation sums are defined solely according to the guaranteed minimum levels set by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. Republics and enterprises may increase the size of compensation payments out of their own resources. According to population groups, compensation payments are distributed as follows:

	Billions of Rubles
To working people in the state sector of the material production sphere	49.4
To working people in the nonproduction sphere of which	35.5
Increase in wage rates and salaries	10.7
To sovkhoz and kolkhoz workers	12.1
Grants to families with children	47.6
To servicemen and military construction workers	7.7
To students	5.7
To nonworking pensioners	29.2
To the unemployed	1.1

Moreover, the change in the conditions of exaction of income tax from working people's wages will lead to a fall in the sum paid into the budget of R8.5 billion, which constitutes additional compensation to the population.

The budget will also compensate for the increase in prices of goods consumed in hospitals, children's homes, old people's homes, and other budget-financed institutions, in the total sum of R9.8 billion, of which R6.2 billion goes on food products, which constitutes direct compensation to the population.

Thus the total compensation to the population is R203 billion, or 85 percent of the change in retail prices.

The increase in retail prices also required an increase in expenditure on maintaining the army and law enforcement organizations in connection with the increase in normative costs for expenditure on food, kit, and material provisions for their functioning. An additional R7.4 billion is earmarked for these purposes.

It is well known that prices for medical supplies sold to the population and to health care institutions have not been increased. In this connection additional budget expenditure, according to detailed information, could reach R16 billion, since wholesale prices for Soviet-produced medicines and the contract cost of imported medicines are greater than retail prices.

It should also be borne in mind that on 6 April this year the USSR Cabinet of Ministers adopted a supplementary decision on compensation for the increased expenditure of students using the services of public catering enterprises at their place of study. Expenditure on the implementation of this decision will amount to more than R10 billion, according to the nine-month estimate.

As a result the total sum of funds channeled into compensatory measures for the social protection of the population, increased wages in nonproduction sectors, and support for budget-financed institutions and organizations is set at R240 billion, and thus virtually corresponds to the size of the change in prices.

The figures cited reflect those indicators of the retail price reform that were agreed between the Governments of the USSR and the republics, were submitted for consideration by the Supreme Soviets, and formed the basis for the decision on implementing the reform.

The actual situation differs from the estimated indicators at the moment. In some republics prices for certain goods have been set in excess of the agreed upper limits, while in the Central Asian republics bread prices have been held, and prices for a number of other goods increased to a lesser extent. The increase in free prices for such goods as furniture and confectionery was larger than expected in the estimates. Tariffs for suburban railroad shipments set by the Ministry of Railways by agreement with local soviets also increased on a considerably larger scale.

Local organizations made very substantial amendments to the size of price increases by increasing from 2 April the tariffs for urban passenger transport, consumer services, certain municipal services, and a number of other services and goods, which was not envisaged in the agreement. According to preliminary estimates, this has increased the total level of prices by approximately R30 billion. Mention should be made of the selective nature of this increase, which primarily affected the incomes of the population of major industrial centers. These questions fall within the competence of local organizations, but as they timed their decision to coincide with the general price reform, they should have made provision for compensating the population for the additional expenses. In accordance with the joint statement of the USSR president and leaders of Union republics on urgent measures to stabilize the situation in the country and overcome the crisis, the USSR State Committee for Prices and the USSR Ministry of Finance, together with the republics' governments, will in the near future clarify and analyze the actual situation regarding prices, in particular regulated and free prices, as well as transportation tariffs, and will prepare proposals on the questions causing the greatest social tension.

Article Advocates Economic 'Cold Turkey'

PM0905133391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Otto Latsis article: "Cold Turkey, Or Some Points on the Nature of Prices"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] What are the opportunities, real rather than imagined, to halt real price growth today? Basically there are two such opportunities. One is in the government's hands, while the other is in the hands of all of us, all of society. Let us start with the first.

The journal KOMMUNIST (Nos. 1 and 6, 1991) featured articles by the economists A. Ozhegov, Ye. Rogovskiy, and Yu. Yaremenko and the political scientist S. Rogov about the problems of defense industry conversion and military reform. Expressed in world market prices, our machine building output (on the basis of the figures for 1988) is distributed as follows: 32 percent is made up of investment equipment, 62-63 percent of armaments and military hardware, and 5-6 percent of consumer goods. Clearly, producers of military hardware will appear in the stores with their pay, but without any goods. As long as we have this production structure, it is useless for customers who are flabbergasted at the price of jeans or shoes to ask about their prime cost. Prices of consumer goods also "include" the prime cost of tanks, missiles, bombers, and submarines—we do not buy these goods, but we have to pay for them, and some people have to pay more.

Yet the defense industry conversion program worked out by the defense departments contains a request for huge new capital investment while increasing consumer goods production by a very modest amount. Under the military reform concept proposed by the USSR Defense Ministry, military spending is planned to grow considerably in 1991-1995. The emphasis on quantity will be maintained, which will inevitably harm the quality of our actual defense potential.

The departments' policy runs counter not only to the interests of the economy, but to the interests of defense itself. We do not need to have expensive defense industry capacity in reserve or large stockpiles of rapidly aging arms that are familiar to potential enemies. We need mobile capacity that can be rapidly restructured, and reserves of unfamiliar equipment of new design, reserves of technology. We do not need a big army for which we can only provide pathetic social conditions—we need an army that is limited in size, but well supplied, trained, and equipped. The entire structure of our defense spending runs counter to modern ideas: We spend most on ordering items from the defense industry, and least on developing new military hardware and providing for Army personnel. Incidentally, the structure of the U.S. military budget is the complete opposite of ours. A sensible structure will make for greater defense capability with lower budget expenditure—that is the specialists' conclusion.

Sensible conversion will ensure that the flow of goods onto the market will increase as demand (the flow of money) declines. The famous "500 days" program for the transition to the market attempted to make use of this resource. Was it realistic in this respect? I fear not. It proposed resolving the task of reducing military spending so quickly that conversion could have ended up by impairing defense industry potential—and, after all, it represents the strongest of all our industrial sectors. No, I am not one of those people who are now undeservedly mocking the program and making unqualified accusations. I do not understand how people can be glad that it was rejected. The "500" program was a fine, professional piece of work and it would be fair to say this about its fate: It was unfortunate that we could not adopt it; it was unfortunate that it could not save us. But the overall logic of our actions during the transition to the market—if not all our specific decisions—should follow the program's logic. As for specific decisions, we ought to approach seriously unusual ideas such as that recently voiced in the press of temporarily paying working people at certain defense enterprises regardless of output production. They should be paid in order to retain skilled cadres, but they should not be making things we do not need; we should not waste money.

It is understandable that those people—from deputies to strike committees—who intend to tackle prices policy seriously need to intervene in it while things can still be changed: when decisions are being made on major spending (of whatever kind, be it defense or social) that is not covered by income. When such spending has taken place and the flood of money has swamped the market, protests against price rises will be just a waste of breath.

Okay, readers might say, that is all up to the authorities, but what can we do to stop price increases? Unfortunately, there is no new answer to that. Just the one thing that everybody knows—work. Of course, rallies—or, even worse, strikes—can be staged. These will not lead to reduced prices, only to new increases. The authorities may take fright and again order some price to be made more reasonable—but that would be another deception. Furthermore, the promises about full compensation and per capita indexation are also deception or self-deception. Indexation for all—that is, the automatic uprating of pay as prices rise—will merely devalue savings and strengthen the power of speculators. Full indexation is justifiable for those on fixed incomes—pensions, grants, payments for children, and salaries of government employees in the budget sphere—such as teachers, doctors, servicemen, the militia, and so forth. Those who work in the economically accountable sphere should rely on their own efforts to boost production and, therefore, their incomes.

We have gotten used to managing prices not as the market dictates, but as government employees dictate.

For many people this system is convenient and advantageous, others place their faith in the semblance of benefit it affords. The usual defense against a strict market assessment of the work of each of us is like a drug: It is nice to be ill but awful to get better. It is easy to get hooked on this drug: It makes our inevitable downfall invisible for a time. But coming off the drug is horrible. The price of recovery is going cold turkey, to use the medical term. By turning to market prices, we are giving up our consoling fix—and the country's entire socioeconomic organism will suddenly go cold turkey. We have to get through it, hang on at all costs and get through it. We have to pass up the offer of a relieving fix from hypocritical sympathizers. We have to help the weak and support those who are doing an unpopular but necessary job.

Price liberalization is merely the spearhead of the attack on the old system. Cold turkey goes further than that, it covers all the socioeconomic ideas of institutionalized socialism. Our cozy view of the state as an omnipotent deity that can and should "provide" something will break down—we will suddenly realize that it can only provide what it takes from us. The myth of the protective distributive omnipotence of socialism will break down—we will suddenly realize that only what has been produced can be distributed. Our society will become a prosperous society only if it proves its worth in production rather than distribution. Faith in mobilization methods and the usefulness of emergency steps will break down, the "firm hand" will weaken, and the "turning of the screw" will end. Cold turkey will result in whole social strata being turned upside down, parties will disintegrate, and politicians will unexpectedly emerge.

People who want to exploit a sick society's sufferings and delusions will also appear. Both liberal extremists and reactionary extremists are training for this. It is so easy nowadays to make political capital out of criticizing the government—all the more so as its mistakes are obvious. It is not a question of those who want to correct these mistakes and continue the reform policy. Others have come to the fore who are incapable of suggesting anything except turning back—we even heard from them at the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum. They particularly like complaining about prices, taxes, and wages. They are opening old wounds in order to prevent our recovery.

Let us not forget that cold turkey is a recovery process; but only for those who can stick it out.

Agricultural

Continuing Agricultural Decline Seen

PM0705101191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 91 p 1

[Report by Ye. Yakovleva: "Low-Calorie Figure"]

[Text] We have achieved a record: In the first three months of the year the volume of agricultural production fell by 13 percent.

But, to all appearances, we are not stopping there. Production of meat, milk, and eggs is dwindling. The republic reduction records—according to State Committee for Statistics reports—are held by Georgia, Armenia, and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova. Livestock numbers are declining and there is a feed shortage. It is better to keep ten high-yield cows than 100 kolkhoz critters each giving a jug of milk a day—this is our clear and sensible intention; but, alas, the reality is that the numnber of wretched critters has dwindled to 10 and and there are problems with the high yields.

The decline was set in motion last year and it looks like continuing this year.

By the start of the sowing campaign around 90 percent of the equipment had still to be overhauled. There are not enough potatoes for planting (supplies stand at 80 percent) or seeds for pulse crops (87 percent).

Planting of potatoes, vegetables, sugar beets, and cotton has been dwindling for five years now. It is laborious and unprofitable... In view of the fact that last fall the cities refused point-blank to go out and do urgent harvest work, even fewer potatoes are going to be planted this spring.

It is an old adage that it is unprofitable for our kolkhozes to produce anything that people enjoy at the table. All the economic efforts of recent years to link demand and supply and regulate production by increasing purchase prices have had the opposite effect: Production is falling.

The only thing that is not in decline in our agriculture, but is rapidly increasing, is the number of individual farmers. But, judging by how many there are, they will not determine the food situation this year.

Kashin on Agricultural Problems, Programs

914B0151A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 6 May 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Vladimir Kashin, Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party and candidate of agricultural sciences: "'About To Die, But Sow the Rye'"]

[Text] *Things are particularly difficult for the peasants in the present year. A considerably greater amount of field work than in past years is having to be performed by a lesser quantity of tractors and other agricultural equipment. Add to this the moral-psychological pressure on the part of the financial authorities of the country and Russia and the industrial enterprises and their constant attacks on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms], particularly on their leaders and specialists, and you will understand how they feel at this time.*

The peasants should be in revolt in such a situation, it might have seemed—their life is no easier than that of the miners. But the peasants are working from early morning till late at night, showing by example that it is only possible to emerge from the crisis situation in the country thanks to selfless labor. A piece of folk wisdom says: "About to die, but sow the rye." They were the first to appeal to the miners to end their strike and they declared that they could not strike, although life was worrying them to death. But the grain has to be cultivated for the people. The moral principles of the rural workers and their understanding of their duty and responsibility for the fate of the state and for bread for the people—this is the pivot which is holding back our breadwinners from ill-considered steps.

But are the breadwinners like this, people may object. Are not the kolkhozes and sovkhozes to blame for the food crisis? Well, let us address the facts.

In the years of Soviet power only 22 percent of the total capital investments in the national economy have been channeled into agriculture, although the proportion of national revenue created in the agro-industrial complex constitutes 28-30 percent, and considering the part thereof realized in other sectors, 38-40 percent. Whence the conclusion that industry, transport, and other spheres of the economy, to which not only material and financial but also human resources have been transferred, have developed at the expense of the countryside. We should, on the contrary, be amazed at the resilience of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and say thanks to the rural inhabitants, who have together with the whole people borne on their shoulders the grim war years, the postwar devastation, and the endless injuries in all periods of their development. And they have not only survived but also constantly increased agricultural production.

No one denies the fact that, had there not been major mistakes in the development of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system, more could have been achieved. Nor can we deny what has been done. And, then, concealing what awaits the tenant farmer today is dishonest. And what does await him is most arduous labor from morning till night, without days off and holidays, and the fact that the tenant farmers alone will in the years to come hardly succeed in solving the food problem even partially.

Statesmen of Russia have not once said anywhere in their reports and programs how much the republic will obtain in the way of additional farm produce from the tenant farms. This is being deliberately glossed over since, even given the total tenant-farmerization of agriculture at the expense, naturally, of the destruction of many kolkhozes and sovkhozes, the addition could be scant. Computing it is easy.

Only the calculations must be realistic, not mythical, not those which are being employed in the Association of Peasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives of Russia [AKKOR]. For example, this is information, disinformation, rather, communicated by N. Popov, general director of the AKKOR: "1) two-thirds of kolkhozes and sovkhozes are unprofitable, and the state feeds them, encouraging dependency; 2) 1 billion rubles [R] has been allocated for tenant farming in 1991—this is niggardly compared with the R20 billion allocated by the state for financing the kolkhozes and sovkhozes; 3) there are in Russia today 8,500 tenant farmers and 4,500 agricultural cooperatives, which could this year produce five to 10 percent of the total gross agricultural product."

First, unprofitable farms in Russia, per the work results of 1990, constituted approximately one percent, not two-thirds. Second, what is niggardly is not R1 billion for 13,000 tenant and cooperative farms, but R20 billion for 28,200 kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and interfarm enterprises since there are for the tenant farms approximately R1,700 per hectare of land, but on the public farms, only R98. Such is this sly "niggardly." Third, for the production of R5-R10 billion of agricultural products (five to 10 percent of the total in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]) each farmer and cooperator would have to be producing on average R380,000-R700,000 thereof or 40-80 times more than is today the average of those working on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Is this realistic given today's level of equipment availability and inadequate material facilities of the peasant farms?

The answer, I believe, is clear to all....

The newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY this January carried a comment by S. Baymukhametov, a member of the USSR Writers Union, in which there was not a line that did not contain accusations leveled at the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This writer does not like public property—this is a matter of his conscience and beliefs—but falsifying statistical data and confusing credulous readers is not allowed. The author of the comment writes that 60 percent of the total production of potatoes, 30 percent of the vegetables, and 27-30 percent of the milk and meat are produced on three percent of the plow land in the personal use of the populace.

Where did he get these figures? What little bird whispered them to him? The true state of affairs is as follows: Last year they produced R23.8 billion of agricultural produce, which constitutes 23 percent of the gross agricultural product in the republic. But this amount was not obtained from three percent of the plow land (3 million hectares).

On this land the populace cultivates mainly potatoes, vegetables, grapes, fruit and berries, and other food crops, but use is made for the keeping of livestock and poultry on the land of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and forest resources—plow land, natural hayfields, and pasture. Some 35-40 million tons of feed units, which can be obtained from 25-30 million hectares of land, are required annually by the personal subsidiary plots for the production of milk, meat, eggs, and wool. That is, the populace is provided with feed mainly from the land of the public sector of production (this means hay, straw, fodder root crops, silage...). Some 10-15 million tons of grain alone, for whose cultivation 7-10 million hectares of plow land are required, are allocated the personal homesteads. Such is the arithmetic.

That justifiable unhappiness with the command-bureaucratic system and the peasants' estrangement from the results of their labor had long been maturing among the kolkhoz and sovkhoz peasantry is another matter. I believe that the main emphasis of today's agrarian policy should be geared precisely to the revival and development of public forms of the production of the system of civilized cooperatives about which Lenin was thinking at the end of his life.

The multistructural nature of the rural economy proclaimed by the 27th CPSU Congress we support, but believe that artificially accelerating events is just as harmful as holding back the process of the formation of tenant farms. Multistructure is a reality of our times. Some 25,000 kolkhozes and sovkhozes, 2,800 interfarm enterprises, approximately 300 agro-industrial associations and integrated works, 53 agrofirms, 22 joint stock forms [as published], 14,000 subsidiary plots of industrial enterprises, approximately 4,500 agricultural cooperatives and 8,500 peasant (tenant) farms are functioning in Russia currently, more than 8 million families are engaged in the cultivation of produce in horticultural cooperatives and over 15 million families have private subsidiary plots. We have everything. All these forms should have an equal right to life and comprehensive support on the part of the state, the working class, and the cities and industrial centers. Otherwise all the present organizations and innovations will remain declarations.

The main thing is to avoid the previous mistakes typical of all reorganizations and experiments in the countryside, making of paramount concern the interests of the peasants themselves. After all, previously all policy was directed, alas, at the extraction from the countryside of the maximum possible without compensation for the heavy labor of the rural inhabitants.

The present processes and reformations are repeating these mistakes, unfortunately. We recall the decisions of the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, which examined primarily the agrarian question. The lengthy debate ultimately led to the adoption of the decree "Program of the Revival of the Russian Countryside and Development of the Agro-Industrial Complex." All authorities and organizations were instructed to give priority to the development of the agro-industrial complex and, as of 1991, to channel no less than 15 percent of the RSFSR's national revenue to this end.

The peasants and all who are associated with the processing of their products and agricultural services would finally be able to breathe easier, it might have seemed. But the rural inhabitants and, particularly, the leaders quickly became disenchanted and saw that the program was of a sham and populist nature: It was not buttressed by financial and material and technical resources, and the whole of tax policy and pricing would lead to the destruction of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and not to the revival but the ruin of the countryside.

The revival of the countryside does not mean, I believe, distribution of the land to the peasants and all those who desire it but primarily the accelerated building of roads, housing, hospitals and schools, electrification, the mechanization and supply of gas to production and domestic living, the development of municipal services and general amenities and an improvement in the peasants' living conditions. Without this we will not halt the migration of the rural population and we will not revive dying villages and, consequently, we will not obtain more produce from the countryside than we do currently.

The peasants have appealed repeatedly with great anxiety and pain in their hearts to the Supreme Soviet and the Russian Government to turn toward the countryside and to hear their voice. We can only wonder why the present leaders of Russia do not hear them and are making decisions on agrarian and peasant matters fed to them by townspeople-scientists who have not, as a rule, worked in the countryside and who have long lived "on asphalt."

What is the explanation for this? In whose interests are the "democrats" working and for the sake of who and what are they pursuing their policy of the sale of land into private ownership and of the privatization and denationalization of the sovkhozes and other enterprises?

Even the Saratov governor, P. Stolypin, subsequently the author of the not-unknown agrarian reform, was the height of candor and did not conceal its consequences from the people. In a report for 1904 he wrote: "At the present time the stronger peasant usually becomes a kulak and exploiter of his fellow villagers, a bloodsucker, in the figurative expression. Thus, virtually the peasant's sole escape from poverty and darkness is the prominent, according to rural views, muzhik's career. This was a career for individuals, but for the bulk of rural inhabitants it meant slavery and their conversion into farm laborers. In Lenin's words, "Stolypin's agrarian legislation...means encouragement of the plunder of the communes by the kulaks and a breakup of the old land relations in favor of a handful of prosperous owners at a price of the rapid ruin of the masses. It was the second major step of mass coercion of the peasantry in the interests of capitalism."

So today also people should know precisely what awaits them, what the latest agrarian reform promises them and what labor in the countryside would be like, whether or not there would be a social stratification of the peasantry and what their lives would be like one, five, 10 and 20 years hence. Nor would it be inappropriate for the people to know that an abrupt breakup of production relations in the countryside and a break with the current system of agriculture have always led to a 25- to 40-percent decline in the production of farm products and, as a result, to famine. History has confirmed this repeatedly.

And today we are once again on the brink of famine. The rate of decline in the production of animal husbandry products in the current year has reached catastrophic proportions and amounted to 10-17 percent; we did not experience this once throughout the postwar years.

Can it be that we communists and social democrats, centrists and radicals desire grief and suffering for our people? After all, what has been created over decades may be destroyed very quickly, but restoring and, further, multiplying everything and improving life would take decades.

Opposition to the interests of the agro-industrial complex and attempts to distract the state authorities from the accomplishment of urgent tasks in agriculture continued at the Third Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. Few constructive proposals pertaining to a solution of agrarian problems were heard in B. Yeltsin's report either. In the sphere of an increase in food production he proclaimed as the main measure the maximum and rapid satisfaction of the citizens' requests pertaining to the allotment to them of land, the lifting of all restrictions on the freedom of trade in agricultural products and the encouragement of the formation of trade and purchasing cooperatives and private enterprises trading in and delivering farm produce to the cities. That is, the emphasis is being put on support for the private sector and its protection in the system of forms of ownership.

The government measures set forth in I. Silayev's report are geared to this. It is proposed "to embark in the next few weeks on privatization of enterprises of the sectors serving agriculture in order by the start of the harvesting to have developed an extensive network of trade and purchasing and service organizations with varying forms of property ownership."

Excuse me, but the implementation of such privatization measures in a period of the disintegration of the economy and practically demolished business ties would inevitably involve outfits in a struggle for their rights and distract them from their main activity. The more so in that the privatization process is assuming a chargeable and forcible nature today even: It is planned to start it in the next few weeks, having created an interest in this on the part of the local soviets, into whose coffers will go 80 percent of the resources obtained from privatization.... All this will lead to the final collapse of the service support of the agricultural enterprises, the creation for them of additional difficulties, and a deterioration in the results of their activity and will exacerbate the food situation even more.

The main thing now is to increase the production of agricultural products and to improve their preservation and processing and to reduce losses appreciably. But the program of Russia's leaders says practically nothing about this most important aspect. It also glosses over how to avert a further decline in agricultural production and what needs to be done to help the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, peasant (tenant) farms and interfarm enterprises in the completion of the livestock wintering, preservation of the numbers thereof, and an increase in productiveness.

It is time that we all understood that comprehensive measures pertaining to the extrication of the sector from its critical condition are necessary. Daily painstaking work is essential. The edict of the president of the USSR of 8 April 1991, "Urgent Measures in Agriculture" and the USSR Supreme Soviet decree "State of Affairs in Agriculture and Urgent Measures Pertaining to the Preparation for Field Work" orient us toward this also.

The RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo is also seriously concerned at the current situation in agriculture and is orienting the local party organizations toward rendering the soviet and economic authorities assistance in surmounting the difficulties and establishing normal work.

We call for such actions from all other parties and social and political organizations, and for the unions, to involve themselves specifically in creative work and help the working people of the countryside emerge from their troubles for the good of the whole people.

The situation is so serious that it cannot be underestimated—this would be tantamount to signing our own death warrant. Is this what we want? The common sense of the continuation of life and assurance of a better lot for our children and grandchildren must prevail, for all that!

Military

Akhromeyev Discusses Military Balance

Part 1

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[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev by NOVOYE VREMYA Editor-in-Chief Aleksandr Borisovich Pumpyanskiy, Commentator Yevgeniy Rusakov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov: "Is Everything Reasonably Sufficient?"]

[Text] **In War like in any Other War. But also After War like After any Other War.... What Is the Army's Role After the Cold War?**

Our guest, interlocutor, and opponent is Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev. NOVOYE VREMYA

Editor-in-Chief Aleksandr Pumpyanskiy, Commentator Yevgeniy Rusakov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov participated in the discussion.

Certain recent NOVOYE VREMYA articles served as the basis for the discussion.

[Pumpyanskiy] It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to NOVOYE VREMYA territory, Sergey Fedorovich. When you proposed the idea of a direct discussion, I responded to you that my colleagues and I considered this opportunity to be an honor. I am not being deceitful. It is more often different: when responding to criticism or when a question is more or less sharply posed, officials complain about us to the highest levels of authority and request that journalists be called to order....

[Akhromeyev] In that case, I must also say that I even reported my disagreement with one of your articles (NOVOYE VREMYA, No. 2/91) to the president. Yes and how could I act otherwise when several military district commanders called me and protested.

[Pumpyanskiy] It seems that I have not begun this discussion in the most appropriate manner. Nevertheless one more preliminary comment. If and when we enter into polemics, it will not at all be with the goal of pinning someone to the wall or even to protect someone personally according to the principle: "ours"—"alien", "ours"—"not ours." We are interested in clarifying and presenting your point of view on pivotal security problems and relations between the Army and society to our readers.

And now down to business. It seems to me that the main thing is to answer the question: does a military threat exist for the Soviet Union today? If yes, then from where does it originate? What is the size, nature, and direction of the threat? All remaining questions and answers, including military structural development, are derivative.

[Akhromeyev] Actually, this is a fundamental question. Our foreign policy in many ways and the Soviet Union's domestic situation to a large degree depend on the answer to that question.

Today a military threat does exist for the Soviet Union. And it primarily originates from the United States and NATO. But today this threat is different and is not the same one that it used to be. Three or four years ago this was a direct threat of war. Today there is none. The military threat and tension have diminished significantly. Normal relations are being established between the countries. But today you could not call United States policy with regard to the Soviet Union simple. It interweaves the aspiration to find mutual understanding and to even establish cooperation with the Soviet Union with pressure on us using various techniques, including military force. This is the threat. I will try to demonstrate this.

First. The Warsaw Treaty military organization has been eliminated. The NATO Bloc military organization has survived. They assert that the NATO Bloc has been preserved to protect Western democracy and because of the military threat from the USSR. I think this is trivial. Today no one in Europe is threatening the NATO Bloc.

There is an official document called "U.S. National Security Strategy" which President Bush submitted to the Congress during the Spring of 1990. Congress took it into consideration (actually approved it). Nearly a year has passed since this document was introduced but nowhere has it been said that it is no longer in force. This is what President Bush said in it: "No matter what course the Soviets choose during the next decade, the Soviet Union will remain an awesome military power. The United States must also have a modern defense at its disposal in the future which will increase deterrence and strengthen security." This clearly states how the United States regards the Soviet Union today. Yes, Paris was after this and we and the United States signed three important treaties there and officially stated that we do not consider each other as enemies but "U.S. National Security Strategy" also remains in force.

Second. We are conducting negotiations with the United States on the reduction of all types of weapons other than naval weapons. And for just one reason: the United States has multiple superiority in naval forces over us and does not want to reduce them.

Third. Having surrounded the Soviet Union 40 years ago with its military and naval bases, the United States still maintains these bases now. And none of our American negotiating partners can say why the United States needs these bases today and there are 1,500 of them and armed forces totaling 500,000 men are maintained on them. But the answer is clear. They are needed to exert military pressure on the Soviet Union.

Fourth. The USSR has state interests which do not coincide with the interests of other countries. Take the problem of the Kurile Islands. The United States officially supports Japan in her claims on the southern Kurile Island chain. Finally, there is the Baltic problem. Does the United States position with regard to the entry of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union in 1940 coincide with the interests of the Soviet Union? The interests of the USSR and of the United States far from always coincide. We need to frankly say this. The Americans are not shy about doing this. All of this requires us to have those minimal armed forces that can provide our state the capability to defend the Soviet Union's state interests and prevent interference in our internal affairs.

About Nuclear Weapons, Vietnams, and Afghanistans

[Pumpyanskiy] This requires clarification.

It is one thing when an Army threatened our border and which was about to invade our borders and attempt to seize our territory and enslave our people. That is one situation. Does such a military threat exist? If yes, then everything is clear and we only need to think well. If Alexander the Great is on our border, then we need to have one hundred elephants. If we do not have 100 elephants but 100 whales, then preliminarily of course we need to resolve the strategic riddle of childhood: which is stronger—an elephant or a whale. If Bonaparte is threatening us with his continental army, we also need to put 600,000 men under arms. The traditional logic of our military propaganda creates precisely this perception of the threat among our people. If you will, this is the 1812 or 1941 syndrome. The entire Cold War epic literature operated on this. We instilled in the people: our primary enemies are American imperialists, West German revanchists, Japanese militarists, NATO, and the West. All of these mighty powers were threatening us and they intend to invade and launch a nuclear attack at any moment. If this is actually so, then our conduct is logical. Everything—for the army! We will tighten our belts, create a military economy at any price, and sacrifice everything, but we will not permit the worst.

But is that the situation today? A different picture arises from what you are saying. The very existence of a powerful American military force is the threat. But this is already a fundamentally different situation and we should draw entirely different conclusions from it. Let us still determine if any changes have taken place in your definition of the threat? And were the traditional ideological and political precepts (that existed in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's) in this regard correct?

[Akhromeyev] The Soviet Union has been conducting a new foreign policy for five years. It was formulated in 1986. All of the fundamental changes which have occurred in Europe are primarily the result of our foreign policy. When we began to implement it, we assumed that changes would occur in Central Europe and that the unification of Germany would possibly occur. This did not happen all of a sudden. In a state like ours, foreign policy is not planned for one year or even for several years. Therefore we calculated that the elimination or at least the significant reduction of the threat of war and the changes that are taking place would be the result of this foreign policy. We have achieved that. Have our Western partners met us halfway? Yes. The United States vacillated for a long time but later moved toward the achievement of mutual understanding with the Soviet Union and an arrangement with us. The countries of Western Europe also met us halfway and maybe even to a greater degree. And therefore today we are not talking about the threat of war [voyennaya ugroza] but about the military threat [voyennaya opasnost].

And the military threat and tension have diminished and, I would say, they have even lost their shape. Does a direct threat of the initiation of war exist today? Can one contend that NATO's armies stand on our borders, ready to begin aggression in a short period of time? It is impossible to contend that. Today there is no such direct threat of war for the Soviet Union. I am convinced that it does not exist either for us or for the other countries of Europe. This is a joint achievement of the USSR and the countries of the West. But something else has remained (I am repeating this): military pressure on us has not ceased. The Soviet Union's state interests have remained and the Soviet Union's socialist choice has remained which need to be protected. And there are forces, external forces, that are seeking to get the Soviet Union to conduct a policy that suits them and that does not always meet our interests. I am frankly saying that these forces exist in the United States and that these forces exist in other countries. We must have the minimally required military force and, of course, not only military, so that we can conduct our own independent foreign policy. And first of all, we need to have an economy and we need the people to support this policy. Everything must be balanced.

[Pumpyanskiy] The Soviet Union's new foreign policy is unquestionably a fundamental factor. But with all of the desire to compliment our country and our foreign policy, our leadership should still be modest. We are saying that perestroyka is a return of common sense. Common sense has returned to us and the West has responded. If common sense had returned to us earlier, the West also would have responded earlier. By the way, this is so. The main thing is that a fundamental change in the assessment of the threat of war has occurred.

Previously, it was thought—justifiably or not, that is another question—that a direct threat of invasion existed. Right now this is not so. This is a revolutionary change in consciousness but our military thought has still not drawn the appropriate conclusions because then there must also be fundamental changes here. Entirely different forces are clearly needed to repel a different threat. Then the principle of reasonable sufficiency is already natural and we have subscribed to it on the political level. But our military people are reacting very noisily to proposals to reduce a thousand excess, even obsolete, tanks in order to serenely believe that the idea has also been accepted by the military.

In war like in any other war. But also after war like after any other war. Demilitarization of the country is also natural after the Cold War. Instead of this, panic has arisen: they say we will be left completely defenseless....

[Rogov] What can present a military threat for a nuclear superpower like the Soviet Union? As long as nuclear weapons exist and as long as the United States is capable of destroying the Soviet Union in 30 minutes and the reverse, the military threat will be preserved.

But we must consider not only the capabilities of potential enemies but also their intentions. And today both we and the Americans are admitting that neither we nor they intend to initiate a thermonuclear war. From this point of view, your thesis that NATO and the United States present a threat to the Soviet Union signifies approximately the same as what Bush said with regard to the United States. But this message contains a whole series of fundamentally new, previously unseen theses in

American policy for Congress which are in keeping with the new political thinking. For example, it talks about the reduction of the role of military force and about the need to develop cooperation with the Soviet Union and a shift from confrontation to partnership. American presidents have never spoken such language during the last 40 years.

[Pumpyanskiy] I must generally admit that Bush's "horrible" quote did not horrify me at all. Yes, in the circumstances that have developed the potential on that side is already grounds (or justification) that there should also be a definite potential on this side. But if the concept of the threat of war is exhausted by the very fact of physical force on that side, then entirely different conclusions follow from this. First, define what you are or what you want to become to each other—an enemy, opponent, partner, something else or, I am horrified to even articulate it, an ally in world affairs. And as soon as we decide that there are no hostile intentions, then reduce the military component. Mutually reduce. Prove our good intentions to each other. There are no grounds to threaten someone or to increase the revolutions of the military machine.

[Akhromeyev] Dear comrades, there are three of you and I am alone. You have immediately posed many questions and it is difficult to answer. When I spoke about the military threat, I certainly considered that the parties have nuclear weapons which are a means of deterrence. It constantly creates a potentially lethal threat to all mankind. But today nuclear weapons do not create a reliable guarantee of protection from possible aggression or protection of state interests. The United States had nearly as many strategic nuclear forces in the middle 1970's as they do today but they suffered a defeat in Vietnam. We suffered a defeat in Afghanistan and nuclear weapons also did not help us at all. I am taking not the political or moral but the purely military side of the issue. Under certain conditions, nuclear weapons have turned out to be useless. Conventional armed forces and conventional weapons have been employed.

Today's world is such that states need conventional armed forces besides nuclear weapons which have become a political means of deterrence. Take the Persian Gulf. Iraq had an enormous military machine at its disposal. It crushed Kuwait in short order. An incommensurably large military force was concentrated in response to this aggression and it defeated Iraq.

The Soviet Union does not live in a simple geostrategic situation. It needs force to protect state interests. Whoever asserts that this military force is not needed is either confused or is consciously harming the country. What will happen if the Soviet Union becomes weak and cannot defend itself? A great power cannot be weak in a military sense.

With regard to how to determine who is an enemy and who is an ally, permit me to point out: This is a bilateral process. For now the United States frequently acts from a position of strength. And reductions are a bilateral process.

[Pumpyanskiy] Sergey Fedorovich, in my opinion you have cited marvelous examples. Nuclear weapons—yes, they provide deterrence or, more correctly, restraint and a certain degree of security but they are not omnipotent and it is no wonder that the Americans could not win in Vietnam and that we could not win in Afghanistan. Right?

[Akhromeyev] We simply could not use them. It was impossible to use them.

[Pumpyanskiy] But a completely different conclusion follows from these examples. Nuclear weapons do not support any offensive, interventionist, occupation, or whatever other goals—either for the Americans in Vietnam or for us in Afghanistan. This thesis does not have any relation at all to defense.

So, why do we need armed forces: for defense or for some other tasks? Both examples are examples of aggression. You cited them in the context of protection of state interests. The Americans, they say, were not able to support their own state interests while fighting in Vietnam and we could not support our state interests while fighting in Afghanistan. And it is remarkable that I am telling you about this. From my point of view, the state interest of the United States of America consisted of not becoming involved in the war in Vietnam and the state interest of the Soviet Union consisted of not becoming involved in the war in Afghanistan.

We are obliged to respect America's legitimate interests, but not the interest to fight in Vietnam. The world community did not recognize our conduct in Afghanistan as being totally justifiable. In this sense, the world community, if you will, better understood our state interests than our leaders did.

So it is worthwhile to talk about legitimate, universally recognized, and properly understood interests. This requires a corresponding system to elaborate and formulate them. In a broad context, this means the presence of a democratic system within the country and, in a narrow context, this means an open procedure and parliamentary hearings....

If you proceed from this democratic, civilized idea of state and national interests, then the need for armed forces will also be qualitatively and quantitatively different than if you are planning new Vietnams and Afghanistans.

About the Tanks that Saved Us from Nuclear War and About the Tanks that We Saved from Disarmament

[Akhromeyev] I also cited a third example: Iraq—Kuwait. When I spoke about nuclear weapons and about conventional armed forces, I was just answering the question that you raised—about nuclear and conventional forces and their correlation.

After that, you began to say: an aggressive army is not needed and policy must be justifiable. I do not have any argument with you on that issue. I repeat: any state needs conventional armed forces to defend itself from aggression and to protect its own state interests. If you are subjecting this to doubt, I consider it to be groundless.

Just what are the Soviet Union's state interests today? Our relations with other countries are determined by our foreign policy and the new military doctrine. If we talk about the core of modern Soviet foreign policy, it is a triad—demilitarization, democratization, and deideologization. Demilitarization—is the non-use of military force when they are not attacking you. Use of force only for defense from aggression. Democratization—each state, small or large, is free to establish its own procedures and no one has the right to infringe on this will of the country and the will of the people. Deideologization—international law and nothing else lies at the foundation of foreign policy.

The Soviet Union's new military doctrine was also developed while proceeding from this. And while implementing this foreign policy, we stated that today we only need that army that can provide the country's reliable defense under modern conditions and nothing more. And right now we are reorganizing our armed forces in accordance with this doctrine. No one else has reduced their armed forces by 12 percent, but the Soviet Union has done this. No one has reduced their defense budget by 18 percent but the Soviet Union has done this.

Of course, everything must be balanced. Today the main thing for us is the economy's recovery and improving the people's lives. The Army and Navy strength reductions and the military budget reductions are also sound. But we need to do everything rationally without thoughtlessly jumping from side to side.

[Pumpyanskiy] Still, how are they carrying out pressure against the Soviet Union? Is it possible to cite an example for the sake of clarity? To some extent it is this question: a hostile military force was pressing against us or could press against us, there would not be an adequate or superior power in our country, and we as a state would be compelled to conduct ourselves differently. What have we yielded to anyone or could we yield in part to anyone by guaranteeing state interests or even ideological purity? This is a fairly typical theme in the letters which we are receiving: look at Albania or Cuba. For decades, the ruling regimes there have not wanted to yield anything, even trivial things, to anyone. And no force on earth could compel these two not too great powers. What does this say about us?

[Akhromeyev] Today our entire military doctrine and, in part, our foreign policy too are unquestionably peaceful and threaten no one and we have been compelled to structure it taking into account the military might of the United States and the NATO Bloc and the U.S. military bases that surround us. We constantly feel the breath of this might on our back. Yes, the military threat has diminished but it is entirely real and it remains. And naturally we are structuring our Armed Forces primarily taking into account the military might of both the United States and the NATO Bloc.

And I have cited specific examples of pressure. Why should I repeat them?

For some reason, you constantly leave out naval forces. This is a fact. No one wants to demonstratively talk with us about their reduction. Dozens of years.... In your opinion, how is this not a form of military pressure?

[Pumpyanskiy] Say that they have 10, 20, or 30 aircraft carriers. What, have these aircraft carriers compelled us to sell land to the peasants? Or to implement the privatization of industry? Or forced us to become involved in the stupidest war with the green snake? What is the link here?

[Akhromeyev] With regard to U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups, I can say: They are the most dangerous weapon for the Soviet Union that is in the hands of the United States.

As for the link of possible actions of these aircraft carriers with the possible sale of land, privatization of enterprises, or the struggle against drunkenness in the USSR, I cannot establish a link using my certainly limited imagination. The matter is simpler. Aircraft carriers are that U.S. military force that can arrive off the coast of the Soviet Union and create a military threat for us 6-8 days after the order has been given.

And what is more. You are always talking about tanks—you have some kind of hostility toward tanks. And it is groundless. Tanks not only won the Great Patriotic War, but they also saved us from nuclear war.

With regard to Cuba, it is not for me to discuss the issue on its policy. Cuba has lived for 30 years under a blockade from the United States. Do you really not know this?

[Rusakov] Right now the problem of guaranteeing national security is not nearly exhausted by the military factor, it consists of economic, technological, domestic political, diplomatic, and even moral components. Right now our society is very troubled by the problem of a reasonable correlation of these components and their conformity to the country's actual capabilities. Our increasing economic and technological backwardness is becoming a factor that is undermining domestic political stability, the capability to produce modern armament, etc. And militarization of the economy has made and continues to make its weighty "contribution" to economic ruin and the impoverishment of the people. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union is faced with a choice: either continue down the old path or, without forgetting about increasing the defense capability within reasonable limits, concentrate efforts first of all on the fundamental problems of society's life support and search for political methods to guarantee security. Let us recall the invincible phalanx of the Ancient Greeks: would it really have made sense if the soldiers' legs would have given away under the weight of the shields?

About Leaders Who Did Not Trust the West

[Rogov] We are all for strategic military parity, however the country has found itself in a situation when she has been compelled to maintain near equality with America, Western Europe, Japan, and China, taken together. No state is capable of withstanding such exertion. All the more so, according to figures published two years ago, that we have a significant numerical superiority in the majority of land-based and even aircraft-based weapons.

Now the USSR has been compelled to conduct a significantly larger reduction of weapons than the West, while destroying military equipment that was manufactured using the labor of our people and it has lost touch with the latter.

[Akhromeyev] About parity. There previously was an aspiration to be strong on all axes. Yes, it was until 1985. But that has already been rejected in the doctrine adopted in 1987. We did not only officially announce this, we are also carrying out the new doctrine in practice. Today we are also setting the goal of maintaining an approximate balance between us and the United States in the area of strategic nuclear weapons. And this is necessary. We are not setting this goal for ourselves in the area of conventional weapons. You spoke about thousands of tanks and other weaponry which are being destroyed today. This is a large issue. Today it is frequently being used for speculation.

You need to historically approach examination of the tank issue. After the war ended in 1945 and we came out of it in a condition that you know well, the Soviet Union did not want confrontation. The United States came out of the war with nuclear weapons. Harry Truman and John Foster Dulles at that time were conducting a policy of nuclear blackmail and the arms race against the Soviet Union. The nuclear threat was real. The Soviet Union had to decide: how would it be? The Soviet Union still did not have nuclear weapons. How to respond to this threat? How to prevent nuclear aggression against the Soviet Union?

I have read documents of that time on this issue. At that time the political and military leadership gathered more than once under Stalin's chairmanship and they came to the decision that there was no other way other than to create a mighty armed forces formation (mainly tank troops) in Europe which would not pose a threat to Europe. This was done so that Western Europe would restrain the United States from nuclear aggression against the Soviet Union.

Later the NATO Bloc equaled our conventional armed forces through the deployment of their own armed forces and nuclear weapons appeared in our country. That is the prehistory of the issue and we do not need to present our political and military leaders of the past as such dolts. At that time, they understood the situation no worse than we do.

Of course, later (in the 1960's-1970's) there was an opportunity to attempt to terminate or at least reduce the arms race. I had the opportunity to work in the General Staff for many years. In the middle 1970's, it was completely clear that we could and had to begin serious negotiations on conventional arms reductions and to reduce military expenditures on a unilateral basis. In 1975, a strategic nuclear forces balance was established. As soon as we developed strategic nuclear missiles with multiple reentry vehicles, it became clear: a nuclear balance had been achieved and the United States would not be able to surpass us in this area. And this was completely clear to the General Staff. Chief of the General Kulikov prepared the appropriate recommendations but Grechko was the minister in 1975. There was no possibility at all to realize these proposals under him. He died in 1976 and Ustinov came into office. The military expenditures reduction variation was made more precise and reported to him. But then Brezhnev became seriously ill. Ustinov looked at the recommendations that Kulikov reported to him and he said: "Well, and where do I go with this? Leonid Ilyich is seriously ill." Everything ended on that note. You need to consider one more thing. When an enormous machine has been wound up and when the people who stand near the leadership have become accustomed to conducting a certain policy, it is very difficult to stop that machine. To do this, you first of all need to replace the leadership and what is more even replace the system.

[Rogov] You said that right now we have rejected that concept of parity that implied maintenance of a balance with everyone in conventional ground-based weapons. In this connection, how do you explain the movement beyond the Urals of two-thirds of those weapons which we had in Europe and which were subject to reduction? Only one fourth of them will be destroyed, another fourth will be refitted, and half will be placed in storage. Why are we creating such an enormous conventional weapons reserve that is equal to several annual production volumes?

[Akhromeyev] Many state and military leaders of the Soviet Union have long considered our country to be primarily European. We have become accustomed to this for some reason. And the primary military threat for us more often arose in Europe, therefore we maintained the best armed forces and the best weapons there. In the east, we had quite a few such divisions where they had automobiles which had been obtained from the national economy during a special period instead of armored personnel carriers or combat infantry vehicles. These divisions had the rest of the weapons. We signed a treaty on armed forces reductions in Europe. It did not prohibit the movement of weapons from the West to the Urals. Why destroy new weapons and be defenseless in the east? In my opinion, no rational man would act that way. And they do not act that way in the NATO Bloc. They are destroying old tanks in Turkey and they are shipping new ones there. And we have sent the new weapons from the groups of forces to the east (but a certain number of the divisions withdrawn from the West have to be totally disbanded). They are tanks, armored vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery. Some of the weapons have been stored in the east so that they can replace broken down vehicles during the next three to four years since we have ceased production but we are still conducting combat training. We officially reported all of this to the West.

[Rogov] Sergey Fedorovich, but why was this letter not published in the Soviet Union? Everyone in the West knows this but our society remains in the dark. This will also confuse the people.

[Akhromeyev] I repeat, reliable figures have been reported to the West. All of these figures were published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI at the beginning of January. You can read them.

Everything that I have said is not a secret. We explained to our negotiating partners: how much equipment is making up for a deficiency today, how much will be destroyed right now during 1991 and what quantity will we replace in the troops during the next three to four years once the old vehicles have been destroyed.

Sometimes I cannot understand the position which some of my opponents occupy. They very soundly demand from me specific data on activities which the Soviet Union is undertaking in strict compliance with the treaty. It turns out that in so doing the moral side of the issue troubles them. But they are not troubled by the main thing—but will the country's defense capability be guaranteed with all of the changes that are occurring? This is also something worth talking about.

[Rusakov] Our country has been in a unique position in recent years. Since the times of the Assyrian, Roman, Charlemagne, and other ancient and early Middle Ages empires, no great power has acted on the world arena without strong allies. After Peter I "cut the window through" to Europe, the Russian State has always had on its side, as a minimum, one great power. After the break with China, we were left once again in proud solitude: we could not consider our Warsaw Treaty partners as strong allies. Although, of course, this issue is sooner for our previous leaders....

[Akhromeyev] Unfortunately, Russia did not always have a great power among her allies. Recall Crimea and the Russo-Turkish War (1850's-1870's) and I do not agree with you regarding unreliable allies but that is another question. You have once again returned me to the question which I touched on in passing. The question of leaders and mistrust between the USSR and the West. Stalin was the leader for almost 30 years. His policy was clear. This leader understood only force both in man's relations with man and in relations between states. But his partners—Chamberlain in Great Britain and Daladier in France—were right for him. The situation was different with Khrushchev and Brezhnev, especially with Khrushchev.

It is as if he was the man who brought about the "thaw" and then they removed him for this. But nevertheless, he is also a son of his time. Those leaders who survived the capitalist encirclement of the 1920's and 1930's, and then experienced the Great Patriotic War, and especially such people as Khrushchev and Brezhnev who experienced it while already in solid positions, had a firmly developed view on our foreign policy. They saw what had been created in 1941 and 1942 in our country when the Fascists destroyed millions of people and the country collapsed and burned. But Khrushchev and Brezhnev were also patriots. Having survived this entire horrible time, they could not trust the West until the last day of their lives. This was already in their blood. That is my personal opinion but I think there is a serious basis for it.

When I began to work in the General Staff, I often had the opportunity to read and analyze various materials, to participate in conventions, and to see approaches to the solution of important problems. I had the opportunity to meet with Brezhnev frequently. This man did not trust the West and he thought: We will survive if we are strong. They say: the military pressured Brezhnev. That is not true. You did not have to pressure him. We were not required to convince him. Brezhnev positively resolved military issues on his own initiative. He was matured by this and he experienced these lessons of life. That is the matter. Ustinov also survived the Great Patriotic War. It is true not at the front but he saw and knew the front and the rear areas, being a weapons narkom [people's commissar]. Therefore, these peoples' thinking had been completely formed by 1945. We were young then, I finished the war as a battalion commander—my thinking was not so set. We could rethink many things in subsequent years. Older people could not. You cannot hide the Great Patriotic War syndrome. You young people do not completely understand this.

Roosevelt was a man who sincerely wanted to establish relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In my opinion, sincerely. And Stalin generally trusted him. Who knows how things would have turned out if Roosevelt had lived for about another four years. But anti-Soviets came to power after him in the United States. And they did not trust us just like our leaders did not trust them.

[Pumpyanskiy] Thank you, Sergey Fedorovich. Your historical-psychological excursion was very interesting and actually explains many things. So: there is no threat of war but there is a military threat; pressure is being exerted on us; interference in our internal affairs is being carried out; and, finally, we have interests and ideas that need to be protected. This is how we can summarize the Army's reasons. The readers have listened to the arguments and now can calmly reflect on how convincing these reasons are to maintain the largest army in the world and the most militarized economy that has turned out to be incapable of providing either food, clothing, or shoes to the people.

[Akhromeyev] Of course, the readers need to reflect to ascertain the truth. As for your summarization, I am drawing the conclusion that we are ending how we began. We have not convinced each other.

[Pumpyanskiy] Somehow or other, let us shift to the second large topic of our conversation....

The Army and Domestic Policy. This is the topic of the next discussion (NOVOYE VREMYA No. 15).

Part 2

91UM0610B Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 15, Apr 91 pp 12-17

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev by NOVOYE VREMYA Editor-in-Chief Aleksandr Borisovich Pumpyanskiy, Commentator Yevgeniy Rusakov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov: "Is The Army Protecting Itself?"]

[Text] "The Marshal is becoming angry, therefore the Marshal is incorrect...." After this polemical article, Marshal Akhromeyev proposed meeting at the editorial office for a face to face discussion. NOVOYE VREMYA Editor-in-Chief Aleksandr Pumpyanskiy, Commentator Yevgeniy Rusakov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov participated in the discussion.

From the problem of security and the external threat, the conversation shifted to the topic: the Army and domestic policy.

[Pumpyanskiy] Sergey Fedorovich, at the beginning of our conversation, you illustrated your thought about interference in our affairs which we should rebuff with this example: Baker has advocated free enterprise.

[Akhromeyev] Aleksandr Borisovich, Baker expressed his opinion not on free enterprise but on the situation that has developed in our country today. I will read it once again: "In the USSR, we have noted a return to the centralized economy, a less free press, expansion of the powers of the Army and the KGB, and the resignation or departure from the government of the main advocates of reform," and he said that all of this was unacceptable to the United States. That is, Baker, while assessing our reality in his own way, enumerated what B.N. Yeltsin and others do not like today. In his opinion, these actions of the Soviet Union's highest organs of power are incompatible with the course toward peaceful transformation in our country. I do not intend to argue with him since this is essentially a useless exercise. In principle, he should not have said this.

[Pumpyanskiy] I also do not like what Baker enumerated. Although we can discuss how appropriate such opinions are from the lips of the head of the foreign policy department. Only why do the military and the Army need to draw conclusions from this? Politicians need to draw conclusions from this. You call this ideological interference. Let us assume it is. And you, as I understand it, are proceeding from that quote that, they say, we the Army must oppose interference. How? In general, why do we need to provide the Army's answers to ideological contradictions?

[Akhromeyev] I was speaking not about "ideological interference" but about interference in our country's internal affairs. These are different activities. If the U.S. Secretary of State is providing assessments of the situation in my country and recommendations of how it needs to act, then, excuse me, any Soviet citizen (civilian or military) has the right to express his opinion as a result of this.

[Pumpyanskiy] We are not talking about opinions but about military policy.

[Akhromeyev] I did not begin the conversation about J. Baker's statements. There is another example—on the Baltic Region. Naturally, the United States has the right to recognize or not recognize the entry of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union in 1940. But does U.S. policy complicate the situation in the Soviet Union or not? It seriously complicates it. This position is not simply statements. There are cases when American citizens, even those in civil service, are operating on the territory of Lithuania against the interests of the USSR. How can a Soviet citizen regard the fact that a U.S. civil servant is directing the construction of the barricade around the parliament in Lithuania? I suggest that this is intolerable and complicates Soviet-American relations.

Who Is Drawing the Army into Politics?

[Pumpyanskiy] To discover strangers on our native barricades is a matter for the militia or the KGB and, say, a major has adequate authority to deal with the situation you mentioned. In any case, this has no relation to the Army or to the problems of military structural development.

Let us pose the question more broadly. When a military man says: "I am defending the Homeland," this is natural and normal. But what does this sentence on the lips of the military mean: "We are defending our socialist values"? People can believe in communism, in free enterprise, or in God. This is a world of ideas. And we can only defend the world of ideas ideologically and spiritually. Where is the Army's place here? You said that the Army guards the socialist choice. I would like you to explain your position on this issue.

[Akhromeyev] I will try to answer.

First. Today our society is multiparty. The Army does not have the right to interfere in inter-party disputes. The Army understands and has assimilated this. But the Armed Forces defend the values that are consolidated by the Constitution. That is their responsibility.

There are various attitudes in society toward the Constitution. Some say that it is obsolete and it suits others. But the serviceman does not care about this. He swears an oath to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and he is obliged to protect the existing Constitution of the USSR. In accordance with Article 31, the USSR Armed Forces are obliged to defend our country's integrity. This is especially obvious today when on March 17 the majority of the Soviet people voted for a single renewed Soviet Union. If someone infringes on our country's integrity, the Army is obliged to defend the Homeland from these separatist activities. And we need everyone to know this. Using what methods? The Army itself will not determine this. The Congress of People's Deputies, USSR Supreme Soviet, and the President of the USSR will make the decisions on this issue.

Second. Our social system is socialist. It has also been consolidated by the Constitution of the USSR. A certain segment of our society does not like the socialist system. But then let these people seek changes to the Constitution of the USSR. If they amend the Constitution using the prescribed procedures, if the provision on the socialist society is removed from it, the situation will be changed.... Today the Armed Forces must protect the socialist choice. That is their constitutional responsibility. And as long as this provision is written in the Constitution, servicemen will defend it.

Today the Constitution of the USSR has begun, excuse me, to stick in separatists' and "new democrats'" throats. It is no accident that they are conducting themselves as if the Constitution of the USSR does not exist. They are attempting to ignore it. However, it is alive and in force.

They assert that the Army is interfering in the affairs of Lithuania. This is untrue. On March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian Council of Ministers announced that the Constitution of the USSR is not in force on the territory of Lithuania. But Soviet troops are on the territory of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. They are guided by the Constitution of the USSR. So, who, you ask, is engendering confrontation? The leadership of Lithuania is engendering confrontation.

And one more thing. Laws have been put into force in Lithuania that discriminate against officer personnel and their families. Let them repeal these laws and the Army will return to their barracks and it will not be seen. But the leadership of Lithuania is refusing to repeal them because it is seeking confrontation. The Lithuanian leaders are afraid of the normal constitutional process for a republic to secede from the USSR.

[Rogov] Any measures of discrimination against servicemen are completely intolerable. But the situation under which the internal function of the Armed Forces is being transformed into confrontation between the Army and the people is causing concern among many people. This confrontation is frequently being provoked by extremist forces which want to win points on this. Nevertheless it is obvious that if harmony is disrupted in society, it will be impossible to restore constitutional order through the use of force. The thesis that armed force must not be used in foreign policy as a means of achieving political goals is 100 times more true for domestic policy.

[Akhromeyev] I do not agree that it is impossible to restore constitutional order using the Armed Forces. That approach is hypocritical and cunning. It is impossible to trample the Constitution and it is impossible to transform the country's laws into a simple sheet of paper. This is occurring everywhere in our country. The development of society without force is only possible under the condition of compliance with the country's Constitution and other laws and with normal parliamentary activities.

While society was united, no internal functions arose for the Army. But society has split and such forces have arisen which want to dismember the country and forcibly change the social and state system while acting in violation of the Constitution of the USSR and through the force of the crowd and unscrupulous politics but, as the referendum confirmed, it is supported by the people. B.N. Yeltsin states: We need to remove the President of the USSR from his post and transfer the power that was granted to him in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR to the Federation Council. But this is an unconstitutional path to eliminate state rule. This is a speech against the Union Constitution. This statement incited and aroused the country. It created a very acute state in the state. The Army also expressed a negative attitude toward this statement.

The Armed Forces will not interfere with anything if the process in society proceeds within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR. But when the political struggle goes beyond the framework of the Constitution, the Army and Navy will stand in defense of the Constitution in accordance with the decisions of the highest state organs.

[Pumpyanskiy] I think that your opponents could easily challenge some of your positions. Defense of the Constitution is a good but not absolute argument. And not only because it is absolutely clear that our society deserves the best Constitution and will quite rapidly arrive at a new Constitution. Here you say that if they repeal the line about socialist choice tomorrow, the Army will immediately cease to defend the socialist choice. But if today the Army pours blood on this dubious altar, then how in your opinion will the conscience of the Army and of our citizens dressed in uniform be clean tomorrow?

Honestly speaking, I am afraid of all of this rhetoric. Still recently they said: "The Army is the leading detachment of the Party!", and now with the same fervor: "The Army defends the Constitution!". I would not begin to place the equals sign between the concepts of the defense of the homeland and defense of the constitution, it is not at all one and the same thing. And I do not like it very much when they make a fetish out of nothing. And you can defend the Constitution in our far from rule-of-law state in such a way that of the state only the Constitution will be left. They wanted to sort of confirm the logic of the Union using military force in Tbilisi but they broke the last ties and prodded the people beyond the boundary that all of us are clearing up right now both in the center and in the republic.

I would like for our disputes to be less about words and more about the essence. The Stalinist Constitution written by Bukharin was completely democratic but shielded the most dictatorial regime. Without a doubt, violations of the Constitution are deplorable. But Stalin transformed the Stalinist Constitution into a scrap of paper. Brezhnev and his associates made senseless the Brezhnev Constitution. Did the Army defend constitutional values at that time—freedom of speech and the right of nations to self-determination? Just General Grigorenko alone....

Is the Constitution—the Fundamental Law? Yes, but only in a normal, that is, democratic, civilized state and in our country always, at any level, the Fundamental Law was the word of the Party or other leadership and even spoken in a whisper, and still not a Constitution. And if we recognize the standard of interference or use of the Army in the domestic political process, we will never become a normal state. You can be certain of that.

An opponent will also challenge another of your arguments. You say: enemies are demanding that the president quit and that the prime minister resign. These words sound threatening in our domestic ideological market. But say this to any other person in the West and he will not understand what the problem is. Political opponents have the right to criticize any official and to demand changes while naturally appealing to the voters. If some group of conspirators or some committee of salvation is secretly planning some sort of action and moreover with the use of the Armed Forces, this indisputably is a crime and the punishing right hand of the state must be directed against this crime.

[Akhromeyev] You treat your Constitution very lightly. For you the socialist social system is a "line" and for me it is 70 years of the life and struggle of our people. You can disagree with me but I am expressing my own position. Today three directions of the struggle which is being conducted using anti-communist methods have appeared.

First—against the highest organs of state rule. The expression of this is the demand to dissolve the Congress of People's Deputies, to dissolve the USSR Supreme Soviet, to relieve the President of the USSR of his position, and to delete the union government. The struggle is being conducted against the legally elected highest organs of power. Parliamentary methods are being replaced by the elements of the crowd. One step remains until the use of force.

The second direction is the bitter struggle against the CPSU. I am carefully analyzing it. Besides the beginning of the war in 1941 and Chernobyl, for me the most difficult year in my life was 1988 when they attacked the CPSU from all sides. Secret work went on for its erosion and then its elimination. This activity was carried out both from without and also from within. We still need to find out how this happened and who organized it.

And the third direction of the political struggle is the actions of certain forces for the disintegration the Army and Navy. I will say more about them.

[Pumpyanskiy] Everything that you are saying sounds very menacing but for some reason I do not want to be frightened. Well, say, you frighten us with the replacement of the regime. But just what is the replacement of the regime? In 1985, a replacement of the regime occurred, did it not? In any case, I would not like to think that we have the same regime as under Chernenko and Brezhnev.

In fact the question is on a completely different plane. This is a political struggle and it must be conducted using exclusively political means and in so doing it is desirable to use civilized methods. I absolutely do not like how the political struggle is developing in our country. Here there is so much foolishness and so much lack of culture from the various sides: both from the right, from the left, and from everywhere. I am afraid that the public can lodge serious complaints against nearly every leading figure on our stage. Of course, we need to become civilized although this will hardly happen in one year or in one month. But there is one standard that, whether we want it or not, we must recognize as unwavering. This is not a fabrication of bourgeois democracy or of the scheming West.

The Army is outside politics. The Army must not become a political instrument. Armed people must not participate in the political struggle. A weapon is something completely different and not a political argument at all. A man with a gun is always right. But a man with an assault rifle is even more right.

But right now many people are getting the impression that the Army is being drawn into the political process in our country. Not people who serve, not citizens in uniform, but the Army as an institution. I do not like a demonstration organized at Army higher echelons. This is incorrect.

[Akhromeyev] I do not intend to frighten you. I do not need to add too much to this. I did not talk to you about any sort of replacement of the regime. I talked about attempts to forcibly change the state system in our country. B.N. Yeltsin called for these attempts. And not only called for but also acted in this direction. And another thing. We have left the line of the dispute. I was talking about the unconstitutional methods of the struggle and you were talking about parliamentary methods. That is a substitution of the topic of discussion.

Is There a Threat of a Military Coup?

[Pumpyanskiy] That is not a substitution at all. A substitution is when they substitute the armed struggle for the political struggle and when they replace it with punitive operations. And so that everything is clear, I am not against a pro-Army demonstration—this is a matter of citizens but a demonstration from the troops is already not a political demonstration but a military parade. The Army can have its lobbyists, its eloquent defenders, and its ideologues, if you like. But when a column of tanks moves out onto the street and when the Army seizes a television tower, this is already the refutation of politics and the infringement of social standards and rights. In a society that wants to be civilized, the argument "the Army will protect itself" is improper. The Army cannot protect itself, this is a dangerous self-service.

[Akhromeyev] They have been asserting for three years now that the Armed Forces are preparing to and can commit a coup. Who is saying this? You are courteously silent and I am openly saying: B.N. Yeltsin, A.A. Sobchak, and G.A. Arbatov. These assertions are an obvious falsehood. So who is involving the Army in the political process? It is these people. With what goal? In the political struggle—to split the Army and Navy, isolate the generals and senior officers from the rest of the Army, and attempt to at least pull some part of it over to its own side. Is this really proper?

But you are not speaking the truth about punitive operations. The Army has not conducted and is not conducting any punitive operations.

You express dissatisfaction with the fact that the Army is protecting itself. Then appeal to the other side to cease political provocations and speculation against the Armed Forces. Servicemen as citizens of the USSR have the right to defend their honor and dignity. I did not come to see you with a pistol or with an assault rifle that you have talked about but with your weapon—words. In my opinion, I am also conducting myself normally. Let other people also resolve their differences just like we are resolving ours.

I am serving my fifty-first year in the Army and I have been educated to respect the state's leadership, the Constitution, and our society (The entire Armed Forces command staff has been so educated). Where did this charge of a military coup come from? Does the threat of a coup really exist? Why are such statements being made? Are these the methods of political struggle against the Armed Forces? But they are absolutely intolerable.

That provocation has disappeared and another has begun—dictatorship is eminent. Whose dictatorship? Someone is inflaming the situation.

[Rusakov] Actually, representatives of a certain portion of society are expressing their concern because of the threat of a military coup and the establishment of a dictatorship. As far as I understand their logic, the question is not one of a home-grown Bonaparte, Pinochet, or Kornilov coming to power. They have in mind the possibility of an attempt of certain political forces or of some sort of influential unconstitutional figure to turn back the process of democratization and reform of society while relying on the military which has so aggressively begun to participate in the country's political life. What do you think, do these types of conversations have nothing in common with reality?

[Pumpyanskiy] I could also submit the "creeping coup" variation: exertion of pressure by the military on the President of the USSR for the purpose of terminating reform and the utilization of the Army's capabilities as a powerful independent political force to exert this pressure jointly with other forces who have positions close to it.

[Akhromeyev] I do not understand why you are saying "certain political forces" or some sort of "unconstitutional figure" will attempt to rely on the military. Right now such figures (and this is reality) are relying on other forces.

The military, while actively participating in the struggle against the anti-Army campaign, is defending the Army and Navy from the destruction which G.A. Arbatov, OGONEK magazine, and certain others are carrying out. It is they who are attempting to carry out a "creeping coup" using military demonstrations and political strikes and they are striving to change the state system in our country through force.

Far from everyone can rely on the Armed Forces but only those to whom they are subordinate in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR. No social forces are able to rely on the Army and Navy. For some reason, you are displaying a special tact by not naming these forces by name.

[Pumpyanskiy] You were speaking about such an Army tradition as boundless loyalty to the Politburo....

[Akhromeyev] I was talking about respect. The Politburo previously was the highest power. But right now this respect has been transferred to the highest organs of state rule.

[Pumpyanskiy] We see the processes that are occurring in the highest echelons of the CPSU. For example, many people think that the CPSU is moving to the right. I am afraid that it is already time to say so: The CPSU is on the RSFSR Communist Party platform.

At first we were struck by the divergencies between Gorbachev's pragmatism and his political and state actions and Polozkov's views. Let us assume, although it would seem that right now this hypothesis is not too relevant, that the Politburo ultimately decides that Gorbachev went too far in his reforms, rapprochement with the West, and in rocking the system, that Gorbachev's policies are promoting the breakup of the Union and it is no wonder that Yakovlev and Gorbachev inspired Lithuania's separatism....

[Akhromeyev] You do not need to place these leaders side by side. The emergence of the Lithuanian problem is the result of A.N. Yakovlev's errors, if you take only the subjective reasons.

[Pumpyanskiy] Well, that is what you think but others think differently. In any case, this is a question of an ideological and political dispute—and not about personalities but about the nature of processes. But here the Politburo makes a decision: Enough! You need to stop! And it is naturally appealing to the Army. Help, comrades! In the kind traditions which have existed for 70 years. You need to save the Homeland! You need to save the socialist choice! Will we save?

[Akhromeyev] I cannot agree with you with regard to the situation in the CPSU and in the Central Committee Politburo. Here you and I have opposite opinions. "The CPSU is on the RSFSR Communist Party platform," as you say—this is an attempt to make two leading Party organs clash. Why? The CPSU and its component the RSFSR CP is a political force which is carrying out perestroyka under M.S. Gorbachev's guidance. It makes up the foundation of the center, that is, of that political force on which the President of the USSR relies.

Let the suggestions expressed by you about possible CPSU activities with the indication of the names of several leaders also remain yours. I will refrain from discussing them. Today the CPSU Central Committee Politburo does not command the Armed Forces and cannot issue any type of orders to them.

You, dear comrades, while discussing democracy, are stubbornly proceeding from durable, established democracy. Then provide the country a normal situation and respect for the Armed Forces. Now you have it in for the Army that is defending the people in ethnic conflicts with weapons in hand, eliminate the ethnic conflicts. Insure that Armenians do not kill Azeris and that Azeris do not kill Armenians and that airborne troops are not sent to a conflict area on alert. They will send, excuse me, not you but troops.

In your complaints, you proceed based on theoretical democracy which we do not have in this country and I proceed based on society's real state and the Army's role in our society and not in some sort of model democracy. I would like you to express your attitude toward this problem. It turns out strangely: You only criticize, you do not like anything, but you do not propose anything specific.

The Army does not operate anywhere without permission. They talk about Tbilisi. Take the USSR Procurator's conclusion on the events in Tbilisi. It states who was at fault. The Army was not to blame for the events in Tbilisi. We had this procedure: The Politburo was the highest organ of state rule. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Georgian CP Central Committee Bureau decided that the troops would act.

[Pumpyanskiy] Sergey Fedorovich, I agree with you that the Army has real grounds for dissatisfaction and not only on the level of every day life but also on the political level.

Take these same Tbilisi events. Right now we will not discuss how the Army acted there. But it is clear that the Army did not arrive there on its own. Of course, Rodionov had the appropriate order. Of course, these decisions were made at the highest political levels and in the Politburo. And those people who made the decision must bear the primary responsibility for this turn of events and not the soldier or even the general. Here it is the system, the regime, and the method of rule that we need to blame. Although complaints to that side are muffled. OGONEK is guilty of conducting an "anti-Army line." But then those people who placed the Army in Tbilisi or Baku are not even named.

Sergey Fedorovich, I also caught a certain displacement of emphasis in your words. You said, and the very idea made an impression on me, you said you civilians—the three of us specifically—ensure that we abide by the Constitution, mature democracy, and so forth, and then we, the Army, will return to our barracks. But I must say that the three of us can only ensure more or less proper journalism in NOVOYE VREMYA magazine. You can submit such a massive complaint to society as a whole or to the powers that be.

[Akhromeyev] But today you are also submitting complaints to the Army.

Can the Army Be a Constitutional Court?

[Pumpyanskiy] I will not argue with you here, I am precisely for ensuring order, democracy, and human rights in society. Only this complaint is not military to civilians. It is, if you like, general complaints to the regime and to our respected leadership. But in any case all complaints, problems, and contradictions must be solved using political means.

You spoke about a triad of principles on which Soviet foreign policy is based: demilitarization, democratization, and de-ideologization. Do these three "de's" apply to Army policy within the country? Can the Army be offended by the people or by the state or by democracy, even if it is underdeveloped democracy? Can the Army assume a political role?

Yes, the Constitution is not perfect and society has become entangled in contradictions. But can the Army assume the role of a constitutional court and the interpreter of the Constitution? Can the Army be an ideological judge? Decide just what the socialist choice is? And having pronounced sentence—execute it themselves. Without delay....

[Akhromeyev] You are once again raising the issue about the Armed Forces' independent political role in society. But to respond to the activities of the forces that are conducting the anti-Army campaign and to rebuff them still does not mean that it is assuming a political role. The Army is not playing such a role. It cannot solve anything independently. It does not pretend to a political role in society.

You mentioned the committee of national salvation in Lithuania. But why did you not cite the example of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet which "seceded from the Soviet Union" during the course of a single night? What was that, in accordance with the Constitution? Then you should place these unconstitutional activities side by side—the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and that same committee. Why did that committee come into the world? Because of the separatist policy of Landsbergis and the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet which are operating unconstitutionally!

[Rogov] The Army has an internal function. And actually, when some citizens kill others, the Army must stand between them while receiving blows from both sides. But when the Army itself formulates its position on some political issue or other, the country will not move toward democratization but toward the creation of a regime close to those that exist in a number of countries of Latin America and the Near and Middle East.

[Akhromeyev] I repeat, our Army never occupied and does not occupy the position of a political force in society. It states: its duty is to protect the Constitution and our values and it is subordinate to the highest organs of state rule.

[Rogov] But you say: the Army agrees or the Army does not agree. What does that mean? Or: the Army states. Who is that—the minister of defense? The chief of the General Staff? Who speaks for the Army?

[Akhromeyev] Of course, the minister and the chief of the General Staff speak for the Army. Other military personnel also speak—deputies and other servicemen who speak in the press but already in their own names. If political charges (a plot, coup, etc.) are pressed against the Army and Navy, they must also respond to them in the appropriate manner. And here's who they are: Yazov, Moiseyev, and Akhromeyev. But, since the anti-Army campaign is continuing, Petrushenko and Alksnis have appeared. Yes, they have appeared. Action causes reaction.

Accusers are acting and defenders have also appeared. And if political speculation and activities to destroy them continue to be conducted against the Army and Navy, then Ivanovs, Petrovs, and Sidorovs will yet appear. They will not let the Armed Forces be pushed around. It is time to end the anti-Army campaign.

[Rogov] There are differences in the positions of Petrushenko and Akhromeyev, Alksnis and Yazov. Does the worsening of the political struggle within the Armed Forces really correspond to democratic standards? And, in my opinion, it is illegitimate when independent positions arise on any issue among those figures of ours who are simultaneously professional politicians and retain certain positions in the Army.

[Akhromeyev] Differences in opinions and positions and the worsening of the political struggle are mainly occurring around and not within the Armed Forces. And this worsening has been engendered by the forces about whom I have already spoken. The primary reason you raise the issue about military deputies is because a political struggle for power using unconstitutional methods has flared in society. What can the Army do when the matter is reduced to the fate of the Homeland and its own fate? Of course, the Army will not remain a bystander to the solution of these issues. If the issue is raised about the integrity of the Homeland and the processes are unguided, if they try to dismember the country through force, then just who will remain a bystander?

[Pumpyanskiy] Well, thank you, Sergey Fedorovich. In my opinion, we have expressed ourselves in sufficient detail. One sad observation.

The second half of our discussion on the Army's internal functions in the USSR turned out to be a bit longer than the first in which we touched on problems of external security. I am afraid that even in life that turn has occurred where the internal function outweighs the external function. And this is dangerous. If we proceed from the fact that only the Army can keep the state and our society from falling, this is evidence of an incurable disease.

The second observation is more cheerful. While proposing the idea of a discussion, it seems to me that you willingly or unwillingly proceeded from the fact that you were dealing with an enemy who, using his own editorial advantages, was attempting to score a few more points or even simply trying to talk a bit more. It is no wonder you stubbornly stressed that parity was necessary in the dialogue—just like during negotiations with the Americans. Now I hope you have become convinced that we sooner profess the principle of reasonable sufficiency. We are not at all embarrassed that your line will occupy more space and ultimately we also invited you to listen to your arguments. It is true that someone might say precisely this: "The Marshal certainly advocates parity but that parity where he has one-and-a-half to two times as many—tanks or lines." I am afraid that I will not be able to object....

Somehow or other, we provided our readers what we had to give them: information and the opportunity to compare positions on this vitally important topic.

[Akhromeyev] Military force does not keep our society from falling. There is an enormous potential of other forces in it. They will bring the country out of the crisis and they will heal society. The Army and the Navy are aides in this important matter. I am neither sad nor happy with regard to our polemics. We conducted the ideological dispute properly and as equals. Thank you for providing me the opportunity to completely set forth my views. However, in the end it turned out: My views are known, I am for a united Federated Union and for the socialist choice. You did not set forth your views. That is too bad.

[Pumpyanskiy] Really? I do not think that the readers really need loud declarations from us. Our views on these and on other problems are in every issue of the magazine and far from everything that is printed in the magazine reflects precisely our views. Yes and they are from identical among us. If you wish, our choice is freedom of choice. And we are striving not to confuse glasnost with soglasnost [harmony].

Once again thank you for visiting us with the "weapon of words" although we must admit that I like one of the words in this word combination more than the other....

The editorial staff invites readers to continue the discussion on the topic "The Army and Society."

Baltic Republics

Admiral on Pact Dissolution, NATO Rearming

LD0905161991 Moscow TASS in English 1606 GMT 9 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Biryukov]

[Text] Kaliningrad, Northwestern Russia May 9 TASS—A Soviet admiral called for a meeting of the Baltic countries' naval commanders to ease tensions in the region.

Speaking at a meeting with journalists in connection with Victory Day, Vitaliy Ivanov, commander of the Soviet Baltic fleet and people's deputy of the USSR, said: "We are worried by the fact that the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe have not reduced military confrontation.

"On the contrary, the NATO bloc has unilaterally increased its might."

NATO was rearming planes and helicopters and building new missile warships, while the USSR fully withdrew its submarines armed with ballistic missiles and was reducing the number of other ships and the numerical strength of naval personnel, Adm. Ivanov said.

The United States and NATO stubbornly refused to conduct negotiations on the reduction of naval forces, he remarked.

In order to reduce confrontation in the Baltics, it is necessary to convene a meeting of naval commanders of all Baltic states to discuss and, probably, adopt confidence-building measures.

Ivanov suggested establishing direct telephone links between Baltic states and called for reducing the pollution of the marine environment.

Baltic Leaders Continue U.S. Visit; Meet Bush

LD0905130491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1050 GMT 9 May 91

[From the "Pulse of the Planet" program]

[Text] The three leaders of the Baltic states were received by President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker in the White House yesterday. Later at the news conference, Ivars Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers said the Baltics are not interested in how Moscow will try to save face with the Baltics striving for independence.

This could be an answer to J. Baker asking the Baltic countries to find a path and mechanism on the road to their independence that would allow the Soviet Union to save face. President G. Bush also promised to support the aspirations of the Baltic people at the negotiations and to influence M. Gorbachev at the upcoming summit meeting to renew the negotiations. V. Landsbergis did not take part in the news conference and left for Los Angeles immediately. He said that the shadow of the Soviet Union falling on the Baltics prevents the West from taking decisive steps. Today V. Landsbergis is in Los Angeles.

Bush Stresses Dialogue With Moscow

LD0905125791 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0900 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] President George Bush yesterday, meeting with leaders of the Baltic states Vytautas Landsbergis, Ivars Godmanis, and Edgar Savisaar, in the White House, said that he was pleased at the resumption of talks between the governments of the Baltic states and the Soviet Union. The U.S. President expressed hope that the Baltic and Soviet representatives will tackle the issues in an flexible and pragmatic spirit. In addition, George Bush is said to have promised to speak in favor of the independence of the Baltic states at his next meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. It must be added that yesterday was the first time that President George Bush talked with the leaders of the three Baltic states simultaneously. During the meeting George Bush is said to have emphasized that the Balts must talk with Moscow and strive for the restoration of their independence so Mikhail Gorbachev's honor does not suffer.

Commentary Views Meeting

LD0905111191 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0900 GMT 9 May 91

[Suhan Hindor commentary]

[Excerpt] Yesterday Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar, Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis, and Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis, met U.S. President George Bush. Their constructive exchange of ideas, which lasted an hour, left the impression it was a conversation of one-plus three. Under serious scrutiny at the meeting were the relations of the Baltic states with the USSR. Both the President and the Baltic leaders presented their vision of possible future events and possibilities for development.

Recommended behavior for the Baltic states in their negotiations with the USSR central power was also discussed. Edgar Savisaar presented his proposal to organize an international conference to resolve the Baltic issue to George Bush. Several questions were asked about U.S. policy toward the Baltics, to clarify the substance of possible shifts in it. Economic issues facing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were also dealt with during the conversation. There was talk of setting up a Baltic bank. Also taking part in the meeting was U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

According to Edgar Savisaar, the meeting was successful in every way. He added in an interview that the visit of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian politicians to the

United States is a powerful demonstration of Baltic unity, which was very much needed. [passage omitted]

Estonia Drafting Ethnic Minorities Law

LD0805181491 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1400 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] The ethnic relations commission at the Estonian Supreme Soviet has begun to examine first versions of a draft law on cultural self-determination of ethnic minorities in the Republic of Estonia, as reported by ETA. This law should turn out to be a logical continuation of the law that was valid in Estonia up until 1940. As noted by Sergey Sovetnikov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet's ethnic relations commission, one has to keep in mind that a lot has changed in Estonian society from that time up to now, and that several of the former provisions in the law are no longer applicable. The new law should be politicized as little as possible, which is something not at all easy to ensure in the present climate. On order of the ethnic relations commission, a draft law will be drawn up by a working group at the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law attached to the Academy of Sciences, in conjunction with well-known specialists in the spheres of human rights and ethnic relations. International expert opinion will also be considered necessary for the drawing up of the draft law.

Latvian CP Organizing Central Control of Economy

LD0905160791 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0430 GMT 9 May 91

[Excerpt] The Communist Party of Latvia is organizing the preservation of all-Union control over the Latvian economy. Latvian Communist Party Secretary Djars Potreki has announced that 14 enterprises under so-called all-Union jurisdiction have presented documents favoring special all-Union joint-stock companies in Moscow. At least 16 more similar enterprises are already preparing such documents. The main task of the economic formulations, absurd from an economic point of view, is undoubtedly to maintain central control of the industrial enterprises in the republics of the state. [passage omitted]

Latvia Limits Individual Exports of Food, Goods

PM0905090591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[From IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX, BALTFAX, RIA, and REUTER roundup: "Traveling Light From Latvia"]

[Text] The Latvian Government has laid down that each person leaving the republic can take out agricultural and industrial goods worth a total of 50 rubles. This measure is aimed at limiting the amount of foodstuffs and industrial goods being taken out of Latvia, BALTFAX has reported.

Latvia Establishes Council of Nationalities

LD0905200291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1557 GMT 9 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Summary] Riga, 9 May (TASS)—A Council of Nationalities has been set up in Latvia to represent the interests of all ethnic groups, each of which will appoint not more than three delegates. The new body will "prepare laws and formulate proposals for defending the interests of people of various nationalities", and will have the right to take "legislative initiatives." The Gypsies have alreay named their emissaries—a cooperative chairman, a worker, and an ispolkom official.

Veterans Celebrate Victory Day in Vilnius

LD0905174991 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 9 May 91

[Report by correspondent S. Gelbakh from Vilnius; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today is an ordinary working day in Lithuania, but those whose cause was just, those who were victorious, wore their orders today. Admittedly, the faces are stern and hearts are oppressed by anxiety for the morrow. After all, those who find no difficulty in insulting any of those who took part in the liberation of the Neman region are still coming onto the streets. Accordingly, this year 9 May is being marked here as a day of struggle against fascism, which is rearing its head again.

The veterans were surrounded with respect and love during a reception at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania. Later they gathered in the square which, until recently, was named after Chernyakhovskiy and they laid flowers at the grave of the liberator of Vilnius. No, the people of Lithuania have not fogotten the feats and martial toil of the front-liners.

This is how the procession of veterans through the streets of Vilnius looked. [video shows procession of singing veterans] At the servicemen's cemetery there was a remembrance rally. The working people of Lithuania paid heartfelt homage to those who fell in battle for the liberation of the ancient Lithuanian capital.

Celebrations to mark the victory festival were also held in Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai, Penevezys, and other towns in Lithuania.

OMON Troops Lead Pro-Soviet Rally in Vilnius

LD0905131491

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian at 0845 GMT on 9 May carries a five-minute report by correspodent Z. Miksys on the celebration of Victory Day in Vilnius.

Miksys says that OMON (Special Purpose Militia Detachment) units emerged from the building of the Lithuanian CPSU and marched to the monument to Soviet General Chernyakhovsky, who is buried in one of the central squares of Vilnius. Leaders of the Lithuanian CPSU and the pro-Soviet Yedinstvo movement as well as servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces stationed in Vilnius were present.

Miksys says: "The so-called liberation, which in fact has become our second occupation, continues to this day. The soldiers of J. Stalin brought the so-called sun of freedom and happiness here; we were shot, deported, and tortured, and our native land was devastated.

"To the genuine fighters against fascism, to those who sacrificed their lives, and the victims of the Brown Plague who were tortured to death in Paneriai, Zalioji Zagare, and other places in Lithuania, we bow our heads today."

Dispute Over Lithuanian DOSAAF Continues

PM0905140591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 May 91 Second Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent Yu. Stroganov: "Squadron for the Gunmen? What Kind of Conflict Has Flared Up in Lithuania"]

[Text] The conflict over Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF] property in Lithuania is growing. There is confrontation in the air once again. A statement by the republic government says that USSR Armed Forces soldiers attacked the "Vitis" state technical sports organization and stole vehicles, heavy equipment, and other items. Powerful anti-Army feeling has sprung up as a result. There are accusations of robbery, plunder, and terror. For some reason the Lithuanian Communist Party has been dragged into the conflict. The republic's government has introduced armed patrols in cities until 20 May. It also said that there might be retaliation on the part of... citizens.

There is another view that blames the Lithuanian leadership for what is happening, for the exacerbation of the situation. The transformation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] DOSAAF into the principal state organization for developing the structures of the territorial protection department was ruled illegal. It is claimed that there were no attacks, that the military acted properly, that there was no robbery, and that the facilities were place under guard and the property returned to its rightful owner. This is the view expressed by Colonel N. Fomenko, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF (a nonexistent organization, according to the republic leadership) Central Committee.

The recent events have a long history that began a year ago with the long-drawn-out struggle against DOSAAF, which is so far conducted by "parliamentary" methods. How did the situation develop?

"My personal opinion is that the republic government, its current leadership, set itself the task of transferring the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF base to the territorial protection department," Nikolay Ivanovich said. "Back on 22 March 1990, the legislature adopted a resolution whereby, despite its public organization status, the republican DOSAAF passes to the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. The DOSAAF Central Committee protested against the resolution, but there was no answer. On 2 April 1990 an order signed by K. Prunskiene instructed us to hold a DOSAAF Central Committee plenum. The Central Committee Presidium said no. There was a quorum: 10 of its 15 members were present. The voting was 9:1. Despite that, some of the presidium members held a session of some members of the Central Committee—there was no quorum at this 'plenum.' Some 38 of the 57 Central Committee members were absent, but decisions were made: An entirely new presidium and an entirely new leadership of the Lihtuanian DOSAAF Central Committee were elected."

Every word, N. Fomenko claimed, can be confirmed by relevant documents. So, with their help, by last September it appeared that the invalidity of the "plenum" decisions had been proved. The financial rights of the previous leadership had been restored, although not completely but with provisos. The story was by no means over, however. N. Fomenko noted that A. Butkievicius, general director of the territorial protection department, had played an active part in it. According to the colonel's account, he had ordered all DOSAAF city and rayon committees to hold conferences and elect delegates to a republic conference. The attack continued, but that maneuver failed.

"We conducted a postal poll of Central Committee members," N. Fomenko continued, "asking them whether or not they were in favor of holding a congress—while the sociopolitical situation was still unstable. Some 59 of the 98 members said it would be inadvisable to hold any emergency congress. Then along came the... workers' action group, which set the goal of holding a conference, which, we assumed, was to become a congress. After all, such a group could only appear to create a new organization! They held the conference. The chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee was only present at the start. He made a brief speech, saying that it was an illegal event, so he had no right to be at it. Nevertheless the conference took place and a new leadership was elected. They immediately asked us for the keys, and so on. I replied that there was a proper procedure, that in such cases a commission would arrive and, as soon as it recognized the authority of the newly elected people, we would hand over our keys and posts immediately. The DOSAAF Central Committee auditing commission arrived. Its conclusions were clear: The conference was illegal and delegates had not been elected at it. The results were communicated to the

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless, our building was placed under guard by gunmen."

As readers obviously know, the military soon seized the building from the territirial protection department and returned it to DOSAAF, but the other facilities remained in its hands. The transformation of a political organization into a state organization, the department's principal organization, continued. An organization headed not by a chairman, as elected at the aforementioned conference, but by a general director. In recent days events have unfolded that have caused a stir among the public.

N. Fomenko pointed out that Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF property had been created partly on the basis of dues, but mainly on the basis of money paid for the training of specialists and the activities of DOSAAF production enterprises; a great deal was also received from the USSR Defense Ministry. In fact, one of the tasks was to train specialists for the country's Armed Forces. Financial assistance and a good deal of equipment also came from the center. For instance, all the motor transport facilities came from the Baltic Military District. Around 350 aircraft and gliders were also supplied by the center.

Lithuania's Bickauskas Criticizes Moscow Talks

LD0905131991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] Egidijus Bickauskas, permanent representative of Lithuania in Moscow, has expressed criticism over the standpoint of the Lithuanian authorities toward the Soviet Union following last year's independence declaration of 11 March.

In his interview to the popular Lithuanian daily LIETUVOS RYTAS, Egidijus Bickauskas says that the policy of ultimatum exchange that began last summer is not the most effective one, though it may look rather impressive. According to Mr. Bickauskas, Lithuanian-Soviet relations have not improved. At present, they are even more tense than ever. Mr. Bickauskas says that the idea of patriotism that was misinterpreted had a stong influence over the general political feeling that the processes going on in the East do not concern us at all.

The meeting between Lithuanian and Soviet delegations on negotiations that was planned to take place at the end of May will most probably be postponed. According to Mr. Bickauskas Mikhail Gorbachev was ready to solve the Lithaunian issue last summer, inspite of the fact that the Soviet president had never been favorably disposed towards Lithuania. There is no doubt that the Kremlin would not have acknowledged Lithuanian independence, but still, at least something would have been accomplished.

Now the Lithuanian issue will be viewed within the context of all Soviet problems and will not be singled out.

RSFSR

First Quarter Performance Data Reported

914A0697A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 18, Apr 91 pp 17-19

[Report of RSFSR State Committee for Statistics: "The Russian Federation in the First Quarter of 1991"]

[Text] The following are the basic indicators of national economic performance in the RSFSR in the first quarter of 1991 (in actual prices; billions of rubles):

Indicators	First quarter 1991	% of first quarter 1990 (comparable prices)
Industrial production	227	97
Consumer goods production (retail prices)	71.1	103
Foodstuffs	18.8	95
New fixed assets of state enterprises and organizations (estimated cost in prices of 1 January 1991)	10.7	76
Capital investments of state enterprises and organizations (estimated cost in prices of 1 January 1991)	24.7	93
Centralized	9.5	85
Enterprise and organization investment funds	15.2	99
Freight shipped by public transport, billions of tons	1.3	92
Passenger traffic in public transportation network, billions of passenger/kilometers	143.6	98
Monetary income of population	107.5	121.1
Payments and benefits to population from public consumption funds	40.3	133.0*
Retail commodity turnover in state and cooperative trade	74.6	100.4
Paid services	10.1	97
New housing funded by all sources, millions of square meters of total area	5.9	78

* In actual prices.

National income was eight percent lower than in January-March last year, which was due to the further decline of production in the leading branches of the national economy and the reduction of income from foreign trade. The productivity of social labor decreased by seven percent.

The export shipments of the RSFSR amounted to the equivalent of 9 billion rubles in hard currency and were 7.2 percent below the figure for the first quarter last year. Oil exports decreased from 23.6 million tons to 15.1

million, or by 36 percent, and exports of gas decreased from 16.8 billion cubic meters to 16 billion, or by 5 percent. The reduction of export shipments and higher credit payments in hard currency complicated the situation with regard to foreign currency resources. The result was a reduction of imports of consumer goods for the population of the republic, of raw materials for the food industry and light industry, and of feed additives for agriculture.

Processes connected with the creation of market structures—joint-stock companies, commodity, stock, and general exchanges, commercial banks, and insurance companies—are taking place in the republic in line with new laws and official decisions. The denationalization and privatization of property in physical production and the service sector are acquiring broader dimensions.

During the first quarter 2,000 industrial enterprises, 237 construction trusts, 1,400 trade organizations, trusts, and workers' supply divisions and 12,000 stores and enterprises in the public catering network, 840 consumer service centers and associations, 1,700 studios and workshops of the RSFSR Consumer Service Union, and 370 public transportation enterprises were operating on leases.

Leased industrial enterprises produced goods (and performed work and services) worth 17 billion rubles (7.5 percent of the total for the branch) and displayed a production growth rate of 102.5 percent, which was higher than the rate for all industry. Retail commodity turnover at leased enterprises reached the level of 21 billion rubles (29 percent), and the volume of consumer services was 400 million rubles (26 percent). Freight delivery volume amounted to 175 million tons (26 percent).

Cooperatives numbered 141,000 and sold goods and services for a total of 12 billion rubles.

Some 1,997 joint ventures were registered in the RSFSR and 660 were operating within its territory. They produced goods and performed services for the equivalent of 90 million rubles in hard currency, exported products worth 45 million, and imported products worth 180 million.

After the passage of the RSFSR laws: "On Land Reform" and: "On Peasant Farms," efforts to implement them were intensified. On 1 April, 13,600 peasant farms were registered, or three times as many as at the beginning of the year. They were particularly widespread in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, Krasnodar, Maritime, and Khabarovsk Krays, and Volgograd, Kemerovo, Leningrad, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts. Peasant farms were allocated 605,000 hectares of land (204,000 on 1 January), an average of 44 hectares per farm. The development of peasant farms is being deterred by difficulties in material and technical supply, the high prices of agricultural equipment and construction materials, unsatisfactory socioconsumer conditions, and the resistance of local officials in some territories.

During the first quarter citizens were allocated plots covering an area of 78,800 hectares for collective orchards, or almost twice as much as during all of last year, and 119,000 hectares for collective vegetable gardens. The process was intensified in Altay, Krasnodar, Stavropol, and Khabarovsk Krays and Volgograd, Orenburg, Samara, Saratov, Sakhalin, and Smolensk Oblasts.

Since the beginning of this year around 8,000 apartments and homes from the state and public housing supply have been sold to citizens as their private property for a sum of 44 million rubles. This work was begun by ispolkoms, enterprises, and organizations in Altay, Krasnodar, and Stavropol Krays, Volgograd and Rostov Oblasts, and Moscow. Besides this, apartments were turned over to the population for free in some regions.

Measures are being taken to strengthen social guarantees for the population. A higher minimum wage, longer paid vacations, and a shorter work week are planned for this year. Republic and local funds for the social protection of the population are to be established.

Population and Labor Resources

The demographic situation in the RSFSR is still growing worse. The number of births in January and February was lower than the figure for the same period in 1990 by 20,500, or by 6 percent. As a result, natural population growth also decreased. The rate of mortality due to accidents, poisoning, and trauma is rising: They caused almost 30,000 deaths in the first two months of the year. The number of registered marriages was 12,500, or six percent, lower than in January-February last year, while the number of divorces rose by 3,000, or by three percent.

Labor resources in the Russian Federation consisted of 87 million people. The number employed in all spheres was 72.9 million. The development of different forms of ownership and management has led to the redistribution of manpower among sectors of the economy (millions of people):

Economic sectors	January-March 1990	January-March 1991
State sector	65.5	64.3
Cooperative sector	7.0	7.5
Kolkhozes	3.7	3.6
Consumer cooperatives	1.6	1.6
Cooperatives producing goods and services (excluding moonlighters)	1.7	2.3
Private sector	1.1	1.1

The processes of transition to the market economy are complicating employment problems. At the beginning of the year the number of jobless citizens who had applied for job placement services in 1990 exceeded 700,000. Despite the presence of these jobless individuals, 840,000 vacant jobs and positions were registered at the beginning of the year. Several privileges are to be granted to enterprises arranging for the training and retraining of personnel in production units employing young specialists and retired individuals for the purpose of securing the employment of the able-bodied population and strengthening social guarantees for the laboring public.

Finances and Monetary Circulation

Enterprise, association, and organization profit taxes totaling 17.2 billion rubles (17.1 billion in January-March last year) entered the budget network of the RSFSR in the first quarter, including republic budget revenues of 10.6 billion rubles.

Turnover tax amounted to 13.6 billion rubles, which was 3.9 billion (22.5 percent) less than in January-March last year. The smaller amount is due mainly to the reduction of production volumes and the rise in wholesale prices with no centralized adjustments of retail prices.

Sales tax revenues in the RSFSR totaled 1.9 billion rubles, including local budget revenues of 300 million.

State taxes in the amount of 8.5 billion rubles (109.9 percent of the projected figure) were collected from the population, or 1.1 billion more than in January-March 1990.

Republic budget income for the first quarter was 62.3 percent of the projected figure because of significant differences between planned and actual amounts of turnover tax, income from foreign economic operations, rent payments, and profit taxes.

Republic budget expenditures in January-March were financed at a level equivalent to 46.9 percent of the plan, mainly due to the reduction of expenditures on the national economy.

Credited investments in the RSFSR economy were 24 billion rubles lower than in the first quarter of last year and totaled 190.2 billion rubles on 1 April, including 131.2 billion (69 percent) in commercial bank credit.

The profits of enterprises and organizations located within the territory of the RSFSR amounted to 30.7 billion rubles in January-February, or 43.1 percent more than during the same period last year. Most of the increase in profits was due to higher prices. During the same period 16.1 percent of the enterprises and organizations suffered losses totaling 1.7 billion rubles.

The monetary income of the population was 107.5 billion rubles, or 21.1 percent above the figure for the first quarter last year.

The rise in monetary income was a result of centralized measures to raise wages in culture, public education, public health, and social security. The population earned more from sales of agricultural products at higher purchase prices. The rise in monetary income was also due to the payment of compensation to the population in connection with the retail price reform. According to the data of the RSFSR Central Bank, these payments amounted to 5.4 billion rubles, and the growth rate of monetary income excluding these payments in January-March was 115 percent.

Consumption-related resources per worker exceeded 330 rubles a month, which was 10 percent above the figure for the first quarter of 1990. Wages represented 95 percent of the total, and 5 percent consisted of social benefits of an individual and isolated nature and awards for year-end results. The average monthly wage of kolkhoz farmers amounted to 237 rubles and rose 13 percent.

According to the data of family budget surveys, the per capita monetary income of workers and employees was 26 percent higher than in the first quarter of 1990 and amounted to 238 rubles a month, with respective figures of 37 percent and 243 rubles for kolkhoz farmers. Average compensation payments amounted to 109 rubles in March for the families of workers and employees and 128 rubles for the families of kolkhoz farmers, or around 15 percent of their monetary income.

Consumer spending by the population amounted to 82.1 billion rubles, or 23.4 percent more than in the first quarter last year. Furthermore, the rate of increase in March was 32.8 percent, which was connected with the buying frenzy brought on by the anticipated price reform. This also slowed down the rate of increase in deposits in branches of the RSFSR Savings Bank. Whereas the increase was 5.3 billion rubles in January and 4.9 billion in February, it was 2.2 billion in March. The population also purchased bonds and securities worth 803.5 million rubles, which was 2.8 times the amount purchased in January-March 1990.

Consumer Market and Service Sector

Industry in the RSFSR produced consumer goods worth 71.1 billion rubles (in retail prices), which was 2 billion (or 3 percent) more than in January-March 1990. The increment, however, was mainly due to higher prices.

The output of foodstuffs as a whole was reduced by 5 percent and amounted to 18.8 billion rubles. The following data measure the output of the main types of food products (in thousands of tons):

Products	Produced in first quarter 1991	% of first quarter 1990
Meat (commercially produced)	1,259	84
Sausage	517	91
Edible fish products, including canned fish	1,129	89
Whole-milk dairy products, calculated in milk units	4,642	92
Butter	115	82
High-fat cheeses	79.6	84
Margarine products	198	83

Granulated sugar	513	102
Vegetable oil	310	96
Confectionery	735	97
Bread and baked goods	4,367	114
Flour	4,969	104
Groats	734	98
Noodles	285	105
Canned foods, millions of standard cans	1,302	88
Canned fruits and vegetables	701	94
Mineral water, millions of decaliters	8.5	79
Alcoholic beverages, millions of decaliters	19.0	103
Filtered and nonfiltered cigarettes, billions	38.7	94

Enterprises in almost all territories of the republic produced less meat and butter than in the first quarter of 1990, and enterprises in three-fourths of the territories produced less high-fat cheese, sheep's milk cheese, and whole-milk products. There was a significant decline in the production of meat and high-fat dairy products at enterprises in the Dagestan ASSR, the Komi SSR, Kemerovo, Kostroma, Lipetsk, Nizhegorod, and Saratov oblasts, Moscow, and Leningrad.

The following data are indicators of the output of the main nonfood items:

Items	Produced in first quarter 1991	% of first quarter 1990
Television sets, millions	1.1	100.2
Color sets	0.6	99.7
Refrigerators and freezers, millions	0.9	98
Radios, millions	1.4	96
Tape players and combination radio-players	0.2	109
Tape recorders, millions	0.9	111
Video recorders, thousands	73.3	119
Sewing machines, thousands	440	97
Zigzag models	261	100.8
Washing machines, millions	1.3	105
Vacuum cleaners, millions	1.1	110
Furniture, billions of rubles	2.2	100.5
Motorcycles, thousands	170	97
Bicycles (excluding children's models), millions	0.9	96
Passenger cars, thousands	268	95
China and earthenware, millions of rubles	203	115
Matches, millions of standard boxes	3.9	95
Wallpaper, millions of standard pieces	94.1	99.3
Stationery, millions of rubles	216	100.6
School notebooks, millions	645	92
Dry, primary, and nickel-alkaline 10 Ahr batteries for household appliances, millions	165	95
Garden structures, including accessories, frames, and modular units (delivered to trade organizations), thousands	26.5	97
Electric mixers, thousands	252	122
Electric irons, millions	2.1	89
Electric teapots, thousands	659	81
Small packages of synthetic detergents, thousands of tons	161	92
Household soap, thousands of tons	73.7	80
Facial soap, thousands of tons	48.5	92
Fabric, millions of square meters	2,014	91
Cotton	1,380	93
Silk	252	91
Wool	107	85
Knitwear, millions of items	169	87
Children's knitwear	89.0	78
Hosiery, millions of pairs	193	87
Children's hosiery	68.4	88
Men's socks, millions of pairs	71.2	91
Sewn garments (retail prices), millions of rubles	3,843	111
Footwear, millions of pairs	84.8	89
Children's footwear	39.0	86
Bed linens (retail prices), millions of rubles	235	105

There were more acute shortages of virtually all goods in the first quarter. Production cuts, erratic deliveries to the trade network, and the anticipation of the retail price reform turned shopping into the frenzied buying of anything for sale, for the purpose of acquiring a reserve supply for future exchange or resale.

Retail commodity turnover was 15 billion rubles (25.5 percent) higher in actual prices than the figure for the first quarter of 1990 and amounted to 74.6 billion rubles. The entire increment was due to higher prices and the new 5 percent sales tax. The retail price index of consumer goods was 125 percent.

Reduced volumes of agricultural production and procurements reduced the output of foodstuffs and created difficulties in supplying the population with food. Sales of meat, poultry, fish products, butter, cheese, nonalcoholic beverages, and vegetable and fruit juices were 15- 31 percent below the figures for the first quarter of 1990, and sales of confectionery, sausages, potatoes, vegetables, margarine, eggs, and sugar were 4-12 percent below. The sales figures for vegetable oil and citrus and other fruits were 10-18 percent higher and sales of canned meat were 1.4 times as high (as a result of the inclusion of retail trade reserve stocks).

Rationing is being used everywhere for the distribution of the main food products. The rationing system is most highly developed in Syktyvkar, Tver, Kostroma, Smolensk, Kirov, Yoshkar-Ola, Cheboksary, Kazan, Orenburg, Perm, Ufa, Tyumen, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk. Sales by appointment, coupons, and identification cards have been organized in some regions to protect the consumer market from out-of- town shoppers.

There were more problems than last year in supplying the population with potatoes and fresh produce, mainly as a result of reduced procurements. In the first quarter, 42,200 tons of early hothouse and field-grown vegetables were purchased, but this was 8,800 tons (17 percent) less than in the same period in 1990. Sales of fresh cucumbers, tomatoes, and lettuce in kolkhoz markets rose to 1.3-2.8 times the previous levels, while the market prices of these crops rose to 1.1-1.8 times the previous levels.

The situation in the market for non-food items was complicated by cuts in production and the reduction of imports. Sales of cotton, silk, and wool fabrics decreased by a third or more in comparison with the first quarter of 1990, and there were reductions of 16-29 percent in sales of household soap, refrigerators, television sets, leather footwear, and hosiery and of 7-11 percent in sales of knitwear, radios, and facial soap. Only sales of synthetic detergents stayed at almost the same level as last year. Sales methods securing more equitable distribution were instituted in some regions not only for daily necessities and durable goods, but also for nonessentials.

The shortages of goods and the buying frenzy intensified the sale of the reserve stocks in wholesale and retail trade. These reserves were reduced by 1.2 billion rubles in the first quarter.

The volume of paid services for the population amounted to 10.1 billion rubles, 8 percent higher in actual prices than in January-March last year, and the volume of consumer services amounted to 2.7 billion rubles (17 percent). The increment was due to the higher prices and rates. In comparable prices the sales volume of paid and consumer services decreased. In spite of the higher cost of services, it was not uncommon for orders to be filled more slowly and requests for certain types of services to be denied.

Industry

The volume of industrial production (in comparable prices, based on enterprise reports) was 2.6 percent below the level for the first quarter last year, and the decrease was more pronounced at enterprises of the fuel, chemical, and petrochemical industries. Industrial output was reduced in 59 regions of the republic, and most substantially in the Komi SSR, Maritime Kray, Vologda, Bryansk, Kemerovo, Ryazan, Tomsk, and Tyumen Oblasts (by 6-9 percent), and Chita Oblast (13 percent).

New enterprise wholesale prices went into effect in industry in the beginning of 1991. The overall level of the wholesale prices of producers of manufactured goods, including fixed and contract prices, was 67 percent higher in January, 87 percent higher in February, and 96 percent higher in March than it had been a year before. On the average, wholesale prices were 84 percent higher than they had been in January-March 1990. Production volume in industry measured in current prices increased by 75.4 percent over the three months.

Underdeliveries of contracted shipments during the first quarter amounted to 3.9 billion rubles' worth of products (1.7 percent of the total), or 1.7 times as high as in January-March last year in comparable prices. Contractual obligations for the delivery of products were not fulfilled by 14.9 percent of all enterprises, with the highest numbers of these concentrated in the Karelian ASSR and Komi SSR (34-39 percent of the total) and in Khabarovsk Kray and Perm and Sverdlovsk Oblasts (21-28 percent).

The disruption of economic ties caused work stoppages at many enterprises. In March, for example, lengthy stoppages (as a rule, lasting more than one shift) due to shortages of energy, fuel, and material resources were recorded at almost a thousand enterprises. As a result, manufactured goods worth over 100 million rubles were not produced.

Conditions are growing worse at enterprises of union ministries, associations, concerns, and intersectorial state associations, and the output of many of the most important types of products is still decreasing in the fuel and energy, metallurgical, chemical and timber, and machine-building complexes.

Conditions in the fuel and energy complex have displayed serious deterioration. Strikes by miners in March compounded the difficulties in supplying consumers with coal: Direct losses amounted to 3.7 million tons. The output of coal for the first quarter was 11 million tons below the figure for January-March last year, and almost half of this amount consisted of extremely scarce coking coal. The coal reserves of consumers on 1 April amounted to 28.7 million tons, or 83 percent of last year's reserve, and reserves of coking coal amounted to 434,300 tons, or half of last year's reserve.

Oil production, including gas condensate, fell short by around 13 million tons in January-March. The output of gas was almost the same as last year's. The increased output of electricity (by 2 percent) was secured mainly by a higher GES [hydroelectric power station] output. The production decline at nuclear power plants was six percent. In all, the output of the main energy resources in standard units of measurement decreased by 21 million tons (4 percent) in the first quarter.

Interruptions in the work of the coal industry compounded the crisis in the metallurgical complex. Reserves of coking coal at enterprises of this branch were reduced by more than half in March. The yield of coke in the first quarter was only 91 percent of the yield in January-March last year. Enterprises are still suffering from a shortage of scrap metal. The entire technological cycle of metallurgical production was disrupted, and this reduced the output of all of the main types of products: of cast iron by 1.1 million tons (7 percent), of steel by 1.4 million (6 percent), of rolled ferrous metals by 1.1 million (7 percent), and of steel pipe by 144,000 tons (5 percent).

The output of highly efficient metal products is still decreasing: heat-reinforced rolled products made of lightweight steel, high-strength drilling pipe, cold-drawn structural steel, and several others.

Material and technical supply difficulties at enterprises of the machine-building complex due to reduced shipments of metal and of parts and components caused serious delays in the production of many of the main products of the electrical equipment industry, the machine tool industry, and agricultural machine building. The output of large-scale electrical machinery, electric engines, electric overhead cranes, and bulldozers decreased by 6-9 percent, and there were corresponding decreases of 8-17 percent in the output of metal-cutting lathes with numerical control, road graders, and equipment for iron and steel production and of 44 percent in the output of continuous casting equipment and machinery.

The output of sulfuric acid, soda ash and caustic soda, synthetic ammonia, mineral fertilizer, commercial timber and lumber, plywood, commercial pulp, paper, cardboard, gasoline, diesel fuel, and boiler fuel continued to decrease at enterprises of the chemical and timber complex.

There was also a decrease in the output of polymer materials and items made of them: polyethylene, polypropylene, thermoplastic pipe and tubing, and polyvinylchloride plastics, as well as synthetic dyes, chemical fibers and filament, rubber footwear, and movie film. There are still acute problems in supplying the population and public health establishments with medicines. In spite of the increase in their output in cost terms, there were cuts in the production of many medicines.

The shortage of lumber and paper was even more acute in the first quarter. There was a decrease of 14 percent in the output of commercial timber, of 15 percent in the lumber output, and of 11 percent in the output of plywood. There were long delays in the work of the giant Komilesprom, Dallesprom, Permlesprom, and Sakhalinlesprom lumber associations and the Severoles, Irkutsklesprom, and Tomlesprom concerns.

The systematic reduction of the output of commercial pulp (18 percent below the figure for the first quarter last year) is holding up the development of the paper industry. The output of newsprint, writing paper, notebook paper, and printing paper decreases each month.

In the construction complex there has been a decrease in the output of the main construction materials: precast reinforced concrete, panels for frame-and-panel housing construction, building brick, linoleum, window glass, flexible roofing and insulation materials, bathroom fixtures, and certain types of sanitary engineering equipment (heaters and convectors, gas stoves, and bathtubs).

The shortage of raw materials (slag and mineral additives) and fuel is reducing the output of cement. Cement production decreased at 34 of the 45 enterprises of the Soyuzstroymaterialy Association, including the Novorostsement Combine and the Magnitogorsk, Katav-Ivanovsk, and Podgorenskiy cement plants (by 10-16 percent).

Agroindustrial Complex

The state of affairs in the republic agroindustrial complex deteriorated perceptibly in the first quarter. There were dramatic reductions in the production, procurement, and deliveries of animal husbandry products to the union and republic (RSFSR) supplies:

Products	First quarter 1990	First quarter 1991	1991 in % of 1990
Output of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and interfarm enterprises, thousands of tons			
Meat (livestock and poultry sold for slaughter, in live weight)	2,751	2,387	87
Milk	9,461	8,500	90
Eggs, millions	9,306	8,863	95
Purchased from farms of all categories, thousands of tons			
Livestock and poultry (live weight)	2,757	2,295	83
Milk	8,151	7,028	86
Eggs, millions	8,470	7,471	88
Delivered to union and republic (RSFSR) supplies, thousands of tons			
Meat and meat products (calculated in meat units)	427	319	75
Milk and dairy products (calculated in milk units)	1,863	1,294	69
Eggs and egg products (calculated in egg units), millions	2,178	1,862	85

Farms in the RSFSR sold 2.2 million tons of livestock and poultry (94 percent of all purchases), 6.7 million tons of milk (96 percent), and 7 billion eggs (94 percent) to cover state requisitions and tax in kind. Fulfillment figures for the first quarter of 1991 were 30 percent for tax in kind on deliveries of livestock and poultry to the state and 17 percent for state requisitions, with respective figures of 27 and 17 percent for milk and of 27 and 29 percent for eggs. The campaign to sign contracts with farms for the purchase of the main agricultural products was not completed.

The production and sales of animal husbandry products declined almost everywhere. Furthermore, in the Bashkir SSR, Krasnodar Kray, and Ivanovo, Kirov, Kurgana, Novosibirsk, Perm, Sverdlovsk, and Chelyabinsk Oblasts, where the feed supply was much larger than last year's, meat production and procurements decreased by 8-20 percent. Milk production and procurements were substantially reduced in the Mordovian SSR and Voronezh, Penza, Ryazan, Saratov, and Tambov Oblasts (by 21-38 percent). Egg production and deliveries to the state were reduced in Kamchatka, Lipetsk, and Perm oblasts and the Kalmyk and North Osetian republics (by 18-37 percent).

Underdeliveries of products to large industrial centers and regions in the Far North in the first quarter amounted to 90,000 tons of meat (one-third of the envisaged volume), more than 900,000 tons of dairy products (almost two-thirds), and 68.5 million eggs and egg products (almost a fourth). This caused particular difficulty in supplying the population with food in the Komi SSR and Kemerovo, Perm, Sverdlovsk, Tyumen, and Chelyabinsk Oblasts.

The number of livestock is decreasing at agricultural enterprises mainly as a result of the feed shortage, as the following data testify (millions of head on 1 April):

Livestock	1990	1991	1991 in % of 1990
Cattle	48.6	46.4	96
Cows	15.4	15.0	98
Pigs	29.9	27.3	91
Sheep and goats	54.9	49.3	90
Poultry	459.5	461.9	100.5

The most substantial decrease in the number of the main types of livestock was recorded on farms in Maritime Kray and Irkutsk, Ryazan, Saratov, Tver, Tula, and Tyumen Oblasts. There were higher losses of livestock on kolkhozes and sovkhozes due to disease and death: 70,000 head of cattle (15 percent of the total), 165,000 pigs (14 percent), and 133,000 sheep and goats (20 percent). The higher rate of murrain was a result of a higher death rate for young livestock due to the deterioration of maintenance and feeding conditions.

On 22 April kolkhozes and sovkhozes had planted spring crops on 6.8 million hectares, including grain and legume crops (excluding corn) on 5 million. Some farms did not have a complete supply of spring crop seeds. There have been delays in the exchange of ordinary grain seeds for high-quality seeds.

The additional funds farms earned from the higher purchase prices of agricultural products covered the rise in the wholesale prices and delivery fees of equipment, fuel, construction materials, and fertilizer. The diminished responsibility of many enterprise and organization managers led to delays in deliveries of material and technical resources and fuel and lubricants to farms.

Construction projects in the agroindustrial complex financed by all sources absorbed 6.5 billion rubles in capital investments, or seven percent less than in January-March last year. The use of the personal funds of agricultural enterprises and organizations for construction has been curtailed substantially.

Capital Construction

State enterprises and organizations used 24.7 billion rubles in capital investments. The figure was seven percent lower than in the first quarter last year.

State centralized capital investments amounted to 9.5 billion rubles—45 percent from the union budget and the union fund for the stabilization of the economy, 33 percent from the republic budget, and 22 percent from local budgets. The proportional amount of centralized investments in the total investments of state enterprises is still decreasing, measuring 39 percent as compared to the 42 percent of January-March last year.

The completion of 93 percent of union construction projects and 92 percent of the projects financed by the personal funds of state enterprises and organizations, with a centralized supply of material resources, is scheduled for the fourth quarter, and this could cause delays in start-up operations.

Capital investments financed by the union budget and the union fund for economic stabilization are being used inefficiently. The annual limit on capital investments in the priority union construction projects and facilities where production capacities are being established had been depleted by 10 percent in the first quarter in the fuel and energy complex, 17 percent in the metallurgical complex, 11 percent in machine building, and 6 percent in the chemical and timber complex, with respective figures of 6, 9, and 8 percent for conservation facilities and for the intersectorial scientific and technical complexes and experimental bases of research and design organizations.

The current situation with regard to the construction of production facilities will preclude the reduction of the volume of unfinished construction this year.

Financing from all sources secured the completion of 98,000 apartments with a total area of 5.9 million square meters, which is 22 percent lower than the figure for the first quarter of 1990, and the amount of new housing in the Bashkir, Komi, and Tatar republics and Astrakhan and Sverdlovsk Oblasts was less than half of last year's.

The new housing financed by enterprises with their own funds decreased by 13 percent. Housing construction financed by the personal funds of enterprises of the RSFSR Ministry of Agricultural Production and the RSFSR River Fleet, Northwestern Construction, and Eastern Construction trusts decreased substantially.

The population covered the completion of residential buildings with a total area of 522,000 square meters with its own funds and with the aid of state credit and residences with a total area of 382,000 square meters with the funds of housing construction cooperatives, representing 115 percent and 78 percent respectively of the figures for the first quarter last year.

General educational schools for 18,200 students, or 21 percent less than in the first quarter last year, preschool establishments for 14,100 children (16 percent less), out-patient polyclinics for 7,000 patients a day (28 percent), and cultural centers and clubs with 3,700 seats (29 percent) were built with financing from all sources.

State construction and installation organizations completed contracted operations worth 13.6 billion rubles in January-March, including 5.7 billion in priority projects. The proportion accounted for by this work in the operations of state organizations decreased by nine percent.

The work was sharply reduced in organizations of the RSFSR Southern Construction, Eastern Construction, Ural Construction, Urban Renewal, and Northwestern Construction trusts. One of the main reasons is the non-fulfillment of delivery contracts for construction materials and structural elements.

Transportation and Communications

Freight volumes in the public transportation network decreased in the first quarter. The amount shipped since the beginning of the year was 1.3 billion tons, or 8 percent less than in January-March last year.

The amount of freight shipped by rail was 40.8 million tons less than in the first quarter of 1990, mainly as a result of cuts in the production of many manufactured goods. For example, the decrease of 15 percent in the output of coal in the first quarter reduced shipments of coal by rail by 8 percent, with respective figures of 10 and 8 percent for oil and petroleum products and of 5 and 2 percent for cement.

The plan for freight deliveries to the state was fulfilled by 98 percent. Delivery plans for eight of the 10 main types of freight were not fulfilled, including timber, oil and petroleum products, chemical and mineral fertilizers, and hard coal.

On 1 March, however, 35 million tons of freight to be shipped by rail (with a seven-day work week) had accumulated on loading platforms. The remaining unshipped freight as a whole was below the figure for the same date last year, but the amount of unshipped coke was 2.6 times as great, the amount of unshipped grain and ground grain products was twice as great, the amount of unshipped paper was 1.9 times as great, the amount of unshipped combination feeds was 1.6 times as great, and the amount of unshipped refractory materials and cement was 1.3 times as great as last year.

Maritime freight decreased by 6 percent. Some 2.7 million tons of freight, or 100.4 percent of the assigned amount, was shipped to regions of the Far North and comparable locations.

The amount of oil and petroleum products delivered by pipeline was 12.5 million tons less than in the first quarter last year. The reduction of shipment volumes in the public motor transport network amounted to 50.8 million tons.

Passenger traffic in the public transportation network was two percent lower than in January-March last year, including a 4 percent drop in railway transport and a 5 percent drop in motor transport. Passenger fares began to rise in the first quarter. The quality of transportation services, however, is still extremely low. Schedules are not observed, and the sale of tickets is poorly organized.

The number of traffic accidents on highways and streets was five percent lower than in the first quarter last year and amounted to 26,000, including 3,000 accidents caused by drunk drivers. The number of deaths was 0.5 percent lower and the number of injuries was 6 percent lower, but the totals were still high—5,000 and 28,000 respectively.

Communication enterprises performed services worth 2.4 billion rubles for the population, or 34 percent more than in January-March last year. Losses and thefts of mail through the fault of communications agencies increased by 15,700 rubles, or 15 percent, in the first quarter. The number of unsatisfied requests for telephone installations is almost 11 million at this time.

Crime

Reported crimes in the RSFSR numbered 456,000, or 19 percent more than in the first quarter last year, with known perpetrators in 49 percent of the cases. The crime rate rose almost everywhere, especially in Omsk (48 percent), Vladimir (41 percent), Nizhegorod (40 percent), Kamchatka (39 percent), Tver (38 percent), and Kaluga (37 percent) oblasts.

One out of every six reported crimes was a grave offense. Some 1,200 crimes were committed by people carrying firearms. There were 212 reported thefts of guns and ammunition, which was 18 percent higher than the figure for the first quarter last year.

The number of crimes against individuals decreased by 2.6 percent. Cases of criminal vandalism increased by 3.3 percent and numbered 28,000.

The number of crimes connected with thefts of state and public property rose 45 percent and thefts of the personal property of citizens rose 34 percent, including a 38-percent rise in burglaries. There were more than 45,000 reported group crimes (17 percent more).

Criminal activity by teenagers is on the rise: Minors were the perpetrators or accessories in 37,000 crimes. One out of every six crimes was committed under the influence of alcohol.

In January-March, 212,000 criminals were apprehended, with women representing 15 percent of the total and minors representing 16 percent. Criminal proceedings were instituted against more than two-thirds of the people who had committed crimes.

State of the Environment

The level of atmospheric pollution in many cities and industrial centers in the republic was still high in the first quarter. Agencies of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology recorded extremely high levels of air pollution in Moscow, Krasnoyarsk, Astrakhan, Arkhangelsk, Bratsk, Novodvinsk, and several other cities.

More than 500 cases of high pollution levels in bodies of water were recorded in the RSFSR, with the highest levels in the basins of the Ob River and its tributaries, the Irtysh and Tobol (26 percent of all the cases in the USSR), and the Volga River and its tributaries, the Oka and Kama (20 percent). Concentrations of zinc ions, ammonium nitrites, and petroleum products were from 10 to 50 times in excess of the norm here.

The number of cases of sudden (accidental) air, water, and soil pollution has displayed virtually no decrease. A break in the dam in the ash heap of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification's TETs-1 in Vorkuta dumped 10,000 cubic meters of pulp ash into the Vorkuta River. Enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification dumped more than 10 tons of fuel oil in the Sochi River. A 1.5- kilometer strip of the seashore near Sochi was also polluted. Extremely high concentrations of pollutants were recorded in the Nyuduya River in Murmansk Oblast, the Rudnaya River in Maritime Kray, the Chusovaya River in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the Vikhorev River in Irkutsk Oblast, and the Pelsh River in Vologda Oblast through the fault of enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, the Agricultural Chemicals Trust, and the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry.

Yeltsin Signature Drive Ruled 'Invalid'

LD0905143891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] The MOSKOVSKIYE KURANTY, in a report by Irina Kochetova, writes that the results of a signature drive to nominate Boris Yeltsin for the post of Russian president, which was carried out at a rally on 29 April, have been deemed invalid. This statement came from active members of the Democratic Russia movement. One of the statutory instruments, which shows that such procedures should be registered with the local soviet of people's deputies 10 days in advance, had not been made public on time. After the procedures are registered, the initiative group should be formed and signatures should be collected on special forms. Therefore, signature collection should start anew. Perhaps, the lesson will not be wasted and henceforth everything will proceed in accordance with the law.

Further Reportage on 7 May Supreme Soviet Session

LD0805064891 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0900 GMT 7 May 91

[Report by correspondent Andrey Nikoforov at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Today a joint sitting of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet chambers started off, as usual, by a traditional limbering-up at the microphones. Here are just a few fragments, so to speak:

Deputy Shakhray expressed his dissatisfaction with the way the information about the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's work is being prepared for and presented by the "Vremya" program. He made an official inquiry on this issue and also suggested that yesterday's speech by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin at the session, in which he spoke of the way the Supreme Soviet chairman is using his additional authority at this stage, should be broadcast separately. The legislature voted in favor of this suggestion.

There was also a suggestion from Deputy Ponomarev that the events at the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan should be discussed today. In this connection, the Supreme Soviet of Russia chairman announced that, on his demand and after a discussion with the top leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, a group of deputies of the Russian legislature had gone to the region.

Then the deputies turned to a very complex draft economic law—or rather, there are two of them—on privatization of state and municipal property and on personal investment accounts and deposits. Mikhail Dmitriyevich Maleyev spoke and said that privatization must be conducted in several stages; while the overall duration of this process is defined by the Government of Russia as approximately 15 years. He paid special attention to equality of terms at the start of privatization. Everyone in Russia, from the elderly to children—and this amounts to almost 150,000,000 people—should be supplied with means of payment, since the population has no such means; and this is what is meant by "personal accounts and deposits." The government thinks that 7,000 rubles of agreed means of payment should be transferred to the citizens' accounts. The minister asked the Supreme Soviet to pass this law as soon as possible because the process of so-called "wild privatization" is under way, and it causes hundreds of thousands—and even millions—of losses for the state every day.

TV To Begin Coverage 13 May

LD0805123891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 7 May 91

[Report by correspondent Yevgeniy Zherebenkov from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 7 May—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Yesterday the country's main news program had an original interpretation of the outcome of the work of Russia's legislature. It was a productive day, important laws were debated and adopted. This program did not notice that but did stress that the bill on recalling a people's deputy of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] had given rise to discussion and been rejected. I was present at yesterday's session and can say that this bill did not give rise to particular debate and was not rejected, but adopted, on its first reading. There is some difference here, which is what Sergey Shakhray noted. Nor did the Vremya program have a word to say about Boris Yeltsin's speech yesterday on the situation in the republic and the country and about use of supplementary powers. The deputies resolved to instruct the Committee on Information [komitet po glasnosti] to investigate this situation and to give television viewers the opportunity to see yesterday's speech by Boris Yeltsin.

The problem of coverage of the Russian legislature is not a new one, but there are hopes that it will lessen with the start of regular operation of the Russian television channel, which is happening soon, from 13 May." [passage omitted]

Deputies Complain of Media Bias

PM0905103791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 91 Second Edition pp 1,2

[Report by Yu. Makhrin: "Who Will Be the Owner? At the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] This was the main question on the Russian legislature's agenda yesterday: The deputies were discussing draft laws on the privatization of state and muncipal enterprises and on personal investment accounts and deposits.

However, the members of the Supreme Soviet began the morning sitting by "limbering up." This time they concentrated mainly on the work of... journalists. The debate was opened by S. Shakhray, who criticized the television program "Vremya." The speaker was right when he said that on 6 May many viewers were surprised by the limited amount of news from the Russian session. But S. Shakhray subsequently made the general comment that Central Television tends to provide news on the activities of the Russian legislature in a distorted form and had denied Russians the opportunity to see yesterday's speech by B. Yeltsin. He identified it as the Kremlin's handiwork.

It was strange to hear deputies who had won their seats under democratic slogans calling for journalists to be brought to book and to be investigated, for the heads of Central Television to be carpeted, and for the deputies to prepare their own news for television, which it would have to broadcast.

Such pronouncements were no surprise to the chairman, B.N. Yeltsin, because he promptly brought out the big stick and knocked them into the middle of next week—first the television people, and then the newspaper people:

"Correspondents of all newspapers write what they like...."

All right, then, Boris Nikolayevich, so even if you use a magnifying glass you cannot see nowadays the hand of the Kremlin controlling journalists, the former "lieutenants!" So they are free from the censor's yoke!

But the "limbering up" period ended in a mood of gloom. B. Yeltsin proposed instructing the Committee on Glasnost: "to contact the television people and demand that they show the introductory speech I made yesterday and make the necessary amendments regarding our session." Essentially, the press is being dictated to again, only this time by the "White House" on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment.

As we listened to this protracted debate, we journalists were bewildered: In what kind of rule-of-law state is it possible to tell journalists how to write, to try to put the censor's leash on them?!

Eventually the legislature embarked on the discussion of the draft laws. They were presented by M. Maley, chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State Property, and P. Filippov, deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers. What is their idea of privatization? It is "the acquisition by citizens or citizens' associations from the state or local soviets of enterprises, shares in the capital of joint-stock companies or associations, housing, land, or other items of state or municipal property on a collective-shared (private) ownership basis."

The draft laws were vigorously debated at the afternoon sitting. They were adopted on the first reading.

At the evening session the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Law on a State of Emergency was adopted, also on first reading.

As is known, the extraordinary Russian congress instructed the Supreme Soviet to form a commission to investigate instances of blackmail and threats against S.P. Goryacheva and other deputies. A resolution was adopted on the formation of the commission.

Then the deputies devoted precious time to the work of journalists. It was announced that B.N. Yeltsin's speech had been broadcast in full by Central Television in the session diary. The legislature also announced that Central Televsion did not have its own correspondent at the session and was therefore using TASS information. It was this information, pretty objective information, that had been transmitted on 6 May, V. Yugin, chairman of the Committee on Glasnost, observed. But the "Vremya" editor had cut it, so it ended up abridged.

Then V. Yugin, who, incidentally, is a colleague of ours, a Leningrad journalist, read the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and PRAVDA correspondents, as the chairman correctly observed, a homily.

R. Khasbulatov: In my view, PRAVDA provides obective information.

V. Yugin: Objective in your opinion, but in my view not entirely accurate. Because we have only given a first reading to the bill on recalling deputies, whereas it says that the law was adopted, which is misinforming voters. In my view, the reaction to such instances is very simple—deprive the correspondent of his accreditation.

A familiar style: The journalist is no good—down with him! Strange to see it borrowed by our "democrats." Or is it in their blood?

Various Topics Debated

PM0905114191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Legislative correspondent I. Yelistratov report: "State of Emergency Controlled by Law"]

[Text] The 7 May Russian legislative session opened with deputies asking "Why?" Why was the news about yesterday's work in the Supreme Soviet distorted on the "Vremya" program? Why had the Russian legislature remained silent over the alarming events in Armenia? These questions were answered from the chair by Deputy B.N. Yeltsin. It was decided that the "Vremya" program should be investigated: The legislature voted in favor of this. As for the events in Armenia, a deputies' commission was sent there two days ago on the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman's orders—its report on returning from the scene of the events will also serve as a basis for discussion and for appropriate conclusions.

Then the Supreme Soviet was presented with a joint item comprising two draft laws—"on privatizing state and municipal enterprises," and "on personal accounts and deposits."

These laws could also be added to the list of overdue moves insofar as, for all intents and purposes, privatization is already under way everywhere—party and nomenklatura properties are affected, and in every city privatization is rife. The Russian law is meant to put an end to this by defining a single procedure for privatizing state and municipal property. That aside, these laws are expected to strengthen Russia's economic sovereignty.

The agenda also includes a Law on a State of Emergency. It was drawn up in accordance with international legal norms, fixes a wide range of measures to be adopted in conditions of a state of emergency, clearly records the grounds for such measures, and establishes guarantees of rights and the responsibility of citizens and officials. It is to be supposed that this law will put an end to the excessively free use of the term "state of emergency," tolerated equally by individual citizens and entire deputy groups.

The text of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin's directive "On Strengthening Control and Offering Practical Assistance to Supreme Soviets Implementing Land Reforms" was also distributed in the legislature. Red tape merchants in the localities will be the object of strict measures right up to the dismissal of offenders from the positions they hold. Coordinators to oversee progress in implementing this directive in the localities were selected from among the people's deputies and listed by name.

The legislature voted in favor of promulgating a Law on the RSFSR Constitutional Court (effective from the day of its publication). This law is expected to play a significant role in the matter of strengthening the Russian Federation's legitimacy and confirm the RSFSR Constitution's precedence over other normative acts. In practical terms this law's juridical significance is equivalent to the Code insofar as it contains detailed and exhaustive definitions of the criteria for monitoring normative acts, incorporating elements of the norms of state, judicial, procedural, and material law.

As expected, the discussion of amendments to the Law on Recalling an RSFSR People's Deputy was truly heated (if fairly brief). This document has already been put to the vote twice and been "thrown out" both times by the Soviet of Nationalities—which finally prompted Deputy G. Yakunin to suggest that such a failure to adopt the law can mean only one thing: By no means all Soviet of Nationalities members were elected by democratic means and now they are afraid to run the risk of being ousted by dissatisfied voters. Presiding Deputy B.N. Yeltsin swept these suspicions aside.

What percentage of electors' votes should decide a deputy's fate? This question sparked a no less heated argument. Article 37 of the law proposes that a deputy should be considered recalled if over half the deputy's district votes "for." However, this recall "threshold" by no means suited everyone. Deputy V. Khubiyev insisted on a two-thirds majority, and Deputy S. Dzhamaldinov believes that the number of voters in favor of recalling a deputy should exceed the number that elected him originally. In the end, all the amendments were voted down and Article 37 of the draft law remains untouched for now. But only for now, as the law is adopted (finally!) in principle, but it can still be amended between now and 8 May. It is possible that the voters will finally receive the long-promised chance to participate in governing the state on 15 May, if only to use the occasion to remove a deputy who has forgotten that the only road to the summit of power runs through the electoral district.

To conclude the day's session the deputies looked over the clauses of the Law on Citizens' Medical Insurance, which is expected, in the opinion of the author, to prepare conditions for a radical reform of the RSFSR health service.

RSFSR Resolution on Rehabilitation Law

91UN1459A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Resolution signed by B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, in Moscow on 26 April: "Resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet 'On the Procedure for Bringing Into Force the RSFSR Law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed People" '"]

[Text] The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet resolves the following:

1. To bring into force the RSFSR Law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed People" from the moment of its publication.

2. Henceforth and before RSFSR legislation has been passed in accordance with the RSFSR Law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples," existing legislative enactments of the RSFSR and the republics making up the Russian Federation will apply when they are not at variance with this law.

3. Before the end of 1991 the RSFSR Council of Ministers will organize practical restoration of the legitimate rights of each repressed people and pass appropriate enactments making provision for the following:

—recision of all enactments of the government of the RSFSR and RSFSR ministries and departments that served as the basis for unlawful coercive resettlement from places of permanent residence, limitations on the rights of citizens of repressed peoples, and unlawful elimination of national-state formations;

—proposals for the USSR Cabinet of Ministers to rescind all enactments of the USSR Government, USSR ministries and departments, and the former USSR State Committee for Defense that served as the basis for unlawful coercive resettlement of citizens of repressed peoples from their permanent places of residence and limitations on their rights, and also unlawful elimination of national-state formations;

—restoration of the territorial integrity of national-state formations and administrative-territorial boundaries existing before their coercive, anticonstitutional change. To proceed here on the premise that during the process of the application of this law there will be strict observance of existing legislation on the equality of peoples and respect for the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens of other nationalities;

—restoration and return of spiritual and cultural values and archives that are the property of repressed peoples;

—restoration of the earlier historical names for populated points, regions, and localities unlawfully changed during the years of Soviet power.

4. The RSFSR Council of Ministers will, as the creation of economic and social conditions permits, establish the procedure, scales, and a mechanism for providing material compensation to persons directly involved in coercive resettlement.

5. The RSFSR Council of Ministers will do the following:

—before 21 May 1991 submit to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet proposals on providing guarantees for the application of the Law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples;"

—before 1 June 1991 bring decisions of the government of the RSFSR into line with the RSFSR Law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples;"

—by 1 July 1991 ensure a review and recision by ministries, state committees, and departments of the RSFSR of their enforceable enactments, including instructions, that are at variance with this law;

—before 1 July 1991 submit to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet proposals on bringing legislative enactments of the RSFSR into line with the RSFSR Law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples."

6. The Supreme Soviets of the republics making up the Russian Federation will bring the legislation of those republics into line with this law.

7. The Soviet of Nationalities will draw up provisions on the status of national-cultural autonomous formations to protect the right of national minorities on restored territories.

[Signed] B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet

Moscow, House of the Soviets of the RSFSR, 26 April 1991

Communist Party Secretariat Views Land Reform

PM1005093991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Solution to Crisis Lies in Fundamentally Improving Work; From RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat Meeting"]

[Text] A large part of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat meeting on 6 May was devoted to examining questions of overcoming the crisis affecting the economy and consequently Russia's social life.

The vital importance of resolving the food problem and reviving the Russian countryside and the development of the agro-industrial complex are now obvious to all. But have there been any practical improvements here?

What mistakes are there to avoid, what experience should be generalized, and what should special efforts be focused on?

All these subjects came up during the discussion of the experience of cooperation between Kaluga Oblast party committees and soviet and economic organs in implementing the land reform and developing a mixed rural economy. The oblast has virtually completed its inventory and economic valuation of farmland, set up a special fund for the redistribution of land, and allocated land parcels (for private farms, truck farms, and personal plots) to most of the citizens who have asked for land. Socioeconomic (deputies') commissions formed within local soviets at the suggestion of party committees are working quite well and land reform committees are being set up in cooperation with agro-industrial organs.

It is wrong to regard the reform as a simple redistribution of land: Qualitatively new socioeconomic conditions for the solution of the food problem are being established. While protecting the interests of efficient kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], experimental production farms, scientific institutions, and experimental stations, party committees, primary organizations, Communists working in soviets, and economic workers must search more actively for new ways to improve loss-making and low-profit farms, support the processes of transforming kolkhozes and sovkhozes into joint-ownership commodity-producing associations, promote the integration of industrial and agricultural production, create joint ventures and organizations, subsidiary farms, cooperatives, associations, consortiums, and science-and-production and production systems. In conjunction with soviet and economic organs, party organizations can and must do much to develop both personal subsidiary and peasant (private) farming and other forms of productive land use (horticulture, truck farming, and dacha construction).

The discussion was keen and sometimes sharp. V.V. Sudarenkov, first secretary of Kaluga RSFSR Communist Party Obkom [Oblast Committee] and chairman of the oblast soviet; A.I. Stelikov, chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]; N.V. Zudin, chairman of the Kaluga Oblast land reform committee; K.I. Stupin, chairman of Kaluga's "Agropromsoyuz;" A.P. Ustyuzhanin, RSFSR first deputy minister of agriculture and food; V.N. Khlystun, chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Land Reform; I.A. Ivlev, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet subcommittee for the material and technical supply of the agro-industrial complex; N.A. Popov, executive director of the Association of Peasant (Private) Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives; V.I. Kashin, member of the Politburo and secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, and other comrades took part in the discussion. Here are some of the theses raised in the discussion: Public-sector and individual forms of agricultural management must not be played off against one another, the latter will not survive without the former, there must be symbiosis here; improving production relations without providing the necessary material and technical facilities, a new level of productive forces, and thus major capital investment is futile; paramount attention must be paid to training cadres, especially young cadres, for all forms of economic management; and society must care for the countryside, which needs roads, a social infrastructure, and culture.

Party committees have been instructed to back up the land reform with more purposeful political work, consolidate collaboration with soviet and economic organs, and assist the mass media in their coverage and assessment of the experience of new economic building in the countryside.

The Secretariat session approved a legislative initiative on submitting to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet a draft resolution "On Urgent Measures To Stabilize the Situation in the Investment Complex and Restructure Its Work in the New Economic Conditions." The discussion of this question was prompted by the fact that in capital construction we have reached the brink, so to speak: The growth in national income per ruble of capital investments has fallen to three kopeks and in most sectors the commissioning of capacities is between 40 and 23 percent of the state order. The Russian population needs an extra 400,000 apartments. The republic's economy is heavily burdened by the amount of unfinished construction, which should have been reduced long ago, but free enterprise has resulted in a frantic demand for new construction. At the same time the construction base does not meet the needs of the national economy and the consumer market. The system of material and technical supply for construction is on the verge of collapse. Planning work has more than doubled in price although quality has not improved. Construction organizations are losing skilled staff. And virtually the most terrible thing of all is that this most important sector of the national economy has become almost unmanageable. Communists and party organizations cannot view this with indifference.

The RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat adopted a decision to form a council of secretaries of the party organizations of the apparatuses of RSFSR ministries, departments, concerns, and associations as a consultative agency designed to ensure better collaboration among them and the exchange of experience of timely help to local soviets and collectives of enterprises and organizations in establishing economic ties, increasing output on the basis of higher labor productivity and the introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress, and resolving social problems.

A resolution was adopted on improving the system for informing Communists about the activity of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee both via the mass media and via direct acquaintance with documents and materials at party meetings. It is planned to improve the information activity of party committees.

Congress of Numerically Small Peoples Held

Aims of Congress Noted

91UN1459B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Gennadiy Shipitko report: "Protect the Numerically Small Peoples"]

[Text] Moscow—**A congress of people's deputies of the numerically small peoples in the North, Siberia, and the Far East opened on 6 May in Moscow. The 115 delegations, chosen from soviets at all levels, will discuss matters pertaining to protecting the interests and rights of almost 200,000 indigenous inhabitants in these regions.**

"The main task set for the congress," People's Deputy Ye. Aypin, chairman of the organizing committee for the congress, says, "is to reach decisions that would provide protection for these peoples against the onset of the market."

At the congress, which is scheduled to last two days, the chairman of the Chukotka Okrug Soviet, USSR People's Deputy V. Yetylen, will present a report entitled "On the Main Provisions of a Concept for State Self-Government by Numerically Small Peoples." Cochairmen for a new association and assembly of deputies will also be elected, along with chairmen for the standing commissions, and also a presidium and bureau. All their activity will be built mainly on a public foundation but, as Ye. Aypin noted, funding will also be essential for their effective work.

Precisely what funding? Over the past decades the state has adopted several decisions on providing help for the numerically small peoples on the verge of extinction. But none of them has been implemented. The latest resolution, this time from the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, proposes the allocation of considerable funding. But it is the opinion of the deputies chosen from among the numerically small peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East that they can scarcely count on the funds being used as intended. Moreover, the laws that are being established today do little to reflect the specific features of these peoples. It is therefore being proposed that a coordination center be set up in the assembly to provide skilled assistance and monitor compliance not only with this decision but also the decisions of the RSFSR and the local soviets.

Survival, Development Discussed

LD0805095291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1706 GMT 7 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow, 7 May (TASS)—The first congress of people's deputies of the small peoples of the north, Siberia, and the Far East, convened in Moscow with the active assistance of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Russian Federation, ended its work here today. It adopted a decision to create a deputies' assembly of the small peoples of the region and a special fund for their survival and development, and also to set up printed organs. About 100 people's deputies from soviets of various levels took part in the work of the forum.

In the documents adopted today, those attending the congress voiced concern over the fate of the small peoples, and anxiety over the gradual loss of their national originality and the deterioration of their economic position. They entrusted the deputies' assembly, a consultative and coordinating body of deputies, with solving the associated economic and social problems.

The assembly's main aims are formulated in the declaration of its foundation. They include drawing up draft laws aimed at developing the northern peoples, and their submission for consideration by the legislatures of the USSR and Russia; carrying out legal, economic, and ecological vetting of industrial projects; and preventing actions liable to damage the lives and environment of the small peoples.

The congress elected the assembly's governing bodies and its chairman. He is USSR People's Deputy Yeremey Aypin.

Wreaths Laid in Moscow on Victory Day Eve

PM0905140991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Wreath Laying"]

[Text] On the eve of the Victory holiday 8 May wreaths were laid at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier from Moscow Gorkom [city party committee] and Moscow CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee], the "Moscow" deputies' group, veterans of war and labor and public organizations in Moscow and the Moscow area, and Moscow Military District and Moscow Air Defense District military councils. Yu.A. Prokofyev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Moscow CPSU Gorkom first secretary, took part in the ceremony.

Sobchak Views Prospect of Renaming Leningrad

PM0905132891 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[RIA report from news agencies roundup: "A. Sobchak on Renaming Leningrad"]

[Text] At a press conference held 7 May, Leningrad City Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Sobchak had the following to say on his attitude toward renaming the city and holding a nationwide referendum on this matter 12 June: "If this happens, it will be a most happy event. I hope we will give the city a chance to be reborn. Renaming the city is in no way intended to be a snub to Communists and Leninism."

Earlier Anatoliy Sobchak said that this is not the right time to rename the city as it will cost 140 million rubles, which the city authorities cannot afford, RIA reports.

Commentator's View of Gorbachev Japan Visit Hit

PM0805130391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 91 Second Edition p 4

[An. Yuryev "Rejoinder:" "'Star:' The View From Behind"]

[Text] The journalist who interviewed Vladimir Tsvetov called him a "star of Russian television."

Answering the VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA journalist's questions, Tsvetov described as spongers those who accompany M.S. Gorbachev on trips abroad.

The journalist announced that Vladimir Tsvetov had just returned from Japan where he had been preparing reports on President M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the Land of the Rising Sun. He was not part of the retinue. He was representing the Russian Television and Radio Company.

Tsvetov named as members of the retinue the writers Shatrov and Kugultinov, theater producer Volchek, and the president's bodyguard, who, allegedly, because they had nothing to do, took turns to go shopping....

According to the "star," whenever he traveled with Shevardnadze or with Yakovlev, he would manage by himself, but here there were as many as 240 Soviet journalists. Whether or not journalists are classed as spongers I do not know. Although Tsvetov did admit that he was not actually present at the events, but watched them from the television studio. But it is his business whom he follows and where to. Very possibly this fits the concept of his new weekly Russian television program: "We want to create a weekly program on the most important events viewed from inside and... from behind."

Evidently, the coverage of the Soviet-Japanese meeting can be regarded as the premiere of this view "from inside" and "from behind." Here is Tsvetov's view of it.

"Our imperial ambitions are so deeply ingrained," he reckons, "that our heart will not allow us to relinquish this scrap of land—the South Kuril Islands."

What have ambitions and heart got to do with it.... After all, this scrap of land is home to thousands of Soviet people. Most of them do not want either "reunification" with Japan or resettlement on the mainland as refugees. And what would relinquishing it mean? This scrap of land is the size of Okinawa. There are 1 million people living on Okinawa and it accommodates more than half of the U.S. bases in Japan.

"No significant assistance can be expected from Japan. Gorbachev was actually told this," Tsvetov said. "...The businessmen listened politely, but they did not appear especially motivated...." Concerning, that is, a list of projects the Soviet side is prepared to implement jointly with the Japanese.

I repeat—these are the assessments of the "star of Russian television." Here is the opinion of the Japanese.

TOKYO SHIMBUN writes that the results of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan were positive and deserve a "very good rating." This view was expressed by the majority of representatives of around 100 leading Japanese companies, who answered the newspaper's questionnaire. The poll was carried out at the end of April, after the Soviet-Japanese summit in Tokyo.

Many of those who participated in the poll, which concerned relations between the USSR and Japan, advocated a substantial expansion of bilateral trade and economic cooperation at the present stage. More than one-third of the businessmen noted that movement should take place in this direction "without linkage to the territorial issue." It is clear from the poll that leading Japanese companies are most interested in organizing business partnership with the Soviet Union in such spheres as the development of the Far East region, exploitation of oil and gas deposits, and protection of the environment.

Not for nothing did I mention above the U.S. forces on Japanese territory, which have been there since World War II.

The Japanese have long been demanding that they should go home. But when you read the "star's" answers you get the impression that the U.S. soldiers are all but a blessing for Japan. Indeed, had they not gone to the islands in 1945, there would have been no "Japanese miracle." You don't believe me? Read what Tsvetov has to say:

"Reconstruction in Japan was implemented by the occupation authorities almost by force. They laid the foundation for Japanese prosperity."

"The law on economic reform in Japan, devised by the Americans, was adopted immediately because the country was occupied by a force of occupation."

Let us cite some more: "...The present Japanese Constitution was written by Americans in the occupation force's headquarters. An officer delivered it to the legislature. All the emperor had to do was read it out...."

Apparently, it is not so much a matter of the Japanese people's talent and their fantastic industry, as of the U.S. force of occupation. In short, without soldiers you achieve no reconstruction. And do not expect an economic miracle.

Western Republics

Ukraine's Kravchuk Assesses Joint Declaration

91UN1453A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 7 May 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Ukranian Supreme Soviet Chairman L. Kravchuk by correspondent Georgiy Dolzhenko in Kiev; date not given: "Leonid Kravchuk: 'Once Agreed, Implement!'"]

[Text] *The whole country learned with relief of the joint declaration which charted ways of escape from the crisis and a stabilization of the situation in the country. Lively discussion of this document is under way in the work force currently. There are misgivings also—will it not prove just another promise, of which many have been accumulated of late. Our correspondent asked L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, to comment on this declaration.*

[Dolzhenko] Leonid Makarovich, many people in the republic, and in the country also, are interested in the question: Why did you not attend the meeting of republic leaders with the president? Is some secret not concealed here? That you did not want, say, to sign the declaration and availed yourself of an opportunity to go overseas....

[Kravchuk] What secrets can there be in the era of glasnost. It is all very straightforward. We did not even know that any document would be adopted. No one had studied it ahead of time, and the draft was not sent out preliminarily. Although the subject of the meeting was known. It was planned to examine the most painful questions of our life. But there was no question of any document. No adoption of any document was contemplated, I believe. The declaration was formulated in the course of the meeting.

This once again characterizes to some extent today's style of work of the highest echelons of administration. No one imposes anything on anyone. People assembled and adopted a decision. Earlier such papers were prepared by the administrative staff. They underwent lengthy official approval, were shown to the leader, and only then were they submitted for so-called discussion—someone changed some commas, perhaps. But the fate of the document was already predetermined. There was none of this here.

Also very important, from my viewpoint, was the fact that the joint declaration was no accident. It was the natural course of our development and the contradictory trends which are occurring currently in our society. Had the laws and decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Union republics been implemented, and I put them on the same footing, there would have been no need for this declaration. Today the authority of these laws and decrees and of ukases of the president also is not high, to put it mildly. And for this reason there is a search for paths of joint accords. After all, if we are speaking from the purely legal standpoint, the importance of this document is considerably less than that of any decision adopted by the legislature or the congress. It is a declaration of leaders and their intention to do something. It is on its basis that laws, ukases, and decrees are to be elaborated. And then that which has only been outlined will acquire legal force.

[Dolzhenko] You have sown doubts: Was this declaration necessary at all?

[Kravchuk] I am convinced that it was. So that the position of the leaders of the republics be clear and so that there finally be an end to the war of laws. The declaration has lent new impetus to society's development and will accelerate an end to the chaos. As far as my absence is concerned, I was, as you know, on a business assignment. It had been planned a very long time back as a return visit to Germany. It was very important in terms of content, in its nature, and in the agreements. The trip more than justified our hopes. The talks with Weizsaecker and Genscher afforded an opportunity for elucidation of our positions and sharing views, and the meetings in Munich and other cities were held at a level of sincerity and candor which I was not expecting.

The main purpose of the trip was to make direct political and economic contacts and negotiate in practice, in documentary fashion, and initiate cooperation, particularly in the sphere of elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station, help for invalids, the processing of agricultural raw material and iron and steel industry waste, and in respect of a set of construction problems and, specifically, modernization of the Kaluga "Khlorvinil" Works and the retooling of the Lvov Auto Works. There were a great many agreements. I simply could not, therefore, have postponed this trip. The Ukraine was represented in Moscow by Prime Minister V. Fokin, and there is complete mutual understanding between us.

[Dolzhenko] Leonid Makarovich, what would you say about the nature of the declaration itself, to what extent does its content satisfy you?

[Kravchuk] Many points of the declaration simply make me happy. We have finally reached agreement, say, that the Union treaty should be a treaty of sovereign states. This issue was not clear before. Now it is. It is the position I personally have been defending for 18 months now. I also consider wholly correct the fact that the center of all work needs to be shifted to the republics and that they should be responsible for all the processes that occur in them: political, economic, social.

It is impossible in such a vast country to control everything from a single center. This is an impracticable task. After all, each republic has its own particular features, traditions, history, and structure of industry and agriculture. Everything needs to be taken into consideration. And this also is reflected in the document. The idea of relying in work on current laws, until there are new ones, is in principle correct.

But it is necessary to clearly delineate the powers of Union and republic laws here. If we adopt a position of the supremacy only of the Union laws, because the republic laws are, allegedly, imprecise and a hindrance, once again nothing will result. The declaration, for example, records: to unswervingly comply with current laws until the adoption of the new Union treaty and constitution of the Union. I would add: and the constitutions of the Union republics. By what should we be guided currently? Only the Union Constitution or ours also?

I also support elections based on the new Constitution. It should afford all political forces equal opportunities. Whoever wins will govern. We should not be frightened of this now.

Frankly, until now elections have been conducted on a one-party basis. It is now essential to make them an instrument of democratic transformations in society, and they are obliged to lead to national harmony.

I have just returned from Bavaria. All parties take part in the election there. Whichever wins forms the government, and no one has any complaints.

[Dolzhenko] What is your attitude toward the economic part of the declaration?

[Kravchuk] Order needs to be brought to the economy. How? There is no returning to the old, centralized systems. There has been much talk about the need for a state of emergency. So let us impose such in the coal industry. Would the miners go immediately to the face? Or should we send them there by force? We need to weigh our words before throwing out such calls. But work on the anticrisis program is another matter.

We instructed our cabinet at the start of the work of the republic session, on 12 May, to submit the question of formation of the cabinet. The premier will simultaneously present the anticrisis program.

The main thing is the timeframe. If there is to be denationalization, when its start and finish and what its mechanism will be. It is also necessary to revise our budget with regard for the new situation for today everything continues according to the old pattern. It is essential to reconsider the powers of the Union and the republic and determine clearly what we will do in the Ukraine—from the viewpoint of property and other questions—and what will be done by the country's cabinet.

Where are we continually falling down? All levels do nothing but make general declarations. Even the anticrisis program is of a general nature. But the question of mechanisms needs to be posed: It is not what needs to be done but how it is to be done and when. We are continually saying: more freedom here, more rights there, we need to move toward the market.... But we have been hearing this for five years with some modifications and additions. But people want to know how taxes will be paid and shares sold, say, to whom, within what timeframe, and where. Then an individual will perceive a way out of the crisis personally.

I have visited many outfits and I hear this criticism constantly—we do not need appeals, let's have some action. We need to act. The republics, oblasts, rayons, and the work force primarily—where the country's fate is decided. A redistribution of power functions should not be feared. As long as this is for the good of the people. They have found themselves today in a more than difficult situation.

[Dolzhenko] I recall that the question of the distribution of finances was acute not that long ago. And the declaration also speaks of the formation of extra-budget funds? How will this be accomplished?

[Kravchuk] Everything in the declaration is correctly written. But for the formation of extra-budget funds we need to have the resources at least. It is said that in order to make hare stew you need to at least have a cat. But since we waited three months until the increase in retail prices—the wholesale and purchase prices were raised in January, but retail prices, on 2 April—a whole quarter failed to drip into the budget. The first question for us now is providing people with compensation. We reckoned that, after this, there was nothing left.

What do you order that we do? Issue new money or appropriate it from people and give it to the Union coffers? There has been no response. Until the industrial outfits and trade begin to work, until commodity turnover commences, there will be nothing. In order for everything to start operating at full power, it is essential to give people freedom. Returning them to the old administrative forms and compelling them is futile.

Various functionaries are trying to "bar the way" and they are holding their positions dear. Give us the right to ourselves administer within our competence and to manage ourselves. If the Ukraine becomes wealthy, would this be bad for the Union? And, then, the people are coming with flags and placards to us, not Pavlov. We cannot constantly redirect them toward the center. Why, otherwise, do they have such a chairman and such a legislature?

[Dolzhenko] How will the declaration's propositions concerning the citizens' social protection be implemented in the Ukraine?

[Kravchuk] All that is outlined in the declaration in this respect has already been done. Prices in student dining halls, school refreshment areas, and kindergartens have been compensated. The 5 percent tax on a number of commodities has been canceled. But we could do more. Wages in the republic are lower than in other regions. It is hard to explain to people why in the Ukraine, which manufactures so many products and is of such relative significance in the country, the worker must receive less than the average. We have set our cabinet the task of equalizing wage rates and wages. But all will once again depend on fiscal revenue.

We have to work. If the miners continue to strike and if inadequate work is performed in other sectors, nothing will result. The Ukraine is today building a modern state. If everyone is interested in this, and the recent referendum confirmed this, everyone must work. There is no other solution.

Rukh Holds News Conference on Khmara Case

LD0905144491 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 9 May 91

[Excerpts] There was a press conference in Kiev today held by the People's Movement of Ukraine-Rukh and the People's Council—the legislative opposition. Many Ukrainian and foreign journalists were present at the press conference. The questions concerned Stepan Khmara case. [passage omitted]

Till today, Stepan Khmara has been kept in prison, where he is on the hunger-strike since April the 13th. Fedir Sviderskyy met with Stepan Khmara in prison yesterday and had a converstion with him.

[Sviderskyy in Ukrainian fading to English translation] Stepan Khmara told me that if we wanted to do something for the benefit of the people, we should first and foremost declare our secession from the Supreme Soviet, Fedir Sviderskyy says. We must achieve the fulfilment of the demands put forward by the students and the resolution of the Supreme Soviet, which was supposed to meet these demands halfway. Then Stepan Khmara said he strongly doubted that they would let him leave prison safe and sound, Fedir Sviderskyy said.

[Announcer] And here is what People's Deputy Ivan Zayets said in this connection.

[Zayets in Ukrainian fading to English translation] I think that the case of Stepan Khmara is just another test of our people and all the democratic forces of Ukraine. We cannot build a state of law if we do not work for the right of every individual, Ivan Zayets said.

[Announcer] As Mykola Porovskyy, people's deputy of Ukraine, said, an all-Ukrainian action of protest would be held on May the 13th to demand the release of Stepan Khmara, who had been imprisoned without any legal grounds.

Ukraine Abrogates Union Decree on Resources

914A0724A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 3

["Resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on the Effect of the Ukase of USSR President 'On Emergency Measures To Furnish Material Resources to Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations' Dated 12 April 1991 in the Territory of the Ukrainian SSR"]

[Text] The Ukase on Emergency Measures To Furnish Material Resources to Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations dated 12 April 1991, issued by the USSR president, runs counter to Article 71 of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution, the Ukrainian SSR Law on the Economic Independence of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR Law on the Preferential Social Development of the Countryside and the Agroindustrial Complex in the National Economy of the Ukraine, and resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on Introducing Unified State Requisitions for Manufacturing Products and Performing Work (Services) in the Territory of the Ukrainian SSR dated 15 October 1990. The above ukase has not been coordinated with the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet **resolves**:

1. To suspend the effect of Articles 1 and 3 of the Ukase of USSR President on Emergency Measures to Furnish Material Resources to Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations dated 12 April 1991 in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

2. Managers of enterprises, associations, and organizations located in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, regardless of their institutional affiliation and form of property, shall take additional measures to unconditionally comply with the requirements of the Resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on Introducing Unified State Requisitions for Manufacturing Products and Performing Work (Services) in the Territory of the Ukrainian SSR dated 15 October 1990.

3. The Supreme Court of Arbitration, the Procuracy, the banks, the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Finance, and their oblast units will ensure the defense of the economic interests of enterprises, associations, and organizations in the process of executing the present resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet
City of Kiev, 16 April 1991

Kharkov 'National Salvation Committee' Disbanded

PM0905085391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Item from roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX, BALTFAX, RIA, REUTER reports: "Anticrisis Headquarters Disbanded"]

[Text] The Kharkov Oblast Soviet has disbanded the oblast anticrisis headquarters, which had been dubbed the "local national salvation committee" by certain publications. This organization was set up in late February at a joint session of the Kharkov Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom [oblast committee] and Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] bureaus. The obkom and oblispolkom joint resolution, which has still been kept secret from the oblast soviet deputies, envisaged the creation of similar anticrisis headquarters in all cities and rayons in Kharkov Oblast. INTERFAX reported that Communist leaders at different levels were to have set them up with a view to "supporting the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's measures."

Reportage on Ukraine Premier's Visit to Greece

WA0905144791

For Greek reportage on the visit by Ukranian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin to Greece, including reports on his talks with Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis, please see the Greece section of the 9 May West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Dnestr Region Deputies Mistakenly Arrested

PM0805140791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 91 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Deputies Arrested"]

[Text] Kishinev—The Moldovan police have arrested Dnestr region local soviet deputies V. Zagryadskiy and L. Mateychuk in contravention of the law guaranteeing their inviolability.

"Late in the evening the official vehicle in which I was traveling with G. Marakutsey, first secretary of the Kamenskiy party Raykom [rayon committee], was stopped by a State Automobile Inspection worker," L. Mateychuk told a TASS correspondent. "Despite the fact that we presented our deputies' identity cards the police, who were in civilian clothes, shoved me into their automobile and took me to Kishinev. After being searched I was taken into an office in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] where they began to interrogate me. I became angry and demanded that a record of arrest and questioning be drawn up. After a while they apologized to me, explaining that they had confused me with a man who had escaped from a labor rehabilitation clinic."

"Our workers simply confused Mateychuk with the man we were seeking, who looked a lot like him," said D. Korletanu, Moldova SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] MVD administration chief.

Unfortunately, we have not managed to ascertain why city soviet deputy V. Zagryadskiy was arrested and taken from Tiraspol. The republic's deputy prosecutor, V. Didyk, told a TASS correspondent that he has no information on this score.

V. Zagryadskiy himself provided the following information:

"I was seized by armed men in the morning, on my way to work. At the Moldova SSR Prosecutor's Office, where I was then taken, the prosecutor who questioned me tried to justify the fact that I had been arrested by accusing me of calling at a meeting for disobedience to the laws of Moldova. In terms of form I was interrogated as a witness but the questions were of an accusatory nature."

Gagauz Independence Motivations Examined

PM0805161391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 May 91 Union Edition p 3

["Political Map" article by Eduard Kondratov: "Gagauz Knot"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Kishinev—Komrat—Chadyr-Lunga—You can understand why the Moldovan Government is so unpopular in Budzhak today. Not all, but many of its inhabitants are convinced that the autumn events may repeat themselves. The arms that the Gagauz stockpiled then have been put aside for a rainy day. I have been told that a lot more have been collected over these six months, and that they are adding to them where they can. The only secret is: How many of them are there. People do not hide the fact that they will defend themselves, their homes, and their families to the last.

What about independence for a Gagauz republic? Are they ready to lay down their lives for it? I have serious doubts about this very thing. They are not hiding their disappointment. "We do not believe anything sensible will come of this," I heard in the villages, and in Komrat. Note that I heard this from people whom it is customary to call "simple folk." The Gagauz movement's leaders and the majority of other leaders do not intend to back down. They are firmly committed. "It is too late," F. Kuru, chairman of the Suvorot Kolkhoz [collective farm], says, "we Gagauz are no longer children whom it is possible to exploit, trick, and humiliate. We will not get anywhere if we do not look out for ourselves." I. Cheban, first deputy chairman of Chadyr-Lunga Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee], is convinced that a Gagauz republic is even capable of withstanding an economic blockade. I. Bezhan, second secretary of Komrat Party Raykom [rayon committee], is a Moldovan, but even he considers that if Kishinev does not reconsider the previous decisions about autonomy then only one course of action will remain—to give a Gagauz republic the right to sign the Union treaty independent of Moldova.

The leaders of the republic, which for the moment has only been recognized by the Dnestr region, are even more radically inclined. This is what its Supreme Soviet chairman, S. Topal, said to me:

"It is already too late to talk of autonomy. When the Gagauz people asked for it they were met with insults. The status of Gagauz national district [uyezd] suits us even less. It will not give us political rights. There are no guarantees that the Moldovan Government will not brush aside our Gagauz prefect when it suits it, to install its own man. We need the certainty that in 10 or 50 years' time they will not say to us that the Gagauz are not a people, that they do not have the right to live in the land where their forefathers lie."

Despite its not being recognized by Moldova, and despite M. Gorbachev's deeply disappointing presidential decree, a Gagauz republic does exist—they convinced me of this in Komrat and Chadyr-Lunga. Yet it seemed to me that it exists mainly in some people's minds, and not in reality. Five or six people run practically all the Gagauz republic's affairs on a voluntary basis.

The feeling that the Budzhakis are living in anticipation of some miraculous, swift changes stayed with me during my assignment. "The Gagauz made their choice in the referendum. Now the center will not leave us," I heard on more than one occasion. The hope—based on God knows what—that the Union Government will protect them intoxicates many Budzhakis who are convinced that they are on a different track from "such a Moldova." They say that they have nothing against the Moldovan people—they have lived together for so many years. The acceleration of the process to "Romanianize" Moldova, which the leadership has engaged in and which the People's Front is urging forward, makes the gulf all the wider, according to the Gagauz.

The all-Union referendum held here in March, which the Moldovan legislature rejected, demonstrated that 99 percent of Gagauz resident in the republic do not contemplate their future outside of the Soviet Union. What awaits them if Moldova does not sign the Union treaty? This matter is leading to....

Where is there a way out? Moldova will never reconcile itself either to Bessarabia's dismemberment or, even less so, to a part of the Moldovans in the south finding themselves in the position of a national minority. We already know from Tskhinvali what the consequences would be. Budzhak will not be able to "leave" Moldova. It does not want to "remain" there and end up detached from the USSR, as it fears a one-nation diktat. What should be done? Use force against the recalcitrants? How will this be regarded by a world in whose civilized bosom Moldova is striving hard to be embraced?

Let us suppose that even if the Gagauz are made to submit, things will not become any easier for anyone. "This will be a suppurating wound," Gagauz deputy to the Moldovan legislature F. Angeli believes. "It is dangerous for both peoples and threatens an interethnic hostility which will grow through the ages and be handed down from generation to generation."

When you recall Karabakh there is no room for objection. Budzhak today is not the only place in the country in an impasse. The dramatic struggle of the Ossets, Meskhetians, Crimean Tatars, Germans, and Lithuanian Poles for national equality is the second stage of the crisis which has seized the country today.

The fear of remaining defenseless in the face of a threatened one-nation diktat brought the Gagauz to the referendum ballot boxes. Only in the USSR do they see guarantees for saving their people today. They want equality, no more; but no less, too. It is good fortune that blood is not being shed in Moldova's south as it is beyond the Caucasian range, and that the evil weed of revenge has not invaded Budzhak fields. There is still time to hear each other out, to come to an agreement, to make compromises.... Before sitting down yet again at the negotiating table both the Moldovan legislators and the Gagauz leaders should say to themselves firmly: We will not keep recalling our grudges and torturing ourselves with suspicions. However difficult this is, we will have to accommodate each other.

...After visiting Ivan Kurtev I was happy to see his flourishing farm: four bull calves, 25 sheep, 20 lambs, and loads of chickens. He works day and night. He is having to tackle some problems with the kolkhoz.

"What would you like, Ivan?" I asked. "Autonomy or independence from Moldova?"

"I want that there vacant plot of land," Ivan said, pointing to a spacious, garbage-strewn piece of land beyond a gully. "I would sow such-and-such a type of grass there for the sheep.... That is how I get my independence. I am sick of rallies. I want to be my own master, so no one takes anything away from me, or chases me from my land. So that people do not cry 'land thief,' that the Gagauz are third-rate citizens, and that they have fewer rights. Rights ought to be equal here. That is my policy—period."

His eldest son, Viktor, a student studying at the local university to become a professional businessman, agrees with his father:

"The majority of our guys beliveve that economics will settle everything. If we are moving toward a market economy, is it necessary to produce new state structures? There are no fanatical politicians among the students."

"We are searching for a way to save our people," says M. Marunevich, a historian and a dedicated individual who left the Academy of Sciences and moved from Kishinev to Komrat. "We are obliged to think about how to arrange matters so that Moldova's peoples live together as equals."

...May God grant that the sawed-off shotguns buried in Budzhak land will just rust away down the years.

Caucasus

Situation 'Again Tense' in South Ossetia

AU0905110791 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Georgian 1015 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] The press center of the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs has informed us that the situation is again tense in Samachablo [South Ossetia].

Ossetian bandits are robbing the Georgian population almost daily and [word indistinct] (?funds) belonging to collective farms. Units of USSR interior troops in the region are not taking the necessary measures to put a halt to this evil activity. At the same time, they are not hurrying to release the residents of villages in Samachablo whom they have illegally arrested. Yesterday, following the considerable efforts by the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs, those of Batono [polite form of address] Shakro Dzintskaladze, commander of Tskhinvali, the military released four persons: [first name indistinct] Datashvili from Tamarasheni, Zurab Mikeladze from Qornisi, and Avtandil Qorashvili and Zura Metreveli from Tbilisi. Seven Georgian citizens are still being detained, however, whereas only one Ossetian has been arrested for theft.

There is no end to the [word indistinct] action of the Ossetian extremists. If, up to now, they have been blowing up (?houses) in Georgian villages, during the last few days, they have blown up 10 [word indistinct] buildings that supply gori rayon with water for irrigation purposes.

Four Announce Candidacy for Georgian Presidency

LD0805192491 Moscow TASS in English 1742 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] Tbilisi May 8 TASS—Another four candidates announced their intention to run for the Georgian presidency here today. The elections are set for May 26.

The SAKINFORM News Agency reports that, after checking the lists of potential voters supporting them, the republican Central Election Commission registered as candidates for president's post Irakli Shengelaya, president of Svobodnoye Mnenie (Free Opinion) Association, Dzhimi Mikeladze, leader of the Georgian Independent Communist Party, Valerian Advadze, board chairman of the Georgian Union of National Accord and Revival, and Nodar Natadze, board chairman of the Georgian People's Front.

The list of candidates is headed by previously registered president of the Georgian Republic Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was recently elected by parliament to this post.

The situation is unclear with another candidate, Tamaz Kvachantiradze, editor-in-chief of the BALAVERIY magazine. After checking the lists of his sympathisers, the commission found valid less than 10,000 but more than 9,000 signatures.

Under the electoral law, the Georgian Union of Free Democrats, which nominated him, was given five days to collect the missing number of signatures.

Georgian Shooting Still Shrouded in 'Mystery'

PM0905084991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 8

[I. Andreyev report: "Into the Legislature at Night, With a Submachine Gun...."]

[Text] As announced, N. Imiadze, deputy chairman of the Adzhar Supreme Soviet, recently made an attempt on the life of a close colleague—A. Abashidze, acting chairman of the republic legislature—in Batumi. Imiadze was killed in the ensuing exchange of fire after wounding A. Abashidze and the deputy chairman of the Georgian Council of Ministers.

IZVESTIYA asked Georgian Prosecutor's Office personnel to comment on this brutal incident.

According to the prosecutor who drove out to Batumi, the attack occurred in the middle of the night in Abashidze's office, where a sitting of the republic staff for aid to the Georgian earthquake victims was being held. At roughly 0140 hours, a vehicle drew up at the republic Supreme Soviet building and Imiadze and his 25-year old daughter got out. The militiaman on duty noticed the deputy chairman openly carrying a submachine gun. The duty officer called Imiadze over, but took no action when he got no answer. Nevertheless those in session in Abashidze's office received a warning alerting them and putting them on their guard. Imiadze fired a single shot by accident, people at the Prosecutor's Office believe, while walking down the corridor. Bursting into the office he began shooting and in turn became the target of the bodyguards guarding Abashidze and the chairman of the republic KGB Directorate who had readied their weapons.

According to Georgian Prosecutor's Office personnel, there is a great deal of mystery in this. Above all, the reasons for the attempt are unclear. They do not understand why Imiadze took his daughter with him when he entered the chairman's office with gun leveled. If he intended to fire the gun he would hardly have risked placing a relative in the line of return fire or having his daughter witness a bloodbath.

His daughter is in a state of deep shock at the loss of her father and is still unable to answer questions intelligibly. The injured Abashidze claims that he had normal businesslike comradely relations with the deceased and cannot account for the attack.

An investigation team of Georgian and Adzhar Prosecutor's Office personnel is investigating the tragic incident.

Armenians Resist Arms Confiscation

LD0905155891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1400 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] As reported by a TASS correspondent, active work is continuing on the part of the forces of law and order in fulfilling the USSR president's decree on the confiscation of weapons from unlawful armed formations. Servicemen are encountering stubborn resistance during the conduct of operations.

Our Yerevan correspondent has reported that a news conference was held today by (Ashot Monocharyan), fulfilling the duties of the republic's minister of internal affairs. He stated that at the present time there are no subunits of the Soviet Army on Armenian territory apart from those based near the village of Zod in Vardenisskiy rayon. (Monocharyan) thinks that it is too early to talk about a normalization of the situation in the region.

A group of Russian legislators left Yerevan for Moscow today. They familiarized themselves with the situation in the border regions in Armenia. Last night the deputies met Levon Ter- Petrosyan, chairman of Armenia's Supreme Soviet and had a lengthy conversation with him. This was reported by the (Riya) agency.

Hostilities Suspended in Armenian Border Areas

LD0905172191 Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 9 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan May 9 TASS—Hostilities in Armenian regions bordering on Azerbaijan were suspended from 10 pm on May 8, Ashot Manucharyan, Armenia's acting interior minister, told a news conference at the republican Council of Ministers today.

"It is too early to say about the termination of combat operations in the republic," he said, due the fact that "about two thousand Soviet Army paratroopers" remain in Yerevan.

Replying to a question from TASS, Manucharyan said that the Armenian Interior Ministry maintains close contacts with the command of the Army unit deployed on Armenian territory. "Neither we nor they want any unlawful actions taken against servicemen and their families on the territory of the republic," he said.

The interim republican council for the extraordinary situation, at a regular session that was held late Wednesday night, pointed to a "trend towards the stabilisation of the overall situation in Armenia."

The presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet today circulated through ARMENPRES news agency a statement asserting that the Soviet Army "continues aggression" against this Transcaucasian republic.

Troop Concentration Reported on Armenian Borders

NC1005094791 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] On May 8 near Norashen village in Martunitskiy a group of villagers were attacked by Azerbaijanis during the corn harvest. The Azerbaijanis kidnapped tractor driver Aleksandr Poghosyan; (Vanya Markaryan); (Albert Hamamesyan); brigade head Artur Arturyan; and collective members (Karo Dartsyan) and Vanik Sarkiysan and took them to Artsakh in a [word indistinct] car.

The Stepanakert-Gadruyt-Shaumyanskiy telephone lines have been cut. The [word indistinct] is calm.

There are troop concentration around (Kasun Ismail). According to reports, they are arming the residents there. Also, there are troop concentrations in the Armenian village of (Goris) in Shaumyanskiy. The women and children from the Armenian villages of (Mudlu, Manashi), [name indistinct], and (Karachina) have been evacuated to (Gerishen and Gyulistan).

Armenian Defense Official: Situation 'Stable'

NC1005095291 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 9 May 91

[Interview with Vahan Shirkhanyan, Defense Committee chairman of the Armenian Republic Cabinet by Mesrop Saakyan; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Saakyan] We were to observe peace day for the first time in Armenia in May. We cannot talk about either a feast or about peace, however, when Martunashen and Getashen continue to be attacked, and when the achievements scored by the defenders of their (?race) and dignity and by the once peace-loving people of that area are being destroyed. Rather, the 23d Division of the Fourth Soviet Army and the courageous internal forces can mark the day of their conquest of the defenseless Armenian women, children, and elderly and of the peace-loving people [words indistinct].

I went to the Defense Committee attached to the Armenian Republic Cabinet and talked with Committee Chairman Vahan Shirkhanyan. I asked him: What has the situation been like in the Armenian border areas, in Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], and in Shaumyanskiy since yesterday evening until early today?

[Shirkhanyan] Compared to the previous days, yesterday and today have been relatively calm. The Soviet Army has withdrawn from the area near (Patvashen) and from Gorisskiy and gone to the neighboring republics. There have been no clashes. There has been no destruction. I can say that the situation is stable.

[Saakyan] What about Artsakh and Shaumyanskiy?

[Shirkhanyan] We contacted Shaumyanskiy in the morning. The situation there is normal too. The Internal Ministry soldiers and the Soviet Army have not entered Shaumyanskiy. They were deployed on the borders. There were troop concentrations in the border areas, but in general there has not been any violence there as such.

[Saakyan] I heard on Freedom Radio that telephone contact with that area has been cut and that a [word indistinct] is being created there like in Getashen.

[Shirkhanyan] We telephoned Shaumyanskiy this morning, so there was still contact.

[Saakyan] What is the situation like in Yerevan?

[Shirkhanyan] The situation in Yerevan is very calm. There are people who spread rumors and who are not aware of realities. They are enemies. The people should not worry. No, there is no danger of either troops being sent to Yerevan or of an earthquake in Yerevan. (?They allege) that the Russians are evacuating their families from here. This is a rumor they are spreading. We would like people to identify those who are spreading such rumors to the militia and to us so that we can see who they are.

[Saakyan] May we assume that, generally speaking, the Army is ending its savage aggression and that there have been talks between the Army and our government or [between the Army] and your committee?

[Shirkhanyan] There have been talks throughout these incidents and on several occasions and concerning various topics connected with the incidents and the hostages. (?We are) [word indistinct] now but we do not know what will happen later on. Perhaps their operation is actually over and they are withdrawing [words indistinct].

[Saakyan] Has the extent of our losses been determined?

[Shirkhanyan] It is being determined. The number of the hostages and the extent of the losses are being determined.

[Saakyan] Can we tell our radio listeners to breathe a sign of relief?

[Shirkhanyan] Yes. The residents in the border areas and in the city can be at ease as far as the current situation is concerned. All the political means are being used as to [words indistinct].

[Saakyan] Thank you.

Program Draws Attention to Armenian Situation

LD0905193291

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1220 GMT on 9 May carries a 16-minute interview with Dr. Vktor Leonidovich Sheynis, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputy, and Vladimir Ilich Ilushenko, research fellow of the institute of the working class movement and comparative political studies on the work of the Karabakh committee of the Russian intelligentsia, by correspondent Vladimir Poznanskiy.

Asked whether he agrees with the assessment that the central government is to blame for the events in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, Sheynis upholds the obligation of the center to protect its citizens: "The troops of the center are fighting against the local population," he says. "The center is responsible for this. In other words, there is an aggressor and there are the victims of aggression. Unfortunately, the Union authorities are acting on the side of the aggressive forces. When they speak to us about Armenian militants, one should not forget that amateur formations, albeit illegitimate ones, are opposed to the Azerbaijani militia, the special purpose militia detachment [OMON], which is effecting state terrorism against the Armenian population of Azerbaijan."

Ilushenko states: "The escalation in the countryside is so great that one must already speak about military operations, not simply about some individual clashes. Subunits of the Soviet Army and of the internal forces troops of the USSR are drawn into the conflict. The forces of the Azerbaijani OMON are taking an active part."

Ilushenko describes the situation in two Armenian villages as of 3 May, and notes that talks were taking place then between Armenian Supreme Soviet Chairman Levon Ter-Petrosyan and USSR President Gorbachev, in which Ministers Pugo and Kryuchkov also took part. He states: "At the present time, 1,420 residents of Getashen have been taken away by helicopter to Stepanakert. This is despite Pugo's statement that in this village, as well as in the village of Martunashen, there are no civilian residents; there were only militants." He adds: "At the same time, at a session of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the rumor is being circulated that the deportation from Getashen and Martunashen is allegedly being conducted at the request of the leadership of the republic of Armenia. Evacuation and deportation are different things. Evacuation is voluntary departure in connection with some kind of threat, while deportation is the expulsion by force, under the threat of the use of force or by the use of force. What is happening at the present time can only be given one name—deportation."

Ilushenko goes on to say that punitive detachments are operating in the area: "Unfortunately, the subunits of the regular army have been turned into punitive detachments who are loyal to the Azerbaijan OMON, as was officially announced by one of the high-ranking military leaders." He states: "It seems to me that an extremely dangerous process of remuneration of the Azerbaijani leadership is going on for its participation in the creation of a renewed Union."

Ilushenko questions the role of the USSR president, saying: "President Gorbachev is not in control of the actual situation, is not in control of his irregular soldiers [bashibuzuki]. He is not in control of the upper structure of the army and internal affairs personnel, who can issue illegal and inhuman commands." He claims there is an "escalation of the transition of real power to those structures that present a threat to democracy, to the peaceful life of citizens on the territory of the whole of the Soviet Union."

He concludes that the citizens of Russia should understand that the weapons fired on Armenian villages represent weapons against Russian democracy. Ilushenko calls for those who commit atrocities to be punished and for the genocide against the Armenians to be stopped.

Ilushenko says that a process of pushing the Armenian people from territories that it has populated for centuries is under way. He praises the Armenian leadership, which backs a moratorium on Karabakh joining Armenia, but he notes that this should be done on the condition that Soviet power is restored in Karabakh and that it is freed from the control of irresponsible forces in Baku and Moscow, which are whipping up tension.

Dr. Sheynis comments that the terror unleashed by the state on such a large scale will only incite the two peoples against each other and against the Soviet Army. It may lead to the creation of fundamentalist regimes in some republics in response to such actions. Such genocide leaves a long memory throughout generations. He says: "The committee of Russian intelligentsia, Karabakh, issued an appeal to the world community yesterday that ends with the following: Responsibility for the new monstrous crimes against the Armenian people lies with the state leadership of the USSR led by President Gorbachev. To retain the totalitarian empire, to keep Armenia in it, measures that have been decisively condemned by the civilized world are being carried out. We would like to remind people that according to a decision adopted by the Nuremberg Tribunal, neither those who inspire crimes nor those who carry out crimes against mankind are relieved from personal criminal liability. We express our protest against the bloody violence carried out against the Armenian population. We appeal to the world public to demand from the leadership of the USSR that its stop violent actions against the Armenian people. The world is indivisible. Today this is taking place in Armenia, tomorrow in Russia, and the day after tomorrow in Europe. It is not too late. We are able and we must stop this aggression."

Ilushenko says that the Democratic Russia Movement is planning to stage an all-Moscow demonstration and protest meeting on 18 May against the events taking place in Nagorno-Karabakh and vicinity. He calls on Muscovites to take part in the meeting.

Poznanskiy says that Sheynis and Ilushenko have expressed their views on the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, taking the side of Armenia. He notes that those who have the opposite opinion will be invited to present their views.

NKAO: Troops Seize Armenians' Weapons

LD0905123391 Moscow TASS in English 1205 GMT 9 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Stepanakert May 9 TASS—Interior Ministry troops continue seizing illegal arms in line with President Gorbachev's decree.

On Wednesday [8 May], Interior Ministry troops destroyed a missile launcher near Khndzoresk village in Gorisk district in Armenia. The launcher was used to shell bordering Azerbaijani territory.

The troops also seized a self-made artillery piece, several machine guns and ammunition.

In the past three days, troops confiscated 26 machine-guns, 3 air defence and 4 anti-hail guns, communications systems, mines, radio stations and large amounts of ammunition from Armenian militants. A total of 50 militants were detained.

Azerbaijani Border Rayons Reported 'Peaceful'

NC1005072891 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] According to information received from the rayons bordering Armenia and from the internal affairs departments in [name indistinct] and Shushinskiy Rayons, no incident was recorded on the night of 8-9 May. The situation was peaceful.

Azerbaijan Welcomes Observers To View Situation

LD0705154791 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT 7 May 91

[By AZERINFORM-TASS correspondent Natan Barskiy]

[Text] Baku May 7 TASS—In order to inform the Soviet and world public opinion about the true situation in the region, the Azerbaijanian Foreign Ministry has expressed its readiness to welcome anybody who wants to come to the republic and see the situation first hand.

The statement issued by the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry notes that "Armenian nationalist forces are escalating outright aggression against Azerbaijan, are actually waging an undeclared war against it. Military operations against the civilian population are under way not only in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, but also in 11 districts of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic."

As many as 304 armed attacks have been launched on Azerbaijan towns and villages during the four first months of this year. They claimed the lives of 61 people. From April 28 to May 3 Armenian combatants shelled or opened small arms fire on more than 30 Azerbaijan villages and two district centres—the towns of Shusha and Kazakh, killing 4 and wounding 20 people, including two children.

The Foreign Ministry says that "further hostilities against Azerbaijan will produce a catastrophe and the Armenian leadership will have to bear full responsibility for it, since it is grossly violating the norms of international law."

As earlier reported, the USSR Surpeme Soviet was unable to pass a final decision on this problem during its May 6 session in reply to the Armenian parliament's demand for an extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to settle the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which flared up anew last week. All points of the recommended draft decision were keenly debated, and finally it was decided to finalise the document and adopt it on the morning of May 7.

Speaking in parliament on May 6 Soviet Interior Minister Boris Pugo said the Interior Ministry, the KGB and the USSR Defence Ministry were taking measures to disarm illegal armed formations in keeping with the decree issued by the USSR president on July 25, 1990.

Chairman of the USSR Surpeme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov informed the Supreme Soviet that Mikhail Gorbachev, who met Armenian and Azerbaijanian leaders on May 3, had arrived at the conclusion that "the conflict could not be settled if illegal formations were not disarmed."

Azerbaijani Procurator on 'Tense' Situation

LD0705193691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1518 GMT 7 May 91

[Interview with Azerbaijan Procurator General Ismet Gaibov by correspondent Islam Kuliyev; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Kuliyev] The situation on the border with Armenia, and in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] of Azerbaijan, remains tense. There is constant shooting and attacks by Armenian militarized formations. They have become particularly frequent and, I would say, have even become more severe since the well-known events in Khanlarskiy Rayon. A direct participant in these was Ismet Gaibov procurator general of the Azerbiajan Republic.

Ismet Ismaylovich, I would like to ask what the local population of these villages of Khanlarskiy Rayon think of the passport checking procedures.

[Gaibov] During the carrying out of these checks, there was at the same time an operation to disarm Armenian guerillas—from whom was confiscated, as you know from the press, a vast amount of weapons, an Avral armored vehicle, grenade throwers, mortars, munitions, three powerful radio transmitters, and other military equipment. Forty-five people were detained.

During questioning, these people who were detained—as well as a number of witnesses and the civilian population—showed that the extremists sent in from Armenia kept the population of these two villages in such fear that they even forced people to take part in criminal actions. Therefore the cleansing of the territory of Azerbaijan—I would like to stress the whole of its territory—as well as of these gangs and formations remains our urgent task, and its fulfillment should radically alter the crime situation in the Republic.

[Kuliyev] You know that the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic has now raised the question of convening an extraordinary USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies to discuss the questions of the NKAO and other populated points of Azerbaijan.

[Gaibov] Here we simply referred to the country's Constitution. It clearly sets out that the Union republic independently implements state power on its territory. The attempt to impose on the congress the solving of questions that are within the competence of our Republic is illegal.

[Kuliyev] What is your opinion about how events could develop in this situation?

[Gaibov] We in the republic will restore order—with the help, of course, of other bodies of law and order, with the help of the Soviet Army—using the whole force of the law against the rampaging bandits and their inciters and accomplices.

In the first instance, however, it is now essential to establish immediately a five-kilometer neutral zone on the territory of Armenia, along the whole of its border with Azerbaijan, which has long been proposed by the president of our republic, Comrade Mutalibov.

Azerbaijan's Mutalibov Receives Reporters

NC1005104991 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] Azerbaijan Republic President Ayaz Mutalibov received [name indistinct], director of the DAILY TELEGRAPH office in Moscow, and [name indistinct] a REUTER correspondent, in Baku on 8 May. The journalists are visiting Azerbaijan to gather reports on the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the border region between Azerbaijan and Armenia and on the measures that Azerbaijan has taken to restore peace in the republic. For four years armed Armenians and their uncontrolled activities have been making the people afraid.

All of the journalists' questions were answered in detail during the meeting. President Mutalibov stressed that the patience of the Azerbaijani people, who have been involved in the fighting caused by the Armenian separatists, has been exhausted. The leaders of the Union are now fulfilling their constitutional obligations toward the Azerbaijani people. They are seeing to it that the Azerbaijan Republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity are safeguarded.

The journalists thanked President Mutalibov for his detailed and sincere replies and promised that they will tell the truth about Azerbaijan to the world.

Central Asia

Kazakh Citizenship Draft Law Prepared

PM0905093591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[POSTFAKTUM report: "Who Will Be Citizen of Kazakhstan"]

[Text] The POSTFAKTUM agency has been told by representatives of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist

Republic] Supreme Soviet that a draft law "on citizenship of the Kazakh SSR" has been prepared. In accordance with the draft all citizens of the Kazakh SSR are guaranteed the rights and freedoms envisaged by the Kazakh SSR Constitution and all-Union legislation and also by the norms of international law recognized by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. A citizen of the Kazakh SSR, the draft notes, is obliged to support the republic's state and economic sovereignty, to recognize its territory within its existing borders and to safeguard its integrity, and to promote the functioning of the state language in public life.

Kazakh President Publishes Book of 'Reflections'

PM0905152591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[ASIA-PRESS report from news agencies roundup: "President Nazarbayev's Book Is Being Published"]

[Text] The ASIA-PRESS news agency has offered Kazakh readers extracts from the book "No Right- and Left-Wingers" by the republic's president Nursultan Nazarbayev.

It will shortly be published by the "Molodaya Gvardiya" publishing house. It is not simply an autobiographical narration nor an interview on a specific theme, but reflections about what he has lived through, about the painful moments in life, about our common hopes and future.

New Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Appointed

LD0905094191 Tashkent Domestic Service in Uzbek
0300 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] The decree of the president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] on the appointment of Comrade Atadzhanov as deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers under the president of the Uzbek SSR and minister of labor of the Uzbek SSR:

Comrade Alikhan Rakhmatovich Atadzhanov will be appointed deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers under the president of the Uzbek SSR and minister of labor of the Uzbek SSR.

[Signed] Karimov, president of the Uzbek SSR;

Tashkent, 8 May 1991.

Tajik Court Suspends Trial of Former Obkom Boss

PM0905090791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 May 91 Union Edition p 8

[Correspondent A. Karpov article: "'Former' Leader's Case Dragged Out"]

[Text] Dushanbe—The Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Court Collegium for Criminal Cases has suspended the trial of S. Khasanov, former first secretary of Kulyab Tajik Communist Party Obkom [oblast party committee].

He was arrested in March 1989 and charged with abusing his lofty position and taking several especially large bribes over the previous four years. The USSR Prosecutor's Office investigated Khasanov's case for almost 18 months. At the end of 1989 the case was transferred to the Kyrgyz Supreme Court. However, after six months of procedural struggle, the demands made by Khasanov's lawyer were met and this judicial collegium received a plea of abatement.

In October 1990 the hearing began at the Tajik Supreme Court. Some 42 volumes of documents "describe" more than 50 criminal episodes in the former party leader's career. But shortcomings in the work of Prosecutor's Office personnel during the preliminary investigation of felonies committed by high-ranking leaders seem to have become traditional. It was established during Khasanov's trial that the investigation had failed to fully expose a whole series of episodes of the defendant's taking bribes, nor was there adequate evidence of his guilt established during the trial.

For this reason the court agreed with the demand made by Khasanov's defense that the hearing be suspended and the case remitted for additional investigation. A. Zaytsev, public prosecutor and assistant USSR general prosecutor, also acknowledged the justice of this decision.

Thus, the criminal proceedings against the "former" leader are being delayed indefinitely.